

Requisitos: Noções de Econometria e Teoria dos Jogos

Objetivos:

Apresentar em detalhe abordagens empíricas utilizadas para testar diferentes modelos em Organização Industrial. Quando necessário serão feitas apresentações sintéticas de aspectos teóricos e econométricos que sejam importantes para o entendimento dos artigos. As leituras obrigatórias estão assinaladas com (*). A grande maioria das referências está disponível no portal da CAPES. Nos demais casos serão oportunamente fornecidos

Programa e Bibliografia:

1. Abordagens Empíricas em OI

- 1.1. Evolução histórica
- 1.2. Aspectos metodológicos

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2. Identificação de Conduta em Mercados de Competição Imperfeita

2.1. - Aplicações

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2.2. Robustez e Aspectos Metodológicos

- Clay, K., Troesken, W. (2003), Further Tests of Static Oligopoly Models: Whiskey, 1882-1898, *Journal of Industrial Economics*, 51, 151-166.
- Corts, K.S. (1999), Conduct parameters and the measurement of market power, *Journal of Econometrics*, 88, 227-250 (*).
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- Kim, D.K., Knittel, C.R., (2004). Biases in Static Oligopoly Models? Evidence from the California Electricity Market. *NBER Working Paper No. 10895*.

2.3. Oligopólio e Cartel

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3. Modelos de Entrada

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