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DOGUS BEYAZTAS

The Emergence of the Turkish Nation-State in the Insertion of Ottoman Empire to the Capitalist World Economy

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Resumo

Esta tese se concentra no esforço de compreender a dinâmica da formação do Estado-nação turco no Império Otomano no século XIX, que estava incluído na economia mundial capitalista como uma economia periférica e lutava contra problemas como os movimentos nacionais separatistas, descentralização e perdas territoriais. Nesse contexto, ao focar na dinâmica centro-periferia dentro do Império Otomano, modernização militarista e reformas de cima para baixo no processo de periferização econômica, um esforço foi feito para entender tanto as razões do atraso quanto a dinâmica da formação do estado-nação nascente. Dentro das três dinâmicas sobrepostas, a transformação experimentada pelo aparato estatal, que só estava ativo na Anatólia no século XIX, devido à população fragmentada que enfrentou neste espaço geográfico e à incompatibilidade entre a acumulação de poder econômico e poder político dentro desta população tem sido o foco principal da tese. No processo de formação do estado-nação, o conflito entre o elemento muçulmano-turco que detinha o aparato burocrático e a burguesia não muçulmana foi uma dinâmica determinante. Nessa dinâmica, o Otomanismo-Islamismo-Turquismo, que a burocracia militar e civil tentou implementar de cima para baixo para evitar o colapso do Estado, foi essencialmente considerado como um processo de resolução do conflito entre a acumulação de poder político e a acumulação de poder econômico no contexto das dores do nascente Estado-nação.

Palavras-chave: Periferia, Estado-nação, espaço nacional, burocracia, geografia

Abstract

This thesis focuses on the effort to understand the dynamics of the formation of the roots of the Turkish nation-state in the 19th century in the Ottoman Empire, which was included in the capitalist world economy as a peripheral economy and was struggling with problems such as separatist national movements, decentralization, and territorial losses. In this context, by focusing on the center-periphery dynamics within the Ottoman Empire, militarist modernization and top-down reforms in the process of economic peripheralization, an effort has been made to understand both the reasons for the delay and the dynamics of the formation of the nascent nation-state. Within the three overlapping dynamics, the transformation experienced by the state apparatus, which was only active in Anatolia in the 19th century, due to the fragmented population it faced in this geographical space and the incompatibility between the accumulation of economic power and political power within this population has been the main focus of the thesis. In the process of nation-state formation, the conflict between the Muslim-Turkish element that held the bureaucratic apparatus, and the non-Muslim bourgeoisie was a determining dynamic. In this dynamic, Ottomanism-Islamism-Turkism, which the military and civil bureaucracy tried to implement from top to bottom in order to prevent the collapse of the state, was essentially considered as a process of resolving the conflict between the accumulation of political power and the accumulation of economic power in the context of the pains of the nascent nation-state.

Keywords: Periphery, nation-state, national space, bureaucracy, geography

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Introduction

The belated formation of the Turkish nation-state within the Ottoman Empire occurred in historical conditions where three overlapping dynamics overlapped. The tension between centralization and decentralization, which transformed traditional center-periphery relations within the empire in the 19th century; the centralized state construction triggered by top-down reforms resulting from the failure to adapt to the military revolution in Europe; and the divergence between the accumulation of political power and the accumulation of economic power resulting from the peripheral integration of the empire into the capitalist world system. The Ottoman Empire transformed from a peripheral economy, open to external pressures from imperialist countries, into a nation-state during the 19th century. In the first half of the century, when European manufactured goods became widespread and the empire eventually faced financial bankruptcy, the state bureaucracy had already been attempting to prevent the collapse of the empire through centralization efforts from the beginning of the century. These efforts stemmed from the need to counter the phenomenon of decentralization, which had reached a critical level by the end of the 18th century. When local leaders gained significant power in the Balkans and Anatolia, the core regions of the empire, the centralization efforts of the imperial state apparatus intensified, particularly through military reforms. The Ottoman Empire, like previous empires in the same geography, was structured around center-periphery relations. Ottoman political and economic history was shaped by the centre's capacity to reconsolidate itself against these peripheral powers. In the 19th century, when it was incorporated into the capitalist world system as a periphery, the problem of centralization against peripheral powers once again became an urgent issue.

The state bureaucracy that emerged in response to the necessity of re-centralization also played a key role in shaping the general form of the Turkish nation-state, which was being developed incrementally during the 19th century. Top-down reforms and state intervention were influential factors in an empire that was geographically shrinking and socially fragmented. The issues of territorial contraction and social fragmentation, perceived by the bureaucracy as existential threats, became intertwined with the process of peripheralization within the capitalist world economy. In this context, the non-Muslim population, benefiting from advantages gained during peripheralization, emerged as the primary holders of economic capital accumulation. Meanwhile, political, and military power remained concentrated within the Turkish-Muslim population. The effort to reconcile these two distinct regimes of power accumulation

significantly influenced the form of the emerging nation-state and shaped policies aimed at constructing a national economy.

In response to this problem, the bureaucracy sought to strategies to prevent the collapse of the empire. The chronological progression of these strategies reflected attempts to resolve the conflict between the accumulation of economic and political power. The bureaucracy's first effort to preserve the empire under external pressure was Ottomanism, proposed as a framework for a newly established order proposal. Ottomanism aimed to foster a sense of Ottoman citizenship, intending to strengthen the loyalty of the non-Muslim population to the empire. However, it failed due to various internal and external factors. Following the failure of Ottomanism, Islamism emerged as a pan-Islamist approach, seeking to prevent the empire's disintegration by uniting its Muslim populations and forming an Islamic resistance against European expansion. Both ideological frameworks, Ottomanism and Islamism, were attempts to establish a new order to avert the state's collapse but ultimately failed within their respective historical contexts. After the failure of these two ideological frameworks, Turkism began to gain prominence toward the end of the century. Turkism emerged partly in response to separatist nationalist movements, particularly among the Muslim populations of the empire. It provided the foundation for constructing a nation-state based on the Turkish-Muslim element, which dominated the empire's military and civil bureaucracy.

In all three attempts to establish a new order, the emergence of decentralization and nationalist separatist movements in the Balkans and Anatolia (areas where the state's capacity for action was relatively stronger) provoked reactions from the bureaucracy. As the gap between the political-military center and the economic-social periphery widened, the empire's vulnerability to the capitalist European states increased. The ideological frameworks of Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism implemented to address this crisis and prevent collapse reflected the gradual erosion of hopes of binding the non-Muslim bourgeoisie to the empire and the emergence of attempts to establish a new order based on a Turkish-Muslim identity. By the Turkism stage, the focus had shifted to building a national economy. However, this effort faced a new challenge: addressing the fragmented demographic structure in Anatolia, shaped by the ongoing center-periphery dynamics in the geographic core of the emerging nation-state.

These three attempts to establish a new order were deeply related to the capacity of the state apparatus to act within the scope of center-periphery relations, just as in the classical Ottoman order. This situation was not only specific to the conditions of the 19th century, but

also valid for the center-periphery relations that constituted the basic dynamics of the empire from its foundation to its end, and for the coercion-capital relations that varied from geography to geography. These traditional center-periphery relations had a decisive effect in the process of the empire becoming a peripheral economy open to external interventions by capitalist states. As in the Sassanid, Byzantine, Arab and Seljuk examples, the Ottoman state apparatus had to take shape according to the resistance of centrifugal elements (ORTAYLI, 2010: 29-30). The successes and failures of the ideological frameworks of Ottomanism-Islamism-Turkism took shape both within the dynamics of peripheralization experienced in the 19th century conditions and within the ancient center-periphery relations of the empire. Although the Ottoman state apparatus appears to have sovereignty over three continents on the map, it existed as a political and economic organization with varying degrees of effectiveness in each different geography. Within these geographical limits, the geographical extension of the transition from empire to nation-state had to be Anatolia, not because of its homogeneous character in terms of population and the absence of centrifugal forces.

The challenges in controlling the Arabian Peninsula due to its physical geography, distance, and collective autonomy; the remoteness and difficult-to-control hinterland of North Africa; the autonomous structure of population segments and mountainous topography of Balkans; the inaccessibility of the mountainous regions along the Eastern Anatolia-Iran line; and the collective violence potential of the Kizilbash Turkmens in Anatolia had restrictive effects on the action capacity of the state apparatus. Despite its proximity to the palace and central bureaucracy, Anatolia was the region where the Ottoman state apparatus faced the greatest security concerns. The specific issue in Anatolia was the Turkmen population's potential, which the state apparatus felt compelled to control, to assume a new order-building role due to their capacity for collective violence. The activities of the Ottoman state apparatus in the fields of economy and society were constrained by geographical and socio-economic dynamics. Across all regions, including Anatolia, the state apparatus maintained its presence through a center-periphery relationship that required it to adapt to the political and socio-economic activities of local power centers. In this context, the Ottoman Empire resembled the other empires in Near Eastern and Mediterranean geographies (ÜNLÜ, 2016).

The Iranian/Persian state tradition, Islamic political thought, Roman/Byzantine methods of surplus product distribution, and the Mediterranean ecosystem were long-term historical dynamics that influenced the state apparatus of the Ottoman Empire. These dynamics were transmitted through socio-economic and political relations that the state had to accept, either

during conquest or through the integration of religious and bureaucratic officials into its structure. The inherited traditions, the empire's geographical borders, and the nature of center-periphery relations shaped the transformations experienced by the imperial structure in every period. These dynamics remained relevant during the global transitions of the 16th century, when the capitalist world system began to take shape, and in the 19th century, when the Ottoman Empire became a peripheral entity within that system.

This was not only true for the Ottoman Empire. The Islamic world developed through the exchange of ideas, knowledge, and technology within the Afro-Eurasian oikoumene. A similar situation was also true for accumulation within the Mediterranean basin, in particular the Roman and Byzantine examples. In the Islamic world, the transfer of knowledge through translation and intellectual exchange had a profound effect on Islamic political thought. Islam inherited the traditions of civilizations such as the Babylonians, Egyptians, Hebrews, and Persians (HODGSON, 1999: 102-110).[1] The economic wealth of the region came from trade control, pilgrimages, and local trade. One route connected the south and the north, passing through the mountainous Hijaz and extending from Yemen to the Indian Ocean, Syria, and the Mediterranean basin lands. The other, less important, extended east and west, connecting Iraq, Iran, and the regions of Central Eurasia with Abyssinia and East Africa (HODGSON, 1999: 155-156).

In the historical trajectory of the Ottoman Empire, the long-term evolution of Islamic history both clashed with and distinguished itself from other traditions, shaping the empire's development. The fundamental principle underlying the Ottoman imperial state apparatus was rooted in a narrow interpretation of Islam, with its positioning against the Kizilbash Turkmens, who remained outside this framework, conditioning the core fears and reflexes of the Ottoman state apparatus (YALÇINKAYA, 2017). This opposition was essentially the religious-ideological expression of a broader struggle involving the Turkmen population, particularly in the context of rivalry with the Safavids, who actively incorporated Turkmen participation. Beyond the complex interplay between Turkmen asabiyya and Islam, the Byzantine state tradition and the economic accumulation of the Mediterranean trade basin were long-term factors that significantly influenced the formation of the Ottoman state apparatus (HALDON,

[1] Societies in Oikoumene witnessed the expansion of urban administration, the emergence of regional kingdoms, and even the rise of major empires. The term "Oikoumene" refers to the historically developed complex of regions and peoples spanning the Afro-Eurasian landmass, marking the geographical setting of most historical life before the Modern Technical Age.

1993; BRAUDEL, 1972). These enduring dynamics, which profoundly shaped the coercion-capital relations underpinning political sovereignty and socio-economic structures in the Ottoman Empire, were shaped by the historical and geographical contexts of the Mediterranean, Mesopotamia, Iran, Anatolia, and the Balkans.

The economic character of the state varied across Egypt, Mesopotamia, Anatolia, and the Balkans. Following Ottoman military conquests, local socio-economic relations in the conquered regions often had to adapt. Even in Anatolia and the Balkans, the two core geographies where the imperial state apparatus was most effective, there were periods when the state's influence was limited. State-economy and coercion-capital relations were more pronounced in Anatolia and the Balkans, where the Ottoman state apparatus exercised relatively intense control and organizational capacity, compared to other regions where the state's dominance was nominal or superficial. However, significant differences also existed between these two core regions. The Balkans differed from Anatolia in the presence of powerful families and the continuity of influence exerted by aristocratic-like elites.

The importance of these two core geographies in terms of military organization is that they are regions where the land distribution system directly dependent on military supply is in effect (INALCIK, 2009). The same geographies were the regions most affected by the dynamics of the formation and spread of the capitalist system and the military revolution experienced in Europe starting from the 16th and 17th centuries in the Ottoman Empire. These regions are both the places where the empire gradually declined and the areas where the state's mobility was relatively greater compared to other regions. In addition, they are the places where the phenomenon of decentralization, which began with the gradual decline of the empire in the 17th century and reached its peak in the 18th century, was most evident. By the end of the 18th century, these local elites in Anatolia and the Balkans became de facto dominant at the local level. The centralization-oriented reforms implemented by the state bureaucracy in the 19th century were a reaction to this process. When the empire became a peripheral region producing raw materials for European markets in the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire was not only suffering from the pains of peripheralization. It was also experiencing the consequences of the decentralization process of the 18th century when it was forced to implement centralization measures in Anatolia and the Balkans. In the eyes of the state bureaucracy, this process was perceived as a problem that would threaten the existence of the state when considered together with the losses on the battlefields (İNAN, 1983: 23).

This decentralization process was a product of the gradual decline of the Ottoman Empire, once an unstoppable war machine. The Ottoman state apparatus was initially unable to respond effectively to the military revolution in Europe and later to the rise of the capitalist world economy in the 18th and 19th centuries, respectively. Although the traditional practice of confiscation, which aimed to systematically prevent the accumulation of capital and the formation of local centers of power, continued, it lost its former effectiveness during the process of decentralization. In this decentralized state, the state apparatus was unable to create a state-centered resistance to the military revolution and the effects of the capitalist world economy. Although it was not fully colonized, it could not prevent its vulnerability to external pressures from the capitalist European states in the 19th century. Traditionally, the state's intervention against the accumulation of economic power, and therefore political power, which was the result of the state's desire to prevent the formation of a new founding power from below, was the reason why an economic and social segment on which to rely in Anatolia was not formed in the 19th century. This situation was the main political factor that prevented the emergence of a national economy and a national bourgeoisie, which the state would try to create with top-down interventions only when the empire was collapsing.

In this process of decentralization, which signified the erosion of traditional state-economy relations, the anti-mercantilist policies of the classical period weakened. These policies were based on restricting exports, securing public consumption through the liberalization of imports, and preventing potential rebellions (GENÇ, 2014). Anatolia and the Balkans were the regions where the state remained particularly vigilant against capital accumulation that could create alternative political power. In other regions, the state’s capacity to intervene in the economic sphere was limited during the classical period. By the 18th century, as the classical period waned, even Anatolia and the Balkans began to experience this reduced state capacity. Although local leaders in these regions gained de facto dominance due to the state's inability to collect taxes effectively, they could not achieve official recognition from the state. This was because, despite their growing influence, they lacked the military strength to challenge the central army, preventing their de facto power from evolving into formal legal or political authority.

When the Ottoman war economy was defeated by the European military revolution, the state's mobility weakened. Therefore, the top-down reforms of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were primarily military. The military-civilian bureaucracy and local warriors, who managed to survive on the spoils economy, entered into more conflicts to seize the agricultural

surplus after the end of growth through war. In this process, the Ottoman socio-economic system became more dependent on the surplus product obtained from agricultural production. The involvement of the military and civil bureaucracy in the distribution of surplus product, which became more evident in the 18th century, further complicated the problems arising from the distribution of surplus production in Anatolia and the Balkans. For this reason, the palace bureaucracy wanted to get out of the existing problem by selling the authority to collect taxes to local leaders from the very beginning, and the state apparatus had to face its own capacity problem. The problem of distributing surplus products in Anatolia and the Balkans led to a dynamic struggle between local centrifugal elements and the central government. When the possibility of profiting from the war in the core regions of the state apparatus, namely Anatolia and the Balkans, was eliminated, the state apparatus was forced to try to indirectly control local actors and share the tax collection authority through various bureaucratic practices.

As İnalcık stated (2004: 85-87), the Ottoman palace and bureaucracy-maintained control over the social and economic sphere and positioned themselves at the center of the economic distribution mechanism, a defining feature of patrimonial relations in the 16th and the 17th century. The empire's economy and finances were geared toward controlling agricultural production and meeting the needs of urban populations. The primary concern of the state was to ensure the supply of necessities to cities, driven by a fear of rebellion. This approach sharply contrasted with mercantilism, which sought to achieve a foreign trade surplus by maximizing the inflow of gold and silver while minimizing outflows like Genç emphasized. Mercantilism aimed to maintain a consistently positive balance between export revenues and import expenses. In this context, the sultan often prohibited the export of raw materials such as grain, cotton, raw wool, and leather.

While Halil İnalcık (2003) argued that Ottoman interventionism, marked by support for imports and restrictions on exports, stemmed from a paternalistic desire to care for the people, ensure their welfare, and improve social life, the deeper motivation was the state's need to control production, capital accumulation, distribution, and security. In line with İnalcık's perspective, Mehmet Genç (2014: 39-42) asserted that the core framework of Ottoman economic policy, from the classical period to the 19th century, was based on the principles of provisionism, traditionalism, and fiscalism. The principle of provisionism sought to meet the needs of subjects through interventionist policies, such as limiting exports, encouraging imports, and sustaining production. Fiscalism aimed to maximize treasury revenues while preserving traditional production relations. Mercantilism, however, did not take root in the

Ottoman Empire because the state's economic practices were shaped by the priorities of the central bureaucracy. These practices persisted, albeit with diminished influence and scale, during 18th century when the central government weakened. This persistence phenomenon was largely due to the lack of influence or authority of producers and merchants at the administrative level (PAMUK, 1999: 140-143). Despite reduced state interventionism in these centuries, a strong capital accumulation out of the control of the state did not emerge. Even as the state decentralized and shared tax collection authority with local powers, these local actors could not achieve independent status.

In the 19th century, as the Ottoman state apparatus regained political sovereignty, it implemented reforms in the military and civil bureaucracy to counter the peripheralization and declining power of the central administration. These reforms were framed as separate political projects aimed at consolidating the empire. Three ideologies, Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism, emerged within the bureaucratic cadres leading these top-down reforms, all seeking to centralize power, unify fragmented societal segments, and reduce the influence of non-Muslim merchants and local elites who had gained power during peripheralization. While differing in content, their ideological frameworks shared the same ultimate goal: preventing the disintegration of the empire. However, geographical contraction and societal fragmentation complicated the implementation of measures such as re-centralization, industrialization, and army modernization. The state's uneven capacity to act across its diverse territories meant that Anatolia and the Balkans became the primary regions where these centralization reforms and new national ideas were focused. The disintegration of the Balkans through separatist nationalism, coupled with the transition from Ottomanism to Islamism and Turkism, marked Anatolia as the final geographical phase of the empire's transformation into a nation-state.

In this context, a significant challenge arose: the capitalist bourgeoisie was predominantly non-Muslim, while the military-civilian bureaucracy was Turkish-Muslim. This created a fundamental obstacle to nation-building. The state addressed this by initiating a process to transfer economic dominance from non-Muslims to Turkish-Muslims. In Anatolia, the fragmented society and the misalignment between economic and political power accumulation became the central issue for the emerging nation-state. This transformation was characterized by the overlap of top-down reforms and forced wealth transfers, shaping the new nation-state's sociological foundation. These dynamics gave the nation-state its defining features, blending imposed modernization with grassroots shifts in economic power.

1. State, Coercion and Capital Relations in Ottoman Empire: Divergence From Capitalist World Economy

In the early modern period (1500-1800), the Ottoman Empire, unlike its European counterparts, experienced a different transformation process within a complex network of relations involving international trade, finance, and state power dynamics. In Western Europe, the development of the commercial bourgeoisie and the absolutist state overlapped in the 16th and 17th centuries. Over the centuries, the political economy of the state differed radically between European state formation and the Ottoman Empire. The mercantilist approach that marked the period in Western Europe was an expression of a process in which feudal relations of production were eroded or transformed. This process represented a historical shift in which the old nobility actively transformed into the bourgeoisie. The absolutist state acted to safeguard the increasingly vulnerable nobility, aligning with the process of consolidating feudal property within the centralizing structure of the monarchy. As commodity relations grew, economic power shifted to the monarchy, weakening medieval vassalage, and strengthening noble property. Absolutism supported noble rule over peasants but faced transformative dynamics from the bourgeoisie (ANDERSON, 1974: 18-20).[2] Although the absolutist states weakened the autonomy of the feudal vassals, they were forced to accept conditions that strengthened the large landholdings under the control of the nobles because of the alliances they needed. "Until the 18th century, sovereignty was dependent on the will of the king and then on the assembly of nobles, but later it was transferred to the assembly, where the principle of power was based on the people and collective governance was demonstrated" (TOCQUEVILLE, 2004: 106).[3]

[2] This process helped stabilize the social order and integrate the nobility into the framework of the absolutist state, while also securing the central authority of the monarchy. The Absolutist bureaucracy served as both a catalyst and a hindrance to mercantile capital. It raised revenue through office sales from the nobility and bourgeoisie while heavily taxing the poor. This transition from labour dues to monetary rents was accompanied by royal taxes for war, contributing to peasant uprisings in the late Middle Ages (ANDERSON, 1974: 32-33).

[3] The position of Europe on the world scale before the 19th century is debatable. Although it is not the direct focus of the present thesis, the Ottoman Empire, which was located between Asia and Europe, was affected by the hegemony change that was transforming in certain rhythms in the early modern world until at least the 19th century. "If any regions were predominant in the world economy before 1800, they were in Asia. If any economy had a "central" position and role in the world economy and its possible hierarchy of "centers," it was China" (FRANK, 1998: 29). The European dominance that crystallized in the 19th century was certainly not due to the miraculous internal characteristics of Europe as a production center inherently developed that was clearly ahead of China in the previous century, but rather to certain advantages such as the advantages provided by both colonial geographies and energy resources (POMERANZ, 2000).

“When the emergence of a European world economy based on the capitalist mode of production emerged in the sixteenth century, the prevailing ideology was statism, not free enterprise, or individualism” (WALLERSTEIN, 1974: 67). Although economic decisions were oriented towards the European world economy, their implementation occurred within the context of states, shaped by systemic relations. In this period, with the development of absolutism, a state system and what can be defined as 'Europe' in the modern sense began to form for the first time. The wealth that came from the Americas, in the form of precious metals, played a key role in the formation of these structures. The discoveries that made it possible to reach this wealth were shaped by an internal political logic centered on the state, with the aim of gaining economic and political benefits. The primary connecting factor was the superiority of European sea power, which both drove these explorations and enabled commercial capitalism to spread on a large scale to many parts of the world (GIDDENS, 1985: 84-91).

The dynamic that an absolute state similar to that in the West emerged in the Ottoman Empire was only possible extremely late, during the reign of Mahmud II, after the abolition of the Janissary Corps in 1826 (FAROQHI, 2016: 32). In the Ottoman context, neither the absolutist state nor the formation of the capitalist state developed in the same manner as in Europe. Until the 19th century, practices aimed at preventing capital accumulation and limiting raw material exports continued to some extent, as long as the state's capacity allowed. Although not entirely successful, the focused effort to control capital accumulation remained at the center of the state's political economy and persisted as both a guiding motivation and a governing strategy, even if it did not materialize exactly as intended. While the Ottoman state controlled both the urban economy and granted peasants the right to own land, it retained its interventionist character, even though its transformative capacity had significantly diminished. By granting peasants this status, the state sought to weaken the influence of local leaders and prevent uncontrolled production and market sales, as long as the state's capacity allowed. The state continued its political-economic approach from the classical period but faced practical challenges under conditions of decentralization (KARPAT, 2014: 19-25).

The main social basis that made this strategy applicable to the state was the relationship the state established with the independent small peasantry that was not subject to exploitation by the large landowners. The independent peasantry was of vital importance since classical times for the security of the sultan and the palace bureaucracy against local leaders. The formation of an army under the command of a local leader or the enrichment of these local leaders through serfdom was undesirable for the peasantry. The potential accumulation of

material power that could emerge from the relations between producers, independent peasants, and merchants, which could then transform into a possible political founding power, was prevented by state interventions. These measures kept the merchant class under control by restricting capital accumulation (KARPAT, 2014: 29-30). The Ottoman bureaucracy maintained its position by confiscating the surplus product produced by the peasants. The basis of the state's intervention in the economic field was to prevent local forces that could disrupt this mechanism. Even in 17th and 18th century, local powers that were given the authority to collect taxes could not completely escape the control of the bureaucratic structure and could not gain legal recognition. Their lack of a military organization played a key role in this weakness of the centrifugal forces. Until the early 19th century, there was no capital accumulation outside the control of the state, and it only became possible as a result of the peripheralization experienced during that century and the erosion of political independence due to external threats (KEYDER, 2014: 19-29).

In this context, it is crucial to understand why, under historical conditions where central power weakened from the early 17th century onwards, a development similar to the European example, characterized by the superstructural and political transformations accompanying the emergence of the bourgeois class and capital accumulation, did not take place. Furthermore, it is of historical significance to examine why the state-capital relationship in the Ottoman Empire did not follow a similar trajectory, but instead evolved in a distinctly different manner. In the 17th and 18th centuries, as the central bureaucracy weakened, local military-civilian bureaucratic groups with land use rights became more prominent, and the practice of almost eliminating the possibility of accumulating capital through inheritance continued at another level (KÖYMEN, 2014: 82). Although the state apparatus lost its former effectiveness in intervening in the economic sphere, it was able to maintain its influence by delegating some powers and practices to local authorities. Although an economic accumulation ground was formed outside the sphere of influence of the state, the local powers that had the opportunity to hold this economic accumulation were not able to transform this economic power into a military-political power that could change the Ottoman order. “The question of "why did capitalist production relations did not develop in the Ottoman Empire as they did in Europe, and why could it not industrialize?" should essentially be replaced by the question of "why could capital accumulation in the Ottoman Empire not be transformed into industrial capital?" (KÖYMEN, 2014: 83).

The relationship between the state and capital was not based solely on the threat of force. The Ottoman palace and bureaucratic structure "prioritized politics in the narrow sense," keeping local powers capable of capital accumulation under control by granting privileges, military ranks, and similar rewards. The state succeeded in preserving small independent peasants during the 18th and 19th centuries, even at its weakest. Although local powers that could threaten small peasants remained strong, particularly until the first quarter of the 19th century, the state integrated these powers into the military organization and brought their activities under control during this period. Land rent, maintaining a limited monetary economy, and measures against inheritance rights and property transfer were employed to prevent capital accumulation outside the state's sphere of influence (BORAN, 2016: 69–72). However, these efforts unfolded amidst a tight power struggle that varied geographically. The state retained ultimate ownership of the land, controlled the production and distribution centers, and had the authority to intervene in prices. Nevertheless, the Ottoman Empire faced significant challenges in maintaining economic control, even in Anatolia, where its relative effectiveness is high, especially in Eastern Anatolia, due to the region's mountainous geography and the autonomous structure of Kurdish tribes (KÖYMEN, 2014: 74–75).

The idea that the Ottoman Empire dominated the entire geography depicted on maps and exercised absolute control over social and economic issues is largely fictional (FAROQHI, 2016: 32-33). In the Ottoman Empire, state intervention in social and economic spheres showed geographically diverse characters. Although the Ottoman Empire was more interventionist than other Islamic states and could easily organize guilds, it had difficulty controlling merchants due to their geographical mobility. Considering the state's capacity for action, it is not correct to describe price interventions in market as applied in the same way in all geographies, as strict, comprehensive, or highly effective (PAMUK, 1999: 136–137). In this context, although capital accumulation found the opportunity for accumulation in certain periods and regions where state control was limited, mechanisms that would prevent the emergence of a distinct merchant or industrial capitalist class with the capacity to influence the state remained in place, especially in the core regions of Anatolia and the Balkans. Through systematic confiscation policies, the state seized the goods and wealth of local power groups and groups that were believed to be able to transform capital accumulation into political power.

The Ottoman Empire's incorporation into the global economy was marked by the linking of production in some central regions to world markets, expanding from coastal areas into the interior in Western Anatolia and Balkans. Initially, Ottoman markets were shaped by the

interventionist policies of the central state apparatus. However, as the control capacity of the central power diminished significantly in the 18th century, mechanisms of political control over the economy weakened, allowing the empire's integration into the capitalist world economy to accelerate. By the 19th century, this process had become an inevitable and prominent phenomenon, facilitated by the loss of central dominance. The longstanding policy of restricting raw material exports had lost its effectiveness, and raw material production for European markets became a vital element of the Ottoman economy (KASABA, 1988: 6–12). This parallel evolution of political dynamics and economic developments diminished the viability of the old classical bureaucracy. While this development signified the disintegration of the classical state structure and the weakening of central authority, it also heralded the rise of a new bureaucracy. The emergence of this modern bureaucratic structure was necessitated by the state's modernization efforts, which could no longer be supported by traditional systems. Over the past two centuries, as the old state system eroded, centralization efforts became more pronounced. Consequently, the influence of local powers diminished, and the authority of the political center was partially reconsolidated. Under these conditions, a power struggle took place between the local leaders who had not been able to translate their economic power into political power and the bureaucracy, which had lost its former central control (WALLERSTEIN, DECDELI, KASABA, 1983).

Contrary to expectations, the process of integration into the capitalist world system intersected with dynamics that strengthened the Ottoman central bureaucracy against local elites (İSLAMOĞLU and PERDEU, 2021: 119–121). Although it may seem paradoxical at first, this power struggle, which was effective at the beginning of the insertion process into the capitalist world system in 19th century that opened up space for local large landownership and local powerful leaders, resulted in a new bureaucratic structure that consolidated its existence through centralization reforms in the process, due to the failure of local notables to articulate their economic power into military-political power. This outcome was driven by the Ottoman bureaucracy's efforts to delay the disintegration and partition of the Ottoman Empire amidst the struggles between capitalist states and to prevent any single state from gaining a strategic advantage. Another contributing factor was the use of socio-economic tools by the central bureaucracy to maintain control over local leaders, both militarily and in preserving the independent character of small villages (BARKEY, 1996; KEYDER, 2014). With the collapse of mechanisms that had legitimized the old state power and the development of the centralization and operational capacity of the new bureaucratic state, a new state class emerged

that demonstrated an increased ability to align its own interests with those of other social classes in society, compared to the old bureaucracy (İSLAMOĞLU, 1991: 41–42). The reaction that arose within the Turkish-Muslim community against the non-Muslim merchants who gained strength during the insertion process of the capitalist world economy has been the basic dynamic of this overlap since the second half of the 19th century. Although, in the early stages of this process, the central bureaucracy faced the risk of losing its dominance over other social segments due to its alliance with foreign merchants or their minority representatives, the enduring relationship between the two main classes of the old system, the bureaucracy and the small peasantry, played a crucial role in consolidating the power of the central government on the other hand (İSLAMOĞLU, 1991; PAMUK, 2007; KEYDER, 2014).

"The answers to the questions of why capitalist production relations did not develop in the Ottoman Empire and why industrialization failed are as follows: 1) The despotic monarchy did not allow capital accumulation, 2) The state's interest in the economy was insufficient, and 3) The state did not implement policies to encourage industrialization" (KÖYMEN, 2014: 72). According to the definition that shaped Ottoman historiography, inspired by İnalcık, the Ottoman Empire in the classical period (until 17th century) was a centralized, patrimonial, and bureaucratic state. Families with feudal rights were kept under control through the timar (land) system, which formed the basis of the army and state structure during this period when the monetary economy was limited (2009: 217–219). This widely accepted explanation, referencing Halil İnalcık, has evolved into a secondary discussion on the scope and intensity of economic interventionism to better understand the historical conditions under which the weakening of the central state became evident, particularly on the battlefield. According to the consensus that emerged from this discussion, the Ottoman state apparatus's claim of full control during the classical period was replaced by selective interventionism as the central state weakened, from the late 17th century until its collapse (QUATAERT, 2005). Although this interpretation aligns with historical realities regarding the decreasing capacity of the state to control centrifugal forces, another perspective highlights that these centrifugal forces lacked sufficient levels of organization. While the central structure of the Ottoman Empire had weakened to the point of losing the initiative by the 18th century, landowners, producers, and merchants were not organized and strong enough to put pressure on the state in their own interests (PAMUK, 1999: 134–135).

As Pamuk (1990: 22-23) claims, the characteristics of the state apparatus, especially its intervention in the social and economic spheres, have been constantly changing since the

beginning. Until the last quarter of the 15th century, there was a conflict with the feudal rights represented by the local aristocracy within the state apparatus. From the last quarter of the 15th century to the end of the 16th century, the interventionist character of the state gradually increased and reached its peak. From the end of the 16th century to the last quarter of the 18th century, the influence and control of the central state remained limited (PAMUK, 2011: 37-39). In the 19th century, the state regained the central power it had lost in the 18th century, as will be explained in detail below, and the modern bureaucracy began to gain the ability to act to a certain extent, albeit limited. Thus, the central state, whose sovereignty had weakened in the 18th century, relatively increased the power of the empire once again in the 19th century. Small village producers were once again made dependent on the palace and bureaucracy and became stronger against local leaders and farms (KEYDER, 1988).

In addition, the existence of a military organization that could secure the independence of the state still preserved its capacity for renewal and sustainability through military reforms, despite the rise of centrifugal forces. Another important dynamic, as will be explained in detail below, is that the Ottoman state apparatus, which was exposed to external pressure due to the struggles between the great powers, also took advantage of the opportunities created by these struggles by forming alliances. “Although merchants and large landowners gained advantages from the new relations established with European capitalists in the process of inclusion in the world economy in the 19th century, the dynamics of bargaining, pressure and compromise between the European states and the central bureaucracy shaped the process of inclusion of the Ottoman Empire" (KORALTÜRK, 2003: 69). The army, which still maintained its existence to a certain extent not only against internal centrifugal forces but also against external pressure, was an important element in this process. The central power had managed to resist the decentralizing effects of centrifugal forces by making some concessions with the 1808 alliance accord at the beginning of the century. It later strengthened its central power by receiving foreign aid in a geopolitical context, but the background of this centralization process dates back to the turning point of 1808 (KEYDER, 2014).

In the 19th century, when the effects of the Industrial Revolution began to be seen on a global scale, the characteristics that distinguished the Ottoman example from others were as follows: The central state and bureaucracy had partially secured its power over other social classes through recentralization reforms. Although political independence was eroded, it was never completely lost. By ensuring the preservation of an independent peasantry in agriculture, their protection against exploitation by large landowners could be ensured (PAMUK, 2007:

194). The newly modernized bureaucracy, which emerged under the conditions of the 19th century and was shaped by its own unique characteristics, viewed the acceptance of the Ottomans into the interstate system as a means of guaranteeing the survival of the state. At the same time, the new bureaucracy facilitated the formation of a new state organization and was the catalyst for the creation of the conditions that led to the original form of the settlement process (KASABA, 1988).

The effectiveness of the modern bureaucracy in this centralization process led to the defense of a separate set of policies by the traditional sections of the state and the reformers. This situation resulted in an ongoing struggle between the bureaucracy that supported old-style protectionist policies and the modern wing of the bureaucracy. This struggle was not only about which wing would control the state apparatus, but also about how the raw material needs of the Ottoman state would be met, how the needs of local small producers would be addressed, and how relations with local powers would be organized. These were political choices, and the context in which they would be contradictory, and conflicting was shaped by the struggles between these wings (QUATAERT, 2020). Although the modern bureaucracy consolidated its power in the direction of centralization during this process, it did not have sufficient capacity compared to its peers. In the industrialized countries of the 19th century, high profit rates in industry were generally secured by state policies, the domestic market was protected against competition from other countries, and cheap labor and raw materials were provided with the help of state policies. However, none of these conditions were present in the Ottoman state apparatus, which was trying to centralize amidst these conflicts and contradictions (KÖYMEN, 2014).

The history of the Ottoman Empire has been shaped by the dynamics of the formation and expansion of the capitalist world system. Especially during the 19th century, it caused an irreversible rupture that would significantly change the classical center-periphery relations of the Empire. The central problem for the Ottoman authority was how to maintain its sovereignty in its core territories, Balkans, and Anatolia, while navigating its relationships with various peripheral regions, each experiencing different rates and forms of transformation during the insertion into the capitalist system. After the end of the conquest economy, which was based on military expansion and external booty, the Ottoman state shifted its focus to an economy driven by agricultural surplus, moving from an externally driven economy to one centered on domestic production. Over the 17th and 18th centuries, the Ottoman Empire lost its former dominance, both on the battlefield and in terms of technological and economic developments. By the 19th

century, the Empire underwent significant transformation, influenced by both internal center-periphery dynamics and its insertion into the expanding capitalist world system dominated by European powers.

As will be explained in more detail below, the erosion of Ottoman sovereignty in central geographies such as Anatolia and the Balkans, the significant economic power gained by non-Muslims in the process of insertion into the capitalist world economy, and the accumulation of political power by the Turkish-Muslim element played an important role in the belated formation of the Turkish nation-state from empire to nation-state. In this process, the reforms of the bureaucratic apparatus and the militarist modernization efforts were the main levers of the nation-state. The period from the financial bankruptcy of the empire to its final collapse was the era of urgent reforms and reactionary state policies aimed at preserving the state, and this reactionary character dominated the focus of population engineering, the final element of the nation-state formation process.

1.1. State-Capital Relations in Capitalist World Economy

The European-centered world economy emerged in a hierarchy consisting of a central capitalist core, intermediate regions with less powerful capitalisms, and peripheral regions with weak capitalist relations. The dominant cores changed over time, with Venice, Antwerp, Genoa, Amsterdam, London, and New York taking the lead from the 14th to the 20th centuries (BRAUDEL,1987: 53-54).[4] According to Braudel, the European continent turned into a single economic region in terms of trade networks and capital investments, at least from the 15th

[4] In Mediterranean Europe between 1300 and 1600, "the development of the military-commercial complex led to the bureaucratization of military administration and effective tax collection to support permanent armed forces (MCNEILL, 1982: 120-124). In the 14th century, Europe underwent significant socio-economic and military transformations. It transitioned from a predominantly rural society into a market-driven one, marked by the rise of knights as defenders and distinctions between commoners. Merchants were initially seen as disruptive. The Black Death and environmental challenges created difficulties, but advancements in naval technology, the development of a Europe-wide market facilitated by bills of exchange, and the rise of mercenary armies transformed the continent. Geographically separated bodies of water became connected, fostering economic growth and mining developments. Italian merchants played a pivotal role in the commercial economy and lending, while professional mercenaries, condottieri, changed the way wars were fought, leading to a more complex relationship between armed forces and employers (MCNEILL, 1982: 72-77).

century. Additionally, trade and capital investments intensified under the domination of the Genoese and Venetian cities since the end of the 13th century (1992: 120-123).

Developments in mechanization and the expanding Atlantic economy in the 16th century led to the formation of important international fairs.[5] Precious metals and fast transactions supported these fairs, and despite a lull in the 17th century, Atlantic trade gained momentum with the rise of Amsterdam (BRAUDEL, 1979: 25-26). After the United Provinces, consecutively England and the USA held the pioneering roles, created core and peripheral regions within the framework of new world economy arrangements according to the distribution of labour roles in the world economy (BRAUDEL, 1979: 82).

In the capitalist world system, market movements are unequal exchange transactions that transcend state boundaries. Core countries imposed low wages and specialization in low-level jobs on the surrounding state structures in periphery (WALLERSTEIN, 2007: 29-30).[6] The capitalist world economy requires a certain state system and reproduces its existence based on it. It constitutes an interstate system that covers distinct cultural areas, does not have a single political structure, and tends to expand to operate on a global scale. This capitalist system tries to ensure endless capital accumulation through institutional mechanisms that strengthen adherence to this principle (WALLERSTEIN, 1992: 107-108). The rise and fall of hegemonies in the capitalist world economy indicate the end and birth of a historical process. The establishment of a new order in historical conditions where the capitalist accumulation regime is blocked necessarily coincides with a conflict process involving inter-state competition and an accumulation regime that regains momentum within the continuities it triggers. For example, it is stated that US hegemony increased after 1873, when British hegemony ended (WALLERSTEIN, 1992: 3-6).

[5] International trade became a fundamental element in the mercantilist era. The trade volume between Western Europe and the New World, Asia and Africa increased. The center created a trade dynamic by importing spices, sugar, and silk from the periphery. It was essential to Eastern trade, with the exception of precious metals from America. Precious metals coming from America became indispensable for European economies (AMIN, 1976: 155-156).

[6] World-systems analysis emerged in the 1970s as a response to the decline of global economic expansion and the end of U.S. hegemony after World War II. It aimed to understand the world's functioning and was both a product of and a protest against the prevailing knowledge structures. The world-system also has a political dimension characterized by fluctuating geopolitics, including periods of hegemony by strong states (LEE, 2011: 27-31).

According to Braudel's approach, in periods when increasing profit returns reach the limit, a shift occurs from the field of production to financial instruments. In this process, which represents each cycle of systemic accumulation, capitalism tends to coincide with stronger states (ARRIGHI, 2001). The development of capitalism occurred simultaneously in places-space (state formation) and flow-space (capital accumulation). This dual development gave rise to two genealogies of modern capitalism: one focused on hegemonies, the other on cycles of accumulation (ARRIGHI, 2010: 85). In this context, political logic, and economic logic overlap, and distinguishing one from the other is only possible at the analytical level. By the 16th century, states had become dominant economic actors, strengthening merchant capital, and replacing the complex authority structures of the middle ages. A capitalist class emerged that lent money to state administrators in times of war and a new political consolidation was seen within the old administrative structures (SASSEN, 2008: 77-78).

"The capitalist world economy is distinct in that it was the first system to enable the continued development and systemic expansion of capitalism on a global scale. In contrast, previous world systems collapsed due to their vulnerability to the simultaneous existence of competing world empires. The failure of earlier global economic systems can be attributed to the inherent weaknesses in their organizational structures, which could not withstand the competition and interactions between coexisting empires (WALLERSTEIN, 1992: 110-111). Unlike these previous systems, which were based on various tribute arrangements with their own cultural and ideological elements, the modern capitalist world system was unique in its ability to integrate these diverse elements into a single, coherent global economy (AMIN, 1991: 363-365). Before the rise of the modern capitalist system, a unified world system could not be defined due to the fragmented structures caused by competing imperial powers."

The dominant system based on capitalist production since the 16th century European world economy[7] was built on two basic components: the global division of labour and the presence of bureaucratic state structures in certain regions, as core, semi-periphery, and periphery (WALLERSTEIN, 1974: 63-66).[8] These core-periphery dynamics, which began to be

[7] Braudel criticizes Wallerstein for seeing the European world economy as a single world economy and states that world economies have existed since ancient times (BRAUDEL, 1979: 83).

[8] At the end of the 16th century, the European world economy covered not only northwestern Europe and the Christian Mediterranean (including Iberia), but also Central Europe and the Baltic region. It also included certain parts of the Americas: New Spain, Antilles, Peru, Chile,

systematized in Europe at the end of the 15th century, expanded to cover the whole world as a system by the end of the 19th century (WALLERSTEIN, 2007: 15-18).[9]

> "Modern capitalist world-system, as a system, has sought to accumulate capital in a larger area than a political entity can fully control, with the freedom to manoeuvre with multiple options. The relations of production and distribution corresponding to different forms of political domination were accompanied by an unequal distribution of privileges and rewards, and this inequality was the engine of the regime of capital accumulation. This unequal dynamic is what allows the economic expansion of the world system to continue" (WALLERSTEIN, 1974: 348).

In the expansion of the capitalist world system, states have played an important role in ensuring maximum capital accumulation. In this context, the modern state has been a political organization that has been continuously shaped by the dominant capital accumulation regime (WALLERSTEIN, 2007: 49-50). As Wallerstein states, "The modern state did not create capitalism, it inherited it. Capitalism achieves full victory only when it is identified with the state." In the beginning, money elites held power in the city-states of Italy - Venice, Genoa, and Florence. In the 17th century, the Netherlands was ruled by businessmen, merchants, and financiers (BRAUDEL, 1987: 43-44). At the core of these developments was the fact that state policies were aligned with the interests of economic elites. This situation made possible the consolidation of capitalism as a dominant system. The rise of mercantilism as a framework for states to strengthen their economies and gain hegemonic positions in the capitalist world economy was a product of this process. Mercantilism emerged as the dominant state policy characterized by economic nationalism and a focus on bullion flows and trade balances. During this period, the Netherlands established itself as a hegemonic power in the capitalist world economy by using its productive efficiency, commercial power, and financial superiority (WALLERSTEIN, 2011: 38-40). Britain then surpassed its predecessors to become a global

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Brazil, the Atlantic islands, and perhaps a few settlements on the African coast, but not Russia and the Ottoman Empire (WALLERSTEIN, 1974: 68).

[9] Between 1500 and 1750 the European economy changed. In the Middle Ages, the production and trade center of Europe was the Mediterranean basin. First, in the 18th century, the center of gravity of the economy shifted to the North and the Mediterranean economies entered a period of serious decline. The center of textile production in the 16th and 17th centuries led to a shift from the Mediterranean to the North Sea for the purpose of greater market integration. Intercontinental trade expanded in the 17th and 18th centuries (ALLEN, 2009: 16).

trade and financial center on a much larger scale. Beyond Venice or the Netherlands, which emphasized long-distance trade and high finance, Britain consolidated its position through the implementation of protectionist economic policies based on more concentrated state power (ARRIGHI, 2010: 181).

By aligning its policies with the evolving dynamics of the capitalist world economy, the monarchy not only adapted to these changes but also prepared the ground for England to emerge as a major economic power (ARRIGHI, 2010: 193-195). There was a historical background behind this historical outcome. It is based on the reforms of the reign of Elizabeth I (1558–1603). Financial regulations and currency stability strengthened the English economy during this period of social and economic change. The monarchy had to balance its authority with powerful landowners and evolving capitalist interests, and prioritized state policies to control inflation and restore confidence in the monetary system (ARRIGHI, 2010: 193-194).

> "The wool trade became a crucial resource in England in the late medieval period. This trade was effective not only in cities but also in rural areas and had an impact on politics. English wool was marketed in Continental Europe, particularly Italy and the Low Countries. In the Tudor period, feudalism declined, domination of money became more important than domination of people, and land ownership became increasingly commercialized. The specific combination of the peace of the central monarchy and the wool trade drove England towards capitalism" (MOORE, 1974: 5-6).

While the state supported local industries for the benefit of the ruling classes, it also encouraged the liberalization of trade in the surrounding areas outside the protective walls it had surrounded itself with to serve the same interests. The removal of barriers to unilateral free trade and exploitation of labor, combined with successful overseas expansion for surplus capital and wealth, fuelled the critical impetus for expansion (ARRIGHI, 2010: 267–270). Predictably, this model was not universally embodied in the same form in all capitalist states. Different forms emerged depending on the class relations that existed in each case. In the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy, the states of England and France were faced with the challenge of meeting aristocratic demands, but they responded in different ways. In England, the aristocracy accommodated itself to the bourgeoisie, creating a more harmonious relationship. In France, the bourgeoisie had to fight for its position against the aristocracy. A

collision of interests similar to that seen during the English Civil War (1642-1651) was only achieved in France in 1789. This belated development put France at a disadvantage in the world economy and England at an advantage (WALLERSTEIN, 1974: 299-300).[10]

According to Wallerstein (2007: 27-28), the simple image of the market as the place where producer and consumer meet is false. In capitalism, market transactions were only part of the total transaction. Most transactions took place where supply and demand between two intermediate producers in a long commodity chain were regulated through monopoly restrictions. In this sense, the existence and effectiveness of states are vital as an indispensable combination for the security, continuity, and reproduction of the commodity chain. In this context, Braudel's understanding of the world economy as a three-tiered structure is important in terms of understanding the nature of the capitalist world economy, which has enabled significant breakthroughs. At the bottom tier there is a self-sufficient household economy, in the middle tier there is the market, and at the top tier there is the capitalist economy, which is governed by finance capital and ultimately seeks to be identified with the state (BRAUDEL, 1992).[11]

[10] In the 1650s, under Oliver Cromwell's rule, England demonstrated its potential as a Great Power. Cromwell's New Model Army, forged during the English Civil War, transformed English troops into a formidable force, narrowing the gap with European counterparts. The Commonwealth's navy also surged ahead, expanding in size, improving wages and conditions, and securing funding from the commons (KENNEDY, 1987: 62-63).

[11] In the approaches of Braudel, Wallerstein and other world system scholars, while the expansion dynamics of the European world economy on the world scale are decisive and the political formations are the secondary effective elements, there are also approaches that underline the power of the influence of the political sphere. A unique approach in terms of the relationship between the political field and the economic field belongs to Karl Polanyi. The scholar claims that the laissez-faire economy has no natural side and that a free-market system would not have been possible if it had been left to itself. Customs tariffs, export premiums and indirect wage supports were some of the tools that made up the market system. The 1830s and 1840s saw not only an explosion in the number of laws that abolished restrictive regulations, but also a tremendous increase in the administrative functions of the state and the construction of the state with a centralized bureaucracy (POLANYI, 2001: 141-158). According to Polanyi, society set out to develop "self-protection mechanisms". Thus emerged the mechanism that Polanyi calls "double action". The dual movement was a phenomenon related to both the efforts to institutionalize an unnatural situation and the mechanisms that society developed to protect itself against this unnatural situation. Efforts to establish a market economy that included labour, land, and money markets was one aspect of the movement, and liberal discourse presented the dual movement as an anti-liberal conspiracy (POLANYI, 2001: 223).

In modern capitalism, the interaction between state power and economic forces varies depending on the position of states within the global system, leading to differences in free trade and protectionism. The state system enforces capitalist relations of production, both through wage labor in the center and forced labor in the periphery (CHASE-DUNN, 1981: 24–27). The historical development of capitalism is hierarchical, characterized by unequal exchange, the distributive nature of the political structure, and the locations of capital accumulation between the center and the periphery. The hegemonies established by the Netherlands, Great Britain, and the United States reflected these power relations and were marked by military victories that were accepted for certain periods based on military power. During these processes, capital accumulators in these hegemonic states were more influential than their rivals in other powerful states (WALLERSTEIN, 2007: 51–53).

When examining the political structures of different state examples shaped by a combination of systemic and local dynamics, it becomes clear that the state apparatus weakens in terms of effectiveness as one moves from the center to the peripheral regions (WALLERSTEIN, 1974: 355–357). In the peripheral regions, underdeveloped countries began to specialize in the export of a limited number of primary products, while developed countries were compelled to focus on investing in high-tech industries within the capitalist world system. As capitalism emerged as a global system and expanded worldwide, a shift toward specialization in international trade and the fixation of roles occurred. This shift led to the development of economies primarily based on the export of a few raw materials in the periphery (Amin, 1976: 160–162). Thus, the global capitalist system reinforced unequal development. While the center invested in advanced industries, the periphery was relegated to the role of a raw material supplier, remaining dependent on the export of basic goods.

The breakthrough of capitalism from 1492 onwards marked the beginning of Europeans' realization of their superiority, a historical moment that paved the way for their conquest of the world. This consciousness, along with the emergence of the need to spread and establish a qualitatively superior mode of production on a global scale, was seen as a key factor distinguishing modern capitalism from previous societies and represented a pivotal turning point in the process (AMIN, 1991: 366-367). Capitalism, as it emerged around the turning of the 15th and 16th centuries, exhibited a different character due to the private ownership of the means of production, free wage labor, and a generalized capitalist market. In contrast, earlier societies were characterized by racketeering, with surplus value being directly extracted from peasant labor (AMIN, 1991: 350-351).

While world empires are single social economies with inclusive political structures and a redistributive/tributary mode of production, the capitalist world economy is a single social economy with multiple state structures using the capitalist mode of production. When world empires and world economies encounter each other, they interact with one another. The Ottoman Empire, as a world empire, was transformed through its interaction with the European capitalist world (WALLERSTEIN, 1979: 390–392). The increasing demand for grain, corn, cotton, livestock, and tobacco, beginning in the Balkans in the 18th century, led to more concessions being obtained by European states from the weak Ottoman state. In the mid-18th century, the empire's imports began to exceed its exports for the first time. This development transformed consumer habits and triggered the decline of handicrafts. As a result, the balance of demes was disrupted (WALLERSTEIN, DECDELI, and KASABA, 1983: 45–47). The cotton fabric industry, which had continued until the late 18th century, declined significantly in the 19th century due to the influence of technological developments in England. In the 18th century, Ottoman export products included silk, copper, animal skin, fur, cotton, goat and camel hair, mohair, carpets, rice, wood, figs, paint, olive oil, zinc, and salt. On the other hand, the products purchased were primarily manufactured goods such as textiles, fabric, canned goods, coffee, watches, ceramics, lead, glass, sugar, weapons, and spices (GÖKÇEK, 1999: 193–194).

This dynamic transformed local production and trade networks, merchants began to trade through large farmers and local bank-like credit institutions, and a new class of middlemen and producers emerged. In the process, the presence of foreign capital became widespread even in the interior of Anatolia. These local groups owed their wealth and influence on the financial and administrative anarchy that reigned in the Ottoman Empire, and destabilization worked in their favor (KASABA, 1988: 97). In this process, where the old role of the central state was eroded, integration into the capitalist world system paradoxically triggered the formation of the modern nation-state, despite the financial and administrative anarchy. This new modern state, which would strengthen central power and address major internal issues stemming from military superiority in post-Janissary process challenged the existence of old guilds and their redistributive relations (ABOU-EL-HAJ, 2000: 119–120).

After the Janissaries, the old production and distribution relations began to transform. The empire, which was started to reorganize militarily, continued its existence with the advantages it gained from imperialist countries, especially the British, in the context of various geopolitical needs. As will be explained in more detail later on, the 1838 Balta Limanı trade agreement, which was the most important breaking point in the Ottoman economy becoming a

periphery, could be signed in the context of this process. “The agreement eliminated monopolies, locked tariffs at ~7.5%, and hindered local industry protection. Prioritizing political alliances over economic interests further deepened deindustrialization. Imports rising from £5.2M in 1840 to £39.4M in 1913, but this growth slowed after 1870 as per capita exports lagged global trends” (PAMUK ve WILLIAMSON, 2009: 5-7). This agreement brought the Ottoman Empire under the dominance of industrialized Europe. As a result of the Balta Limanı Trade Agreement signed with England and similar agreements signed with other European states, customs duties were reduced. the Ottoman Empire deindustrialized due to cheap European goods and its flow after this free trade treaty. As of this process, while the effectiveness of local Muslim producers, merchants and manufacturers decreased, the effectiveness of the new intermediary class, especially local Greeks, Levantines, and Armenians, increased (AKYILDIZ, 2012).

As will be explained in detail later, by the mid-19th century, the middlemen non-Muslim class had become a central economic power, developing through close ties with European merchants. The liberalization and monetization of the Ottoman economy during the Tanzimat period (1839-1876) was the catalyst that increased the influence of non-Muslims and foreigners (KASABA, 1988: 113-114; TOPRAK, 2014: 75). During this period, the growing discontent among Muslim producers and merchants, which was exacerbated by economic liberalization, reached its peak and triggered the Islamist and Turkist movements (ÜNLÜ, 2019: 86). With the decline of the empire's presence in the Balkans and the influence of separatist movements, these two ideological movements became the focus of the institutional understanding of the state, and its ideological establishment. As will be explained in detail in the third chapter, the last dynamic that emerged against all these dynamics shaped within economic peripheralization was the national economy against economic liberalism (TOPRAK, 2014: 76).

This Turkification process, which intensified with the intermediary role of non-Muslims and the social reaction against the decrease in production, continued until the 20th century. After the Armenians and Greeks were liquidated by different methods, this reaction resulted in the Turkish-Islamic ideology expressed as the "Turkishness Contract", a framework covering the social and economic relations in the emerging nation-state (Ünlü, 2019). The belated formation of the Turkish nation-state was framed by reforms rooted in the militaristic modernization of the Ottoman state apparatus. This new framework, which included the exclusion of the economically advantaged non-Muslim population from Anatolia, was a reflection of the effort

to converge the accumulation of economic power and political power that had diverged in the process of peripheralization within the scope of the genesis process of the nation-state.

1.2. Military Revolution and Capital Accumulation: The Locus of Ottoman Case

The military revolution in Europe was driven by multifaceted economic, social, and political changes in dialectical relation. The European state system evolved through a series of wars, such as the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) and the Franco-Spanish War (1635–1659), and peace treaties that redrew borders and defined state membership. The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 marked the end of imperial dominance in Europe, solidifying the system of modern national states (TILLY, 1990: 167-169). The sovereign modern state, as a dominant and controlling organization, emerged during this historical process by asserting that the source of its absolute and binding authority over its population and territory lies within itself (POGGI, 2007). The modern state's claim to authority is characterized by its pursuit of a monopoly on violence and political decision-making under all circumstances and at all times. This endeavour includes asserting the power to determine the direction and extent to which religious and regional conflicts will escalate (SACERDOTI, 2007: 75-77). The notion that sovereignty involves deciding on a state of emergency during regional wars and turmoil, as emphasized in political theory by Jean Bodin, is fundamentally linked to the modern state's necessity to both end regional conflicts and assert itself as the sole political decision-maker (SCHMITT, 2014). Before the emergence of the modern state, the state's response to regional wars was incorporated into Roman law as a state of emergency, later revised by Machiavelli and presented as a fundamental condition of statehood. Rousseau, in contrast, regarded the ability to determine a state of emergency and intervene accordingly as a key component of a well-functioning republic (FOREJHON and PASQUINO, 2004: 213).

Modern states transformed hierarchy, order, and tax systems, seeking to monopolize authority by prohibiting semi-autonomous units from exercising violence. Simultaneously, they initiated the process of creating a homogeneous nation (CALHOUN, 2007). The nation-state, emerging from the political and economic convergence that followed the rise of the modern state, was shaped as a response to the redistribution of political power and the evolving political order. This transformation aimed to prevent diverse collective structures from generating violence, aligning with the modern state's goal of monopolizing violence. Without the modern state's effort to establish its monopoly on violence and political authority, the formation of the

nation-state would not have been feasible. The modern state redefined the concept of "sovereignty," transferring it from an individual ruler to a collective structure. It distinguished itself by grounding its authority in the people and ensuring the continuity of its power through the people's support (GELLNER, 2013: 70–80).

In medieval Europe, personal agreements were central to governance, as the concept of a modern state was absent. The idea that no one but the king could make and enforce laws was unfamiliar, and individuals retained the right to fight against one another (SCHULZE, 2005: 15–16). As churches and empires lost their political and social power, the concept of the absolute state emerged, followed by the development of the modern state, citizenship, and nation, shaped by a complex historical background (BREUILLY, 1996).

From the 16th to the 19th century, the genesis of modern states and later nation-states played a pivotal role in the growth of global capitalism, involving national competition, colonization, and states supporting the expansion of merchant and banking capital. Wallerstein's analysis, while explaining the restructuring of the world economy, faces criticism for potentially teleological interpretations by underestimating the contingency of the states' reconstructive role (SASSEN, 2008: 74-75). Armies capable of seizing regions enable larger-scale economic accumulation, but conflicts between warring sub-state groups must be controlled to prevent uncontrolled predation. Although we know little about the precise impact of previous world systems on this subject, the relationship between force and capital accumulation, particularly in the Americas, is evident in the capitalist world economy (GIUSTOZZI, 2011: 24-28).

During the Age of Exploration, Iberian states led voyages that reshaped global dynamics. Military advances during the Military Revolution, fuelled by European wealth, underpinned these expeditions. Portugal's exploration, driven by economic aims, sought to challenge the spice trade monopoly and triggered the growth of the slave trade. During this process, plunder and territorial expansion were key factors maintaining momentum, as borders had to be expanded for plunder (FINDLAY and O'ROURKE, 2007: 146-151). Within the competitive capitalist state system, Portugal's conquests in Africa, Asia, and the Americas, although not primarily commercial, were important in shaping a market economy and national capitalism driven by geopolitical and strategic interests. Despite lacking a national financial system, its strong state structure shaped the national economy in this historical context (FIORI, 2015: 58-59).

In the 16th century, European rulers made significant investments in overseas ventures in order to expand their influence and wealth. This proactive approach made possible both legal and illegal trade activities and offered high risks as well as potential rewards. Maritime armed activities included recruitment, equipment, training, and financing (MCNEILL, 1982: 104-109). This period also marked a historical turning point that would trigger the emergence of national political economies as European states began to consolidate their power and wealth through imperial expansion. The concept of the modern state developed within specific historical dynamics as these empires grew. The search and effort to expand their territories on a new global scale became the primary means of acquiring resources and establishing dominance on the global stage. From the 16th century onwards, the framework of a national political economy gradually began to emerge, and empires experienced territorial expansion. The emerging modern state, which began to spread globally, expanded the framework of the national state, which later evolved into a universal model. Long-distance plunder replaced the trade of the Italian city-states. Spain and Portugal sought to seize wealth (SASSEN, 2008: 83-85).

The 16th century's investments in overseas ventures and the subsequent territorial expansions set the stage for the development of national political economies, driving European states toward imperial dominance. As these states sought to consolidate their power and wealth, the Military Revolution, which spanned from 1540 to 1660, further transformed the dynamics of warfare and state organization. The increasing use of firearms and artillery in naval warfare not only reshaped military tactics but also led to a greater demand for centralized management and capital accounting. This shift led to an increase in both regional central power (the state) and the spread of capitalist economic forms (MANN, 2012: 456-457). The military revolution in Europe during the modern era had several dimensions. First, the development of artillery in the 15th century changed the way fortifications were constructed. Second, the increasing use of projectiles in warfare led to the decline of cavalry in favor of infantry in many armies, which in turn led to the emergence of new war tactics. There was also a significant increase in the size of armies. While at the end of the 15th century, the main armies of European states numbered around 150,000 soldiers each, by the late 16th century, this figure had doubled (PARKER, 1996: 24-27).

In the 15th and 16th centuries, Europeans developed advanced fortifications with wall coverings, bastions, and cannons to defend against cannon fire, leading to a shift from large-scale wars to sieges. This development gave an advantage to regions with resources, which in

turn hindered European political unification. European cannon-armed ships dominated global naval encounters, enabling their dominance over global waters due to superior artillery technology (MCNEILL, 1982: 97-102). The evolution of the military revolution was driven by the use of gunpowder, new fortifications, and an increase in the size of armies. Although there were some exceptions, most wars were resolved not by strategies of destruction but by gradual attrition and the accumulation of small victories. These wars were prolonged, consisting of numerous independent campaigns and actions. The length of these conflicts was largely due to the steady increase in the size and cost of armies (PARKER, 1996: 39-41).

The development of military tactics during the Renaissance in Western Europe marked a transition to modern warfare. While the importance of armed infantry increased and firearms gained prominence on the battlefield, the roles of archers and cavalry diminished (PARKER, 1996: 15-17). The decline of feudal cavalry until 15th century resulted from innovations in infantry tactics, such as the use of English longbowmen. Firearms, including cannons and harquebuses, played a pivotal role in this shift, marking the end of England's continuous involvement in continental warfare and the rise of national armies (FINER, 1975: 98-104). From the 14th century onwards, the convergence of market and military dynamics developed, particularly in Italy, with the rise of mercenary armies and their integration into market forces. Advances in maritime technology and the growth of market relations throughout Europe continued. Contracts with Italian city-states and mercenary groups stabilized and evolved during the transformation from a free-market outlook to a quasi-monopoly and the commercialization of warfare (MCNEILL, 1982: 75-78). Warfare, which intensified in Europe between the late 15th and late 17th centuries, played a leading role in the development of the modern state. Economic changes, including the decline of feudalism and the rise in trade, significantly contributed to this transformation. War, with its enormous financial demands, was the driving force behind the centralization of political and military authority in emerging nation-states (KENNEDY, 1987: 70-72). This shift laid the groundwork for the modern, centralized state system that would come to define Europe in the centuries to follow. This militarization played a central role in the development of the modern state.

“Under the general heading of organized violence, the state characteristically carries out four different activities: 1) Fighting: Eliminating its opponents outside the areas where they have use force 2) Forming a state: Eliminating or neutralizing competitors in territory 3) Protection: Eliminating the enemies of the subjects 4) Resource Extraction: Obtaining economic means to perform the first three activities” (TILLY, 1999: 181). Capital accumulation

drives urban development. The concept of "coercion" encompasses potentially harmful practices and methods of coercion. In Europe, groups such as soldiers and landowners used cumulative force. Capital and power are often distinct but sometimes overlapping in purpose (TILLY 1990: 17-19). States emerge as organizations controlling coercion means, including civilian leadership over armies and populations within their territories. Rulers sought resources for war, and the way they extracted them depended on social class dynamics and external pressures. This resulted in varying state organizational structures across coercion-intensive and capital-intensive regions (TILLY, 1990: 27-28). The evolution of capital and coercion in European state formation involved changing strategies over time. Coercion-intensive, capital-intensive, and capitalized-coercion forms can be classified as the various state forms in the last thousand years of European history. Of these, the form that has become generalized in the form of the nation-state was capitalized-coercion at the end (TILLY, 1990: 29-31).

The nature of the interstate system, driven by changes in economic and military power, was characterized by wars and war preparations (KENNEDY, 1987). In this context, monarchical regional states, and city-states, which supported the growth of merchant and banking capital necessary for the development of capitalism in Europe, were necessary but not sufficient for the rise of industrial capitalism (SASSEN, 2008: 80-81). Europe's rise as a global power resulted from its fragmented structure, competitive military advancements, and economic growth. Unlike centralized empires, Europe's fragmented states encouraged innovation. The fragmented structure of Europe has created an environment conducive to innovation due to more intense political and economic competition. Geographic advantages and the increasing importance of trade spurred economic development, and continued competition led to military advancements. Especially, advancements at sea gave the Western powers global superiority (KENNEDY, 1987: 20-27).

The late 17th and early 18th centuries saw a financial revolution that shaped the power dynamics of the period. Monarchies needed strong economies and financial institutions to support large military forces, and they turned to borrowing through bonds. The United Provinces, although economically weaker than France, emerged as a financial capital, while Britain's efficient institutions and well-organized stock exchange raised significant funds that it later used to its advantage (KENNEDY, 1987: 77-81). Until the first quarter of the 19th century, the European state system evolved. While France and Spain remained important, England came to the fore. After 1815, post-Napoleonic era, the system spread to the world scale with the national unification of Germany and Italy, the division of the Ottoman and Habsburg empires,

and global imperialist colonial competition in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific (TILLY, 1990: 177-180).

The spread of modern nation-states meant the global spread of capitalist logic, which became linked with the territorial modern state. The desire and effort to homogenize populations were widely seen in regions that embraced and maintained this idea (NAIRN, 2015: 152). A parallel development, following the global rise of nation-states and nationalist movements, was the effort to homogenize fragmented ethnic demographics through population engineering, which included practices such as ethnic evacuation and forced migration. The rise of nationalism and the politicization of ethnicity within nation-states played a significant role in this phenomenon. Modernity has made ethnic cleansing more common and deadly, with a significant death toll in the 20th century due to ethnic conflicts (MANN, 2005). Ethnicity is not natural or primordial but is socially constructed in various ways. Factors such as language, religion, economic dominance, nationality, and shared political history can contribute to the formation of ethnic identities, with violence being one of the most common components. Modern practices of ethnic cleansing extend to cultural oppression and escalating violence, including mass killings, forced conversions, political persecution, massacres, and genocide (MANN, 2005: 14-17). Even though ethnicity is socially constructed, it can become institutionalized, leading to deep and enduring emotions. While ethnic cleansing is a modern phenomenon rather than a primitive one, it is shaped by the activism of state elites and operates within social networks (MANN, 2005: 24-27).

> "Ethnic cleansing is based on four interrelated sources of social power. Ideological Power: This involves mobilizing values, norms, and rituals in society, which can lead to the creation of ethnic identities and justifications for violence. Economic Power: Economic interests play a role in ethnic cleansing because members of one ethnic group come to believe they have a collective economic interest in another group. Economic power comes into play when there are monopolies or private land ownership. Military Force: Organized and concentrated deadly violence is part of military force. Armies, police, and paramilitary forces are the main institutions involved. Political Power: Political power involves the centralized territorial arrangement of social life. Compromising claims to competing political sovereignty, especially over the same territory, is difficult and will likely lead to ethnic cleansing. This is especially true when powerful factions within two ethnic groups seek rival states and one group is aided from outside" (MANN, 2005: 29-30)

As will be discussed in detail below, the level of ethnic collective structures plays an important role in the formation of the nation-state, acting as one of the many layers of identity that elites and state institutions mobilize to promote collective unity. However, the continuity of economic-oriented political framing and its related practices is crucial to the formation of the modern nation-state (CALHOUN, 2007). National movements, often led by elites, are organized in an effort to build a state that ultimately provides the institutional and structural basis for the nation-state (HOBSBAWM, 2015: 90–99). State-building not only creates administrative and coercive structures, but also injects an ideology of historical continuity and a sense of belonging through the use of symbolic practices, rituals, and narratives (HOBSBAWM, 2006). These processes overlap with the need for a homogenized society required for the organization of capitalist relations of production. Ethnic categories are thus institutionalized to be brought into line with the needs of the state and the capitalist economy (HOBSBAWM, 2014: 80-85). This dynamic is embedded in a matrix of order that capitalism requires, while emphasizing the connection between economic imperatives, political consolidation, and the construction of national identities.

In the case of the Ottoman Empire, its integration into the capitalist world economy as a peripheral entity in the 19th century was a process of homogenization at the hands of the Turkish-Muslim element that controlled the state. The central problem was to bridge the gap between the economic capital controlled by non-Muslims and the Turkish-Muslim population in military and political power. The answer to this problem was expressed through militarist modernism, a national model that emerged in response to the need to reorganize the army that emerged with the end of the classical Ottoman order and the beginning of what was seen as a process of decline. The soldier-nation myth, which was at the center of the transformation from empire to nation-state form, was the product of this process. The soldier-nation myth was a model that included a warrior type that was believed to have existed for thousands of years and that migrated from Asia to Anatolia and maintained its existence during this migration (BELGE, 2012).

The defeats experienced by the Ottoman Empire against Europe from the 17th century onwards revealed the need for military reform. The organization of the Ottoman army in the classical period was linked to military conquests and required the constant reconstruction of forces. This structure was based on agricultural production, product taxation and the supply of

soldiers within the classical land system (EMECEN, 2016). Both the technological gap and the problems in the Ottoman land system made it difficult to supply soldiers due to the increasing power of local forces. It triggered internal rebellions that led to the collapse of the army (AGOSTON, 1999: 137-142). The Ottoman bureaucracy reacted not extremely late to the problem of military backwardness as it became apparent on the battlefield (PARKER, 1988: 126-128).

When the state expansion process ended at a certain historical turning point on the eve of the 18th century, wars ceased to be a source of income and became a significant expense. This change required the creation of a new economic framework and approach to warfare compatible with industrial production, replacing the previous dependence on conquest and agricultural surplus. Before Western European countries adopted mechanized production, the Ottoman Empire was considered one of the most industrially developed regions between the 15th and 17th centuries. Most industrial goods were produced within the borders of the Empire, and only a few luxury goods were imported (JORGA, 2000: 981-982)., From the second half of the 18th century onward, the Ottoman bureaucracy faced the reality that it was falling significantly behind Europe in military technology. Advances in mechanization and warfare techniques during the 18th century highlighted the increasing superiority of European cannons over their Ottoman counterparts (ROGERS, 1995: 6). The need to establish a modern army against this backwardness became the dominant view and paved the way for military modernization in the 19th century (AHMAD, 1993: 3). As will be discussed in the relevant sections below, the factories established as part of military modernization in the 19th century were the main initiatives that can be classified as industrialization in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman bureaucracy recognized the necessity of taking measures to address the growing technological gap. The industrialization efforts initiated as part of military reforms in the 18th century and gaining momentum in the 19th century laid the groundwork for a national economic model, albeit with limited success. While these reforms encompassed changes in education, legal systems, and the economy, 19th-century Ottoman industry, established and sustained with state support, was primarily focused on military production, with few exceptions (SOYLUER, 2013).

The history of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century is characterized by intensified modernization efforts to eliminate military deficiencies that became apparent in the 18th century, to centralize power around the military, and to encourage industrialization. 19th-century military modernization was preceded by organizational reforms in both the military and

civil bureaucracy that began in the 1750s. Without these reforms, the military reforms of the central powers could not be implemented (FAROQHI, 2016: 18). However, these reforms were far from providing a final solution. Despite the rapid response to military technological developments in the 19th century and the introduction of modern technologies, including advanced firearms and artillery (ZENGIN, 2020), the military could not reach the level of Europe, as it focused on imitating Western technology rather than achieving groundbreaking developments through scientific innovations. As will be attempted to be conveyed in the third section below, the 19th-century reforms did not result in a qualitative leap that would close the gap with Europe. Despite this situation, top-down reforms aimed at establishing industries focused on the needs of the army were an important development in the historical trajectory of the Ottoman Empire (KURT, 2015; SOYLUER, 2013).

An important turning point for these top-down reforms was the reign of Selim III. The militarist modernization experienced in the 19th century would be initiated during the reign of Selim III (1789-1807) and would later evolve towards the formation of a nation-state. The most important problem of this period was the difficulty of implementing military reforms within a system that also included the Janissary Corps. The failure of the military reforms known as the Nizam-ı Cedid reforms stemmed from the fact that these reforms threatened the economic and political interests of the Janissaries. While the Janissaries were engaged in various trades and crafts, their participation in guilds also represented an important socio-economic process (BERKES, 2002: 77-78). Therefore, the abolition of the Janissary Corps was a historical turning point and served as the first impetus for centralization efforts and military reforms that ultimately facilitated the formation of the new Turkish nation-state.

The aim of the Nizam-ı Cedid reforms was to establish a regular army similar to those in Europe. The soldiers in the Nizam-ı Cedid army, which was the first step toward a modern military, would carry Western-style weapons and receive training in European-style tactics (ZÜRCHER, 1999: 79-80). This approach was in direct contrast to the existing Janissaries and threatened their social and economic power. The establishment of military schools and training programs, along with the introduction of new military technologies and tactics under the Nizam-ı Cedid reforms, represented a significant challenge to the authority of traditional Janissary methods and promised revolutionary transformation. The fundamental outcome of the reform process, which began with the modernization of the army, was the creation of opportunities for the development of modern state institutions, thus laying the groundwork for militarist

modernization as the foundation for the broader reforms of the 19th century (BELGE, 2012; AHMAD, 1993; ALTINAY and BORA, 2008: 140-142).

The reforms of the Selim III period were ultimately thwarted by the resistance of the Janissaries. During the reign of Mahmud II (1808-1839), who became the sultan after Selim III, the Janissaries were the greatest obstacle to military reforms. The Janissaries opposed all military reforms attempted during the reign of Mahmud II and showed fierce resistance (KUNT and AKŞİN, 2000: 90-92). The reforms conducted during the reign of Sultan Mahmud II were only successful with the ending of the Janissary Corps (1826). However, the abolition of the Janissary Corps was only important as a first condition for the beginning of the reforms. The military reforms conducted after 1826 created problems, especially due to the financial problem that created the necessity to increase the taxes collected from the locals. Due to the necessity of meeting the financing needed for these reforms, increasing tax rates were met with opposition from local elites (ORTAYLI, 1983: 20). Under these conditions, attempts were made to regain control of the land revenues (timar revenues) held by local lords, but this was not successful at the desired level (AKSAN, 2007: 344).

The new army established after the Janissary corps faced a shortage of qualified personnel in its first five years, and it took more than ten years for the new army structure to stabilize. This issue was not only due to financial and personnel problems. During this period, the encounters with the Russian and Egyptian armies posed significant obstacles to the organization of the new army (ÖZCAN, 1991). The army experienced its weakest moments during the 1828-1829 Russian War and the 1831-1833 Egyptian Revolt. As a result, new units (redif units) were formed. These units were organized according to the "Prussian model" and represented a significant shift, as they marked the first instance in which it was recognized that the inclusion of the majority of the population in military organization was necessary (ZURCHER, 2004: 42). In the classical period, the devshirme system (converting of non-Muslim families' children) and the Turkish-Muslim population were essentially considered part of the military class. Although this system, which had become obsolete by the 19th century, did not lead to the inclusion of the entire population, it at least set the stage for the organizational structure of modern armies to enter the administrative mindset.

The only organized structure, the army, undertook Turkish modernization. In this sense, the concept of militaristic modernization is a conceptualization capable of describing the formation of the Turkish nation-state (BELGE, 2012). Militaristic modernization had a strong

economic dimension that should be understood as the theoretical foundations of the creation of a national state. Unlike other similar examples, the Ottoman society was more fragmented. The model was influenced by the concept of nation in German romanticism and likened the state to a living organism that was assumed to be an organic whole. Cultural unity, economic unity and political unity were seen as the stages that a nation should go through. The condition for the formation of this understanding of unity in a fragmented social structure like the Ottoman was only through demographic engineering and ethnic cleansing (AKÇAM, 2004: 138-139). However, the state action capacity required for these actions was not present in the Ottoman state apparatus and army at the beginning of the 19th century. Under these conditions, a pedagogy was designed in schools established within the scope of top-down reforms that would impose the mission of state saviour on newly trained officers. "Young people who came to military schools to become officers did not only learn about military service, but they also saw and learned that the country was in a very difficult situation and thought that the people looked to them as saviours. Again, the same cadres saw the Prussian model as an important solution in the 19th century when they thought that all-out war was necessary" (BELGE, 2012: 662). Compared to Western European models, the Prussian model was seen as a more suitable model for the Ottoman military cadres' social and economic conditions in the absence of a developed bourgeois class. Despite the absence of land-owning aristocrats like the Junkers, the model was seen as more suitable because it was another late example of its applicability.

Although the roots of militarist modernization trace back to the reign of Selim III, it further developed through the stages of Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism after 1839. Of these, Islamism and Turkism were particularly vital in the formation of the newly emerging nation-state. Islamism gained prominence for two reasons: the influx of Muslim populations into Anatolia as the empire lost territory, and the decline in the wealth of Muslim merchants compared to other non-Muslim groups in the empire in the 1870s. After the Russo-Turkish War, which marked the end of the Tanzimat period and the separatist movements of the non-Muslim population in the Balkans, Ottomanism came to an end, giving way to a social contract centered on Islam (ÜNLÜ, 2019). The dynamics that led to the transition from Ottomanism to Islamism and then to Turkism were responses to the central question the Ottoman Empire faced in the 19th century: how to prevent collapse. Although all the responses focused on modernization and nationalist reforms, the proposed orders were different. Throughout the 19th century, the Ottoman State sought solutions between Ottomanism (equality based on citizenship), Islamism (a new identity based on Islam), and finally Turkishness, which constantly faced territorial

losses (AKÇURA, 1976: 28-36). The essence of the ideology that permeated this framework was militaristic modernization, with increasing emphasis from Ottomanism to Islamism and Turkism.

The only common point of Turkish nationalists in the late 19th century was an open or covert opposition to the Greeks, Armenians, and Levantine Christians whom they accused of dominating the economy (GEORGEON, 1996: 92). In this process, the financial difficulties that emerged with military modernization in the 19th century and the increasing hatred of the Muslim people against the interests of the non-Muslim intermediate class turned into the ground that provided the ideological spirit and energy of militarist modernization. A stage was reached where it was accepted that there was no possibility of any kind of political unity between the non-Muslims who dominated capital accumulation and the Turkish-Muslim elements in the military-political cadres. The only point of intersection between these two poles was the short-term relations between the pro-constitutional regime Jon Turks who were struggling against the oppressive rule of Abdulhamid II and the Armenians. The Armenians, who allied with the Young Turks against the absolute power of the Sultan, were later subjected to state policies that resulted in an unsystematic deportation and they lost their social, economic, and political existence in Anatolia (MANN, 2005, 140-145). As will be tried to be conveyed in detail in the third section, the most important problem of this period was the Turkification of the economy and it became a central problem and produced devastating results (BORA, 2017: 174-175). Turks and Muslims who could not hold on militarily in the Balkans retreated to Anatolia towards the end of the 19th century, and the Christian population became an economic and political threat to the solution of this problem (TOPRAK, 2014: 22-30).

1.3. Imperialist Intrusion

Despite significant military reforms in the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire was compelled to make sweeping economic and political concessions to avoid the total loss of its state independence (ÇAVDAR, 1970). For nearly a century, spanning from the 1820s to the First World War, the Ottoman Empire contended with the overwhelming military, political, and economic power of the West. During this period, it began to experience both direct colonial pressures and indirect subjugation by European capitalist states, profoundly reshaping its sovereignty (PAMUK, 2007: 191). The once-traditional, closed, provisionist, and fiscalist economic order steadily unravelled, marking a transformative period. Since this era, the reliance

on political mechanisms to regulate and control prices dramatically weakened, signalling a fundamental shift in economic governance (TOPRAK, 1997: 195).

In the final stage of the Ottoman Empire's incorporation into the world capitalist system, the empire managed to retain its formal independence but became both financially bankrupt and deeply dependent on Western European powers for its economic survival (KIRAY, 2015: 34-35). The major European powers imposed their agendas and employed various strategies to entangle regions like the Ottoman Empire in cycles of debt and dependency. The turning point in this indebtedness was the Crimean War, a conflict strategically engineered by England and France. This war not only drained Ottoman finances but also compelled the empire to accept foreign loans, marking the beginning of a long and precarious history of external borrowing (HODGSON, 1974: 224-226).

The increasing integration into the capitalist economy throughout the 19th century made it progressively more difficult for the Ottoman Empire to escape the free trade model imposed upon it. Toward the end of the century, fluctuations in the bureaucracy's capacity for action became directly dependent on the rivalry among imperialist states (KEYDER, 2014: 40-41). European capital interests not only sold goods to the Ottoman Empire but also invested capital and extended credit. As financial dependence grew, external control over the empire became increasingly feasible. As a result, England and France employed various strategies to entangle the Ottoman Empire in debt. The Crimean War (1853–1856), instigated by England and France and previously described as a critical turning point, further destabilized Ottoman finances. Under pressure, Ottoman administrators were forced to accept credit offers from England and France, whose armies had supported the empire. In 1854, the Ottoman Empire engaged in external borrowing for the first time (KÜÇÜK and ERTÜZÜN, 1994). Between 1856 and 1875, 11 foreign-capital banks were established to provide loans to the Ottoman Empire and generate interest income. An additional seven foreign-capital banks were founded between 1875 and 1922. These banks, along with foreign-capital public institutions, lent to the Ottoman Treasury and worked to deepen the empire's economic ties with their respective homelands (APAK and TAY, 2012: 67-68).

The question of how the capitalist system, which originated in Europe and expanded globally over time, emerged and how it would affect the environment has been a central debate in the field of political economy. Marx emphasized the social and economic transformations brought about by British capitalism through colonization in underdeveloped regions, arguing

that this process played a progressive role. He viewed imperialist expansion as a force that, despite its exploitative nature, ultimately facilitated the transformation of pre-capitalist structures and integrated them into the global capitalist system. Building on Marx's analysis, Nikolai Bukharin extended the critique of capitalist expansion by emphasizing its destructive and militaristic tendencies. According to Bukharin (1929: 148-149), the global spread of economic warfare reshaped world capital and national economies, intensifying political centralization. As financial capitalist groups gained greater power, state intervention in economic life increased. The demands of widespread war necessitated the establishment of factories, mines, agricultural enterprises, banks, and stock exchanges to support the war effort. This situation, driven by the needs of war and imperialist expansion, compelled the bourgeoisie to relinquish greater control over production and distribution to the state (BUKHARIN, 1929: 155-156).

> "In particular, the extraordinary increase in the state budget due to the militarization of national economies has led to a constant need for foreign loans. Capital has acquired an international character through practices such as the ability of an industrial or commercial organization or bank in country A to own stocks or bonds in country B and the obligation to obtain loans from a bank in country A, companies in country B or companies in country B" (BUKHARIN, 1929: 42).

The struggles between national economic structures should be understood as struggles to penetrate economically and politically between various parts of the world economy. Imperialism is a policy of conquest, and when referred to as the ultimate policy of finance capital, operating primarily through banking, its inherently expansionist and acquisitive nature becomes evident (BUKHARIN, 1929: 114-115). According to Bukharin, the importance of banking capital increased due to the formation of monopoly capital through processes of concentration and centralization under imperialist conditions. Industrial capital and banking capital became increasingly intertwined, creating dynamics that exacerbated conflicts among the interests of various national bourgeoisies (BUKHARIN, 1929: 58-62). As financial capitalist groups gained strength, state intervention in economic life intensified. This trend was further compounded by heightened warfare and increasing monopolization, which, in turn, intensified centralization. These developments weakened the middle layers of the bourgeoisie,

leading to further consolidation of economic and political power in the hands of financial capitalists (BUKHARIN, 1929: 148-149).

According to Lenin (2010: 50), “From the end of the 19th century onwards, old capitalism has generally given way to a new capitalism, characterized by the dominance of finance capital replacing the dominance of industrial capital. As Bukharin observed, banking capital and industrial capital have become intertwined” This monopolization has led to the alignment of certain groups of capital with political institutions, transforming them into entities with a universal character. “The old model of capitalism based on competition has been replaced by giant enterprises supported by large banks, forming profit-sharing unions that actively divide markets and determine prices and production quantities” (LENIN, 2010: 19–23).

The distinguishing feature of new capitalism was the export of capital accumulated in developed countries. This responded to the need for capital to find profitable investment opportunities in underdeveloped countries, where capital was scarce, land prices were relatively low, wages were low, and raw materials were inexpensive (LENIN, 2010: 71-73). These conditions created a profitable environment for capital from central countries. In this context, dependency and indirect domination could be established either through the direct conquest of these regions with political and military power or, even in the absence of direct conquest, by exporting capital. It was clear, of course, that "the non-economic superstructure built on the foundations of finance capital, the policy and ideology of finance capital, encouraged the tendency toward colonial conquests" (LENIN, 2010: 100).

As capitalism developed, efforts to search for raw material resources intensified, and the struggle to possess colonies grew fiercer (LENIN, 2010: 97). This struggle took various forms. While purely violent means based on direct force could be effective, relations of dominance and exploitation based on dependency, sometimes involving the threat of violence without its direct application, were also established. Over time, the former, rather than the latter, prevailed. What distinguished imperialism from earlier colonial conquests was that it created dependent countries that appeared politically independent but were, in reality, trapped in a network of financial and diplomatic dependency (LENIN, 2010: 101).

Imperialism is a stage in which the dominance of monopolies and finance capital emerges, capital exports gain primary importance, and the division of the world among the largest capitalist countries nears completion (LENIN, 2010: 106-107). In this historical process, "contrary to Kautsky's claim, the distinguishing feature of imperialism is not industrial capital,

but financial capital" (LENIN, 2010: 108). Criticizing Hilferding, Lenin argues that he fails to recognize that the expanding concentration of production and capital has led to monopolies and that he does not fully understand the phenomena that this process continues to produce. On the other hand, Lenin agrees with Hilferding's observation that finance capital seeks sovereignty, not freedom. Despite this, Hilferding moves away from understanding the essence of the problem with the distinction he makes between financial capital and industrial capital (LENIN, 2010: 55-56).[12]

Marx did not develop a comprehensive political theory to correspond with his economic analysis. This is because the concept of the political and the approach to superstructural analysis are secondary to Marx's theoretical framework. This tendency can be found not only in Marx but also in the Marxist tradition. Antonio Gramsci, the Italian revolutionary who represents a radical break from this tendency, grasps social and political relations by considering them within a multitude of relations before and beyond the state as a Marxist superstructural institution. Therefore, the state is both a tool of force/sovereignty for the dominant class and a structure in praxis that must produce consent in the socio-political field (HOBSBAWM, 1982: 21-25). Gramsci does not accept the concept of the state as a direct and pure sovereignty tool of the dominant class, as in the approaches of Marx and Lenin. The relationship between the political instance in the state and the economically dominant classes is neither linear nor simply considered a reflective relationship in Gramsci's approach. On the contrary, the concrete form of the state is conceived as a totality that includes the praxis of force and consent among the basic classes, meaning it emerges from the dynamics of hegemony between the rulers and the ruled (VACCA, 1982: 55-58).

In resonance with Machiavelli and Weber, Gramsci focuses on the determining effect of the political sphere. In this context, Gramsci examines the impact of political logic and political decision-making within the state-capital nexus. His aim is to explore the politics that accompany the illegal forms of capital. The fundamental connection between politics and

[12] According to Hilferding, (1981: 79-80) “money capital is the capital that is periodically excluded and released from the cyclical flow of capital. This monetary capital, which distinguishes itself from the circular flow of any individual capital, enters the circular flow of other capital when a loan is given to another capitalist". "During capitalist development, the total volume of commodities in circulation increases rapidly, the value of circulation to society increases, and the area occupied by paper money, the equivalent of the state, increases. As a result of the size of the production volume, its transformation into monetary liabilities and the growth of fictitious capital, the volume of commercial transactions conducted with monetary loans also expands" (HILFERDING, 1981: 66).

economics lies in their partnership in the process of creating a structure from which the forms of social organization emerge (GIOVANNI, 1979: 264-265). His focus on this point stems from his interest in the production of social consent that encompasses and reproduces the state, rather than the state itself. In this regard, Gramsci's formulation of hegemony emphasizes social consent, whereas the Leninist version focuses more on the coercive practices of the state apparatus (SHANDRO, 2014: 5-10).

Gramsci's understanding of hegemony goes beyond the Leninist concept by incorporating the idea of intellectual and moral leadership. Hegemony is the creation of a collective will through ideology, acting as a unifying force (MOUFFE, 180-185). The issue this theoretical approach raises is whether social and economic processes can be transformed through political interventions. More explicitly, the counterpart to the problem of hegemony under capitalism is the question of whether backwardness can be reversed through political interventions aimed at addressing economic backwardness. In this context, Gramsci sought to resolve the problem of economic determinism in Marxism, which is why he was associated with Leninism and discussions on the dictatorship of the proletariat (FONTANA, 1993: 1-3).

The problem of the state and underdevelopment in late capitalist countries, which was previously addressed in discussions of imperialism, has continued to be explored in the literature on dependency since the 1960s. Understanding capitalism as a system based on the distinction between center and periphery has provided an important foundation for dependency theories. In particular, in the literature discussing the underdevelopment of Latin America, rather than explaining it through the continent's internal dynamics or discussions of feudalism, the theoretical focus has shifted to the continent's external dependency. The dependency approach, based on the hierarchical relationship between the center and the periphery, views underdevelopment as a structural phenomenon. In revolutionary versions of this approach, the anti-imperialist stance is emphasized, while in more reformist approaches, the focus is on import substitution.

According to the prescription of the CEPAL group, especially Raúl Prebisch, terms of trade tend to deteriorate for products exported by developing countries. Prices of primary products tended to fall relative to the prices of finished products produced in developed countries. The only way to get rid of the dependence of the periphery on the center was the import substitution industrialization policy implemented with state intervention and planning

(MARTINS, 2011: 217-218). [13] A more radical approach was developed under the leadership of Andre Gunder Frank, who opposed CEPAL's prescription of getting rid of underdevelopment through structural reforms. According to Frank, underdevelopment stems from the chain of exploitation that creates and constantly reproduces the dependency relationship between the preferred countries and the central (metropole) countries. For this reason, satellite countries in the periphery can develop only in the processes that they minimize their relations with the metropolitan countries in the center. (FRANK, 1969: 10-12). The appropriation of economic surplus occurs at all levels of the hierarchy, and the surplus ultimately flows into the central world capitalist metropolis. These relationships exist both internationally and locally and shape economic, political, and social dynamics (FRANK, 1969: 18-20).

The economic surplus produced in the colonies was nationalized by both local and world metropolises, further increasing underdevelopment. Landlords, mine owners, traders and industrialists supported economic policies that promoted the exploitation of economic surplus and perpetuated underdevelopment and "inward" development while remaining within the capitalist system (FRANK, 1969: 89-98). Underdevelopment was rooted not in any so-called feudal structure, but in the bourgeoisie's close ties to foreign interests, its appropriation of economic surplus and its control of political power. The national bourgeoisie and the state are thus integral parts of the worldwide capitalist system and what keeps them dependent on global capitalist metropolises (FRANK, 1969: 116-120).

> “Andre Gunder Frank introduced the metaphor of “the development of underdevelopment” to describe and explain this enormous divergence. According to Frank, this divergence was nothing but the expression of a global capitalist expansion process that simultaneously produced

[13] Ricardo contributes to the theory of international trade with the doctrine of "comparative advantages". Ricardo's famous example cites the purchases of wine and fabrics between England and Portugal. Portugal has an absolute advantage in the production of both goods, as it employs fewer workers to produce a unit of both goods. But Ricardo shows that specialization in wine production and the import of fabrics from England are equally beneficial to Portugal. The relative price of wine to cloth in the UK is 1.2 while in Portugal it is just 0.88, and wine exports and cloth imports are profitable as long as the domestic price of wine is lower than the price external. It is convenient for the United Kingdom to export fabric to Portugal where the price is 1.25, the British domestic market price is more than 0.83. Therefore, the model assumes fixed costs for all goods and constant total use of all resources. Ricardo's examples assume that in international trade, as in domestic trade, there is no unrestricted mobility of capital, therefore, at least at the beginning of trade, the values of commodities are not given by embodied labour (VAGGI and GROENEWEGEN, 2006: 145- 146).

> development (wealth) in the central places (Western Europe and later North America and Japan) and underdevelopment (poverty) in other places. This process manifested itself based on a series of metropolis-satellite relations: while the metropolis countries appropriated the economic surpluses coming from their satellites in order to develop economically, "the satellite countries were condemned to remain underdeveloped because they could not access their own surpluses and as a result of the polarization and exploitative contradictions that the metropolises had introduced and maintained into their internal structures." (ARRIGHI, 2007: 21-22)

Underdevelopment is not the result of the survival of archaic institutions (dual society) and the scarcity of capital in regions isolated from the flow of world history. On the contrary, underdevelopment has been and continues to be created by the same historical process that has produced economic development (FRANK, 1969: 9-10). The development of capitalism itself is factually realized through the formation and continuation of underdevelopment. Development and underdevelopment are two sides of the same coin. Rostow and similar modernization theorists ignore the fact that the cause of underdevelopment is the process of initiating the process of integrating land and people into mercantilism and then into capitalism, that is, it is a structural feature of the capitalist logic itself (FRANK, 1969: 43).

The inclusion of Asian, African, and Latin American countries in the capitalist system was shaped by structural underdevelopment related to the supply of cheap labor and raw materials. These processes of insertion reflect the establishment of a relationship in which income distribution is more unequal, and economic and social power is dominated by merchant capital that works in favor of the capitalist metropolitan bourgeoisie (FRANK, 1969: 128-129). What characterizes these regions is economic underdevelopment and a high degree of imperialist economic dependency. The path to industrialization in Western Europe was rooted both in the revolution in European agriculture and in the colonization of regions that would later become underdeveloped countries (FRANK, 1969: 175-176).

The directly extractive nature of the economy in colonial times took a more subtle form, influencing post-independence politics. Latin American countries, dependent on exports such as wheat, copper, wool, guano, coffee, and sugar, experienced prosperity after 1850. However, they were plagued by global economic crises from 1857 to 1900, which disproportionately affected vulnerable populations. Despite the risks posed by this vulnerability, the executive apparatus of the state supported free trade due to its links to foreign markets and urban import

dependency (CARDOSO and FALETTO, 1979: 55-60). The transition from British to US hegemony was marked by the growth of export groups and the centrality of the industrial sector in forming alliances and compromises (CARDOSO and FALETTO, 1979: 25-26).

It is important to note that generalizations across all cases were not feasible. In countries with export-oriented economies that were relatively limited in scope, historical outcomes varied significantly, influenced by factors such as the degree of diversification (like mining or agriculture) and the political dynamics shaped by dominant groups. Economic exploitation was politically imposed; dominant groups were politically linked to foreign entities and provided internal order for labor and resources (CARDOSO and FALETTO, 1979: 96-101). After independence, the political leadership of groups oriented toward the export of primary products formed an alliance with landowners. The ability of Latin American countries to integrate into the world market varied depending on their capacity to reorient their political and economic ties, both internal and external, to adapt to the demands of the core economies (CARDOSO and FALETTO, 1979: 66-69). In these examples, dominant groups sought to define the conditions of participation in the regional economy, negotiate with foreign investment enterprises, and establish stable systems of power and sovereignty (CARDOSO and FALETTO, 1979: 71-73).

The process of integrating the Ottoman economy into the global economic system was experienced in Anatolia and the Balkans, where the raw materials that had previously been inputs for the Ottoman manufacturing industry became semi-finished goods. Instead of remaining products of the Ottoman economy, they became inputs for the industrialized economies of Europe (ÖZER, 2013: 307-308). The integration of the western regions of the Ottoman Empire into the division of labor within the capitalist world economy, beginning in the second half of the 18th century and culminating in the 19th century, had devastating effects. Since these regions were among the most important supply sources for the capital and other metropolises of the empire, this process triggered a domino effect that contributed to the eventual collapse of the classical Ottoman order. It deprived the central government of vital income, weakening the redistribution system that had supported the traditional structure of the state (KASABA, 1988: 35).

In the 19th century, the Ottoman economy became one that exported raw materials and agricultural products while importing manufactured goods. By the end of the century, the empire's economy had become completely dependent on foreign trade flows. It was a fragile economy, vulnerable to agricultural demand crises and credit shortages (PAMUK, 2008: 19-20;

KEYDER, 2014: 122). From the last quarter of the 19th century onwards, long-term trends in Ottoman foreign trade and domestic production followed a course parallel to the economic fluctuations of major industrialized countries. During this period, the Ottoman Empire experienced a slowdown in export growth, deteriorating trade conditions, and large debt payments, becoming a prime example of underdeveloped economies (PAMUK, 2008: 136-137). As a result, the terms of trade worsened for the Ottomans, and the state's income sources decreased. Deindustrialization refers to the shift of labor and resources from manufacturing to agriculture, resulting from changes in trade, technology, or productivity. In this context, between 1800 and 1913, deindustrialization in the Ottoman Empire was primarily driven by shifts in global trade dynamics, the dominance of European industrialization, and the liberal economic policies imposed on the empire by foreign powers (PAMUK and WILLIAMSON, 2009: 3-4). As local producers were forced to sell their products at lower prices under these conditions, their economic situation worsened. Consequently, the state's income was affected, leading to a contraction in the domestic economy.

Ottoman production declined significantly after 1815 due to cheap European imports, British industrial advances, and liberal Ottoman trade policies. Self-sufficiency in cotton textiles ended in 1820, and yarn production and the use of handlooms fell by 80% between the 18th and mid-19th centuries. The market share of domestic textile producers fell from 97% to 25–35% in the 1870s (PAMUK and WILLIAMSON, 2009: 9-11). However, the increase in European industrialization in the 19th century increased the export of agricultural products and raw materials in the Ottoman Empire. Trade-related groups that became wealthy (especially non-Muslim merchants) and the increase in production in rural areas (the increasing influence of local big landowners) caused changes in the social hierarchy. The change in the terms of trade between Europe and the Ottomans in the 19th century had different effects on various classes and segments of Ottoman society. It supported merchants, non-Muslim elites and large landowners who exported raw materials, thus enriching them. Peasants faced higher taxes, land loss and became workers of large landowners. Cheap European goods destroyed local crafts and industries, causing unemployment and economic decline in traditional production areas ((WALLERSTEIN, DECDELI and KASABA, 1983: 46).

While the wealthy elite had access to imported luxury goods such as European textiles, glass and metal products, small producers suffered. Large rural producers (ayans) profited from the export of agricultural products such as cotton, tobacco, and wheat (HANIOGLU, 2008: 17). Rural inequality deepened as landowners became richer and peasants became indebted. While

urban craftsmen weakened, the commercial bourgeoisie and non-Muslim commercial intermediaries became richer, increasing social tensions and center-periphery inequalities (IPEK, 2011: 3-4). During this process, agricultural production and raw material-based production expanded compared to the past. Simultaneously, the economic influence of European states increased with capitulations, which were a means of gaining military and political power and privileges at the political level. Under these conditions, the Ottoman financial independence was weakened (GÖÇEK, 1999).

In the 19th century, prices showed that Ottoman goods were becoming cheaper in global trade, reflecting weaker industrial development and falling relative terms of trade. The empire became a dependent economy, selling raw materials and importing manufactured goods from Europe (PAMUK, 2004: 464). Although Ottoman terms of trade improved by 2.4% per annum between 1815 and 1859, leading to an increase in exports, this growth did not lead to a breakthrough in industrialization due to internal problems such as political instability, technological backwardness, and lack of capital. In this process, the position of large landowners was strengthened due to the increase in raw material exports and peasant exploitation intensified compared to before (WILLIAMSON, 2006: 83–85).

Industrialization in Europe increased the demand for Ottoman raw materials (e.g. cotton, tobacco, wheat). However, the prices of industrial goods imported from Europe (such as cheap textiles, iron and steel, machinery, agricultural implements, steam engines and looms) were so low that local producers could not compete. Ottoman export products (such as wheat, cotton, barley, olives, silk and livestock) were gradually relegated to the status of cheap raw materials. However, after 1880, the deindustrialization of the Ottoman Empire slowed down due to the impact of the global economic crisis (1873-1896). Industries such as weaving and embroidery developed (PAMUK and WILLIAMSON, 2009: 12-14).



Terms of trade for Egypt and the Ottoman Empire 1815–1913 (1913 = 100) (WILLIAMSON, 2006: 84).

The internal factor in the formation and position of large landownership was the continued influence of local influential people (ayan) who had continuously increased their position against the central authority from the 18th century until the first quarter of the 19th century. However, the regions where these forces caused damage in terms of the internal center-periphery dynamics of the Ottoman state apparatus were the Balkans and Anatolia. In other regions, center-periphery relations were already flexible due to the dynamics we will try to show in the second chapter. The loss of power of the political center did not occur in the same way throughout the geography of the empire. Different regions of the empire entered into different center-periphery relations that they were exposed to within the empire in the process of being included in the capitalist world system and experienced transformations in different forms and rhythms. In the second section, an attempt will be made to understand these rhythm and form differences and to convey how different geographies and center-periphery relations were in the classical Ottoman imperial order (from the 16th century to the 18th century). These center-periphery relations will be important in terms of understanding the nature of peripheralization in the capitalist world system and the nation-state formed within this peripheralization, because the capacity of the state apparatus to intervene in the economic and social areas in the Ottoman Empire varied within the given conditions of each different geography. The decentralization effect created by local power centers vis-à-vis the central power, unlike in the classical period, was decisive. It shaped the dynamics to which the

bureaucratic apparatus, much more effective in the Balkans and Anatolia compared to other regions, was exposed during the transformation from empire to nation-state.

2. Socio-Economic Characteristics of Core-Periphery Relations in the Empire

The decentralization that intensified in the 18th century, when the dynamics that accelerated the end of classical center-periphery relations were seen, created fertile ground for the development of plantation-like farms on the one hand and for the emergence of separatist national movements on the other. The state's effectiveness weakened in the Ottoman core geography of Anatolia and the Balkans. In the 19th century, as the Ottoman Empire became part of the periphery of the capitalist world system, the Ottoman state apparatus was faced with a social confusion and centralization necessity combined with decentralization, a process that became particularly acute in Anatolia and the Balkans from the second half of the 18th century onwards. The need for centralization reforms increased as the leading large landowners and influential local powers that played a key role in producing agricultural products for capitalist Europe gained power at the expense of the central government.

Within the Ottoman Empire, each region had its own unique conditions, characterized by different core-periphery dynamics and coercion-capital relationships. The Ottoman bureaucracy operated with the obligation to consider the specific economic, social, and political conditions of each region, both during the classical period and in the 16th-18th centuries when these relationships were transformed. The state's capacity for economic and social intervention was greater in Anatolia and the Balkans than in the Middle East, Egypt, and North Africa. In the conquered Arab regions, including Egypt and much of North Africa, economic and social structures largely continued as they had existed prior to Ottoman rule. In remote provinces where an interventionist approach was not applied, this was due to the limited capacity of the state apparatus.

The Ottoman state apparatus should not be anachronistically viewed as a nation-state capable of exerting uniform control over all the geographies it dominated. Instead, flexible, and pragmatic relationships were established to account for the diverse geographical and socio-political conditions of each region (ÖZEL, 2009; KAFADAR, 2019). Even during the classical periods, when the imperial state apparatus was relatively effective in regions such as Anatolia and the Balkans, where the bureaucracy could function more efficiently, its overall effectiveness

remained limited (AKDAĞ, 1975; YILDIRIM, 2017). Despite their geographical proximity, significant differences in state effectiveness existed between Anatolia and the Balkans. In Anatolia, due to the density of the Kizilbash Turkmen population, the state was more vigilant against the risk of rebellion and civil unrest. In the Balkans, the influence of local aristocracy-like families was more pronounced, limiting the central government's interventionist capacity.

Contrary to the claims of orientalist and modernist approaches, the Ottoman order was not a purely Islamic or cultural unit, but a world empire defined by its division of labor and redistribution mechanisms (ÜNLÜ, 2011). However, this social system was not governed by a centralized policy framework operating uniformly across all regions. The Ottoman internal order encompassed diverse geographies with varying center-periphery dynamics (ÜNLÜ, 2019). It was shaped by a dialectical interaction between local actors and the central authority's capacity to assert influence in different regions. The Ottoman order was not a system of atomic elements reproducing stability independently but a world empire that evolved internally through interactive class dynamics (İSLAMOĞLU, 2022). The survival of the Ottoman state depended on its ability to organize and mobilize large armies in response to rebellions and similar emergencies. The army symbolized the state's existence during such extraordinary conditions. Once the crisis subsided and normalcy resumed, the security focus narrowed to specific areas like trade routes and coastlines. The center-periphery relationship then reverted to its underlying economic and social foundations, continuing much as it had before Ottoman rule.

The Ottoman Empire was not unique in this regard; similar empires had existed in the same geographical context. In terms of force-capital relations, interdependence driven by capital accumulation was the primary force behind the expansion of the world system within the Afro-Eurasian ecumene over the past 5,000 years (GILLS and FRANK, 1992: 622–624). This interdependence was rooted in a form of relationship with political and economic boundaries that required transformation. The world system followed cyclical phases of expansion and contraction, characterized by shifts in hegemonic power. During expansion, multiple hegemonic powers often competed for dominance, infrastructure investments increased, and global economic growth was encouraged. Conversely, contraction phases were marked by the breakdown of multiple hegemonic contenders, including the dominant one,

alongside reduced investments, logistical disruptions, conflicts, and economic decline (1992: 627-628).[14]

Empires developed by exploiting core-periphery systems through tribute and trade, but stagnation often led to decline unless a new regime of accumulation emerged (EKHOLM and FRIEDMAN, 1996: 70–71). Developed core regions exhibited imperialist tendencies, driven by their exploitation of larger peripheral areas. Capital accumulation occurred as aristocratic wealth grew through trade and imperial expansion, initiating a cycle of rise and fall in these core regions. However, capital accumulation was not limitless, and core-periphery relations were never inherently sustainable. This cycle perpetuated the dynamics of both development and underdevelopment, highlighting the interconnected and complex nature of historical economic processes (EKHOLM and FRIEDMAN, 1996: 63). The uppermost layers benefiting from these core-periphery relationships often formed hegemonic coalitions of elite classes, dispersed across the various geographies and political structures of the empire. The continuous power struggle between the empire and these centrifugal forces shaped its dynamics. These elites included influential families and individuals who fostered competition, cooperation, and dependency. This coalition focused on the unequal distribution of resources not only within a single state but also across states, treating each as an economically independent yet mutually dependent entity (GILLS, 1996: 120–121).

> “Wallerstein defines hegemony economically, emphasizing core power's dominance in production, trade, and finance. Frank views world capital accumulation's cyclical nature as the basis of hegemonic competition from 1492 to 1789, a trend continuing today. Braudel shifts focus from political-military hegemony to cities crucial for capital accumulation in Europe, marking a shift from state-centered to accumulation space-based analysis. Rather than focusing on transitions between production modes, world history is viewed as a sequence of hegemonic reorganizations or "transitions," impacting accumulation spaces. These shifts, deeply impactful economically, socially, and politically, mirror the world system's competitive rhythm, especially accumulation cycles. The conventional single-sovereign model is inadequate; "interdependent hegemonic powers" better characterize the system. Pre-modern/post-modern state distinctions lack justification;

[14] The competitive state system in capitalism serves various functions that allow the process of capitalist accumulation to transcend contradictions and expand. It prevents any one state from controlling the world economy, allowing capital to flow into areas of higher profit. In this context, as capital spreads, hegemonic core powers may lose their competitive advantages (CHASE-DUNN, 1981: 35-37).

> capital accumulation throughout history involves private and state capital, with trade's pivotal role in global accumulation undeniable, even in periods of "bureaucratic empires" or world empires." (GILLS, 1996: 115-117).

The transformation of the Ottoman Empire from a small principality in the 14th century into a powerful empire by the 16th century occurred alongside a global dynamic of change. While Europe lagged behind the East in development during the 13th century, it began to gain an edge by the 16th century. This shift was largely driven by external factors rather than inherent European characteristics. Key events, such as the fragmentation of trade routes following Genghis Khan's conquests, the disruption of trade caused by the Black Death, and technological advancements like galleys, played crucial roles. Portugal's establishment of sea routes to India also created new opportunities for Europe's ascent (ABU-LUGHOD, 1989: 18-20). By the mid-13th century, the West and East were interconnected through global trade, with various merchants and capitalist institutions intensifying international commerce. The 16th century, during which Europe surpassed Asia after 150 years, was profoundly shaped by the dynamics of this process (ABU-LUGHOD, 1987: 3-6; 1987: 12-17).[15]

The Ottoman Empire took advantage of the fragmented political landscape of Eurasia to drive its development and territorial expansion, achieving its greatest extent between the late 13th and 16th centuries. It emerged as a prominent and recurring imperial power within the Mediterranean and Near Eastern geopolitical framework. During the 15th and 16th centuries, the Ottomans transitioned to a classical imperial model, projecting their authority across three continents. The empire's trajectory of growth encompassed diverse geographical regions, each characterized by distinct socio-economic and political conditions that significantly shaped its political economy. The expansion and administration of the Ottoman state apparatus were deeply influenced by the complex and interwoven dynamics of Asia, Europe, and Africa. These

[15] Although there were protocapitalist elements in the Arab-Islamic world, the tribute system was dominant. The centralization of surplus was in the form of tribute rather than profit from capital. Capitalism may have the potential to emerge in the Arab world, but due to the environmental structure of colonialism and Western feudalism, capitalism developed in Europe and the Atlantic and declined in the Arab-Islamic world (AMIN, 1991: 358-359). Traditionally, Mesopotamia formed a trade network with connections to various regions. Food, textiles, and manufactured goods have always been important exports. Egypt, on the other hand, is more isolated, with only a few major access points for raw materials and foreign trade. This isolation preserves its monopolistic position and prevents internal competition by protecting centralized structures (EKHOLM and FRIEDMAN, 1996: 66-67).

intricate relationships, spanning multiple domains of governance and commerce, often surpassed the administrative and logistical capacity of a singular central authority to fully regulate or control (BULUT, 2012: 65-66).

This situation was not unique to the Ottoman Empire but applied to all political structures that previously covered large areas in this geography, particularly to other empires in the same region. Like previous empires in the Ottoman lands, the Ottoman state bureaucracy was primarily concerned with center-periphery relations. Within this framework, elements of the bureaucratic traditions of the Iranian-Islamic world and the Roman-Byzantine state were inherited and continued (STREUSAND, 2011: 130-131; ORTAYLI, 2008). The structure of the Ottoman state was a synthesis of various influences, including the Iranian-Islamic model, the Turkish-Mongol tradition of leadership law, and Roman imperial ideology (TOYNBEE, 1974: 19-21; STREUSAND, 2011: 13-15). What distinguished the Ottoman Empire, which inherited these traditions, was its nomadic heritage and Central Asian warrior culture. The settlement of nomads played a significant role both in the empire's founding and in the organization of its state army in later periods. Additionally, the capacity for violence of this population posed an ongoing threat to the Ottoman dynasty (TOYNBEE, 1974: 23-26). The Janissaries, recruited from the children of Christian families, were primarily tasked with protecting the Ottoman dynasty from the Turkmen warrior potential, which was particularly concentrated in Anatolia.

Like the empires established in the same region before it, the Ottoman Empire was structured as a central bureaucratic system supported by various circles that met its diverse needs. In this context, the supply of resources such as irrigation, agriculture, timber, and similar products played a crucial role in the relations between villagers and the empire's bureaucratic centers (MIKHAIL, 2011: 25–27). However, it is difficult to claim that a single center maintained identical relationship dynamics with all the surrounding geographies. In the three geographically distinct continents it encompassed, the relations between the center and periphery varied greatly due to the diverse geographical and socio-economic characteristics of each region. The nature of these variations was determined by factors such as the distance from the center and regional economic, social, and political dynamics. The dominance of the Anatolia, and the Balkans, did not resemble that of the more distant corners of Africa and the Middle East. Beyond geographical distance and socio-economic differences, factors such as intra-dynastic conflicts, alliances, and mass rebellions were at least as influential in shaping these relationships (FAROQHI, 2010: 72–73).

The Ottoman Empire developed at the crossroads of the Silk and Spice Routes, which connected the economies of the East and West via the Mediterranean. The Ottomans controlled key maritime regions, including the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, and the Persian Gulf, linking the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea and the Mediterranean to the Red Sea (TABAKOĞLU, 1999: 19). The empire spanned from the Black Sea in the north to Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula in the south, from the Persian Gulf in the east to Central Europe and North Africa in the west. Within its vast territory, this region was governed by a network of centralized state authority and local autonomous or semi-autonomous structures (INALCIK, 2022A).



Holocaust Memorial Museum. "The Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, 1807–1924." Encyclopaedia of the Holocaust. Accessed January 19, 2025. https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/map/the-dissolution-of-the-ottoman-empire-1807-1924.

Within this vast geographical area, Anatolia and the Balkans were like the heart of the empire. However, this geography was also problematic in terms of the empire's state apparatus. The existence of the Turkmen tribalism (asabiyya)[16], especially in Anatolia, was a threat to the

[16] Asabiyya is defined in medieval Arabic dictionaries as a strong bond that closely unites several people with the same interest or view (IRWIN, 2018: 45). Asabiyya refers to the social bond to which family, lineage, kinship, religion, or any social action is necessarily connected. What establishes the state is

security of the Ottoman dynasty. These center-periphery relations had their own unique characteristics. While semi-autonomous structures were more common in some regions of the Balkans, in the Arabian Peninsula there was complete autonomy in internal affairs and symbolic dependence in terms of external dependency. In the Arabian Peninsula in particular, the Ottoman presence existed on the coast. In Anatolia, the capacity of the Alevi Turkmens to produce violence in Anatolia prevented the formation of a social and economic order from time to time. This population was so critical for the Ottoman dynasty and the state apparatus that the Islamic law scholars brought from the Arab madrasahs in the establishment of the state's political sovereignty were in a sense related to the effort to define themselves by making a difference with this Turkmen-Kizilbash asabiyya (YALÇINKAYA, 2017). This situation was certainly not specific to the Ottomans. In this geography, center-periphery interactions had historical continuity. Some of the empires and forms of state, both modern and non-modern, have experienced a similar problem of asabiyya. This kind of dynamics facilitated the rise and subsequent dissolution of numerous empires, exemplified by the Persian, Roman and Arab Empires, and always presented themselves as a dynamic arena in which the rise and fall patterns of empires emerged (TOYNBEE, 1974: 15-18).

The Ottoman Empire distinguished itself with its mastery in effectively connecting the state apparatus with both Asia and Europe, as well as its capacity to adapt to different geographical regions, unlike other empires (MCNEILL, 1974: 34-36). The Ottoman state apparatus did not exercise a political hegemony specific to modern states in this geography, nor

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related to the rise of a sovereignty in which the potential of obligatory cooperation (asabiyya) can be activated. The state can exist together with the bond of closeness carried by asabiyya. According to Ibn Khaldun, a state cannot be established with an army. The army is one of the results of the dynamic that precedes the establishment of the state. What establishes the state is related to the rise of a ruler in which the potential of asabiyya can be activated (İBN KHALDUN, 1975: 363). Ibn Khaldun deals with the state with its contradictions and crises, with the constructive and destructive violence of which it is both a product and a producer (BOZARSLAN, 2016: 237). According to Ibn Khaldun, asabiyya is the relationship that specifically binds individuals to influential groups. Such a bond is achieved through the individual's subjective identification with the group. The interests of the individual are identified with the interests of another person as rational, semi-rational or irrational ways (GOODMAN, 1972: 256). According to Ibn Khaldun, asabiyya can occur in the context of 1) lineage, genealogy, 2) cause. In both forms, asabiyya is an energy source for human groups who have to struggle. The state will be established with this energy. Likewise, the deterioration of the state is the result of the extinction of the same energy source (ÜLKEN and FINDIKOĞLU 1940: 64). It is only after people pass through the period of nomadism and its necessities that they begin to live a settled life and only then start to build cities and towns and build castles. The construction of cities or the construction of another settlement can only be done through the gathering of many people and forces and cooperation (IBN KHALDUN, 1996: 223). The more the number of people who are in cooperation in any society exceeds those who work on their own account, the more they will be successful compared to another society with a lower number of cooperation (TURCHIN, 2016: 105-107).

was it capable of doing so. The most distinctive feature of the Ottoman state apparatus in this context was its ability to flexibly integrate established political, social, and economic relations across regions with varying dynamics. The scope of control and supervision varied across the regions under the empire's control, and neither displayed a homogeneous character nor did the empire attempt to impose uniform control over emerging dynamics. Different degrees of central control were observed in various geographical areas (FAROQHI, 2010: 75).

The borders and political sovereignty of the Ottoman state were flexible and uncertain, even during the classical age when the empire was at its most powerful. These borders were often natural, such as rivers and coastlines, which were frequently inconsistent and variable. The Mediterranean coast and the Arabian deserts lacked clear distinctions between inner and outer regions, making it difficult to determine where the empire's sovereignty truly began and ended (KASABA, 2009: 39–40). The concept of borders for the Ottomans in the classical era was quite different from its modern interpretation. At that time, border lines were less significant; what mattered most was not the line drawn on a map but who controlled the castles. However, the presence of these castles did not always indicate a clear boundary. In this regard, Ottoman borders were quite flexible by modern standards (FAROQHI, 2010: 39).

Although it is widely accepted that the Ottoman Empire had a centralized structure in its later period, this centralization did not translate into absolute control over all its territories. Despite the empire's efforts to consolidate power, it faced significant challenges in maintaining authority across the vast and diverse lands under its rule. Coastal regions, in particular, presented a unique risk, as they were more vulnerable to external influences and internal unrest. Settlers in certain areas, seeking economic opportunities and greater autonomy, gravitated toward the seashores, further complicating the state's attempts at centralized governance (FAROQHI, 2010: 71). The effectiveness of the Ottoman state diminished as one moved inland from the coastlines, with regions farther from the imperial heartland proving more difficult to control. In some cases, even on the Anatolian side of the Mediterranean, the state struggled to enforce its economic policies, particularly with regard to illegal raw material exports. Despite efforts to curb this activity through official regulations, such exports were rarely stopped, highlighting the limits of the state's authority over its more distant territories. Smuggling, in particular, became a widespread problem, and the state's attempts to curb it were often ineffective, demonstrating the challenges the Ottomans faced in maintaining economic order across their sprawling empire (GOFFMAN, 2004).

The Ottoman geography exhibited significant variations in terms of land organization. There were notable differences across regions within the Ottoman Empire regarding tax policies, surplus production, distribution of surplus value, and military organization. The timar system, which was central to the land regime, was most prevalent in the Rumelia region south of the Danube River, Bosnia, Thrace, and Western and Central Anatolia. In contrast, it was much less widespread in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia, as well as in the Aleppo and Damascus provinces. It was particularly exceptional in Iraq, the Arab regions, and Egypt. Regions whose revenues were not distributed as timars included Egypt, Baghdad, Yemen, Abyssinia, Basra, Lahsa, Algeria, Tripoli, and Tunisia (INALCIK, 2012: 169). The timar system involved the transfer of all or part of a region's tax revenues to an official authority, in return for financial, administrative, and military compensations (ORTAYLI, 2008: 124). Timar holders, along with the peasants they gathered, participated in military campaigns, with provisions, equipment, and supplies provided from the regions under their control (TIFTIKÇI, 2012: 19-20). The presence of the timar system in a given geography is crucial for understanding the extent of Ottoman authority there. Regions with timar systems were those where Ottoman bureaucracy was more effective, while regions without timar systems often had more symbolic or flexible relations with the central authority. The most significant distinction between the Ottoman timar system and Western feudal practices was that timars were not passed on to heirs through inheritance. This principle, which was consistently upheld in law, was, however, sometimes circumvented with different practices in some regions. The Balkans, as a region with a timar system, provides a notable example. During the Balkan conquests, many Byzantine-type timar (pronoia) holders continued to hold their lands as Ottoman timar owners. However, this did not mean that the inheritance of these lands was legally recognized (INALCIK, 2012: 170).

Instead of supporting feudal tendencies and establishing a land organization, the Ottoman Empire evaluated its lands as “miri (state owned land)” and divided these lands into regions consisting of one or several villages and allocated them to sipahi (a class of horse soldiers who owned a fief). It was implemented on the condition that they did not own property and fulfilled the necessary duties (KÜÇÜKKALAY, 1999: 54). A sipahi distributed land to farmer families who also ran a private farm, in exchange for title deeds. Farmers paid taxes (up to 15% of the sipahi's income) and maintained their lands almost as private property. Sipahis financed the military forces (cebelii) and performed central government duties when necessary (KÜÇÜKKALAY, 1999: 55-56).

The Ottomans transformed the local nobles into sipahis (cavalry in imperial service), granting them some de facto rights over the existing economic and political elites inherited from the Byzantine Empire (STREUSAND, 2011: 79-81). This transformation prevented the formation of a land-owning noble class in the Balkans and Anatolia. Another challenge was the inclusion of non-Muslim peasants into the system. Although no definitive solution was found for this issue, the Ottoman dynasty addressed it by taking children from non-Muslim families at a young age, educating them, and forming the Janissary army from these recruits. The Kapıkulu class, which included the Janissaries, was directly accountable to the Ottoman dynasty and played a critical role in ensuring the dynasty's security. Unlike the warrior Turkmens, the Kapıkulu class did not pose the risk of creating a rival dynasty. Consequently, the Kapıkulu army became a key component of the Ottoman military, which relied heavily on these servants of the sultan.

However, from the end of the 17th century onwards, the timar system in its existing form gradually began to lose its military function. The land regime was disrupted, and the timar-holding sipahis were progressively eliminated (INALCIK, 2012: 12). From the 17th century, as the Ottoman central government weakened, tax collection was transferred to local contractors (mültezim), who paid a share to the state. This system alleviated financial burdens, particularly from wars, by involving local lords and ayans in tax collection, thus strengthening their authority and supporting state revenue. The iltizam system allowed for faster, more effective tax collection as the central government struggled with supervision. By the 18th century, this process contributed to the rise of a local aristocracy dominated by numerous regional leaders (KÜÇÜKKALAY, 1999: 57). By the early 19th century, the timar system had disappeared entirely. The decline of the timar system directly impacted the Ottoman army, as a significant portion of the military had previously consisted of peasants recruited by timar holders (ORTAYLI, 2008; TIFTIKÇI, 2012). During the same period of this system's erosion, military reforms intensified, as will be explained in detail below.

The dynamics of geographical distance and proximity, which determined the intensity of state control in the functioning of the timar system, also applied to the control of trade. In the Ottoman Empire, the security of marketplaces was always of critical importance, not only for the continuation of commercial activities but also for the preservation of state authority (ERDOĞAN, 2016: 133-134). However, this security issue was also limited by the state's capacity to organize within its geography. Trade in the Ottoman Empire generally occurred in two ways: the caravan route through Anatolia to Iran, India, Central Asia, and China, and the

sea route to South India and Southeast Asia via the Red Sea or the Persian Gulf (MANTRAN, 1987: 1438).

Egypt, Arabia, Crimea, and the Balkans were regions from which goods were constantly shipped to Istanbul. However, the Balkans were the primary source of grain and meat, which were essential foodstuffs (ÇAĞMAN, 2016: 129). To feed Istanbul's enormous population, the Black Sea coastal regions of Europe, Thrace, and Northern Anatolia were particularly important. Trade with these regions was closely monitored (Hourani, 2013: 281). The Edirne-Dubrovnik-Avlonia road, the Edirne-Niğbolu-Braşov road leading to Transylvania, and the Istanbul-Akerman-Lwow (Lehistan) roads over the sea were placed under control. Additionally, Danube river transportation, as well as the transport of artillery and ammunition, was carried out via the Danube River and the Black Sea (ÇAĞMAN, 2016: 132).

In the southeast of the empire, the Tigris and Euphrates rivers played a crucial role in Ottoman state-building by facilitating trade transportation and enhancing agricultural production in Iraq. These rivers were strategically utilized by the Ottoman administration to integrate Iraq more effectively into the larger Ottoman territory. This integration was key to the region's economic significance within the empire (HUSSAIN, 2021: 24-25). Additionally, the Tigris-Euphrates basin held great importance for the Ottoman Empire as it provided vital transportation routes linking the Mediterranean with the Persian Gulf, fostering both trade and military mobility (HUSSAIN, 2021: 40-41).

The Ottomans controlled key Asia-Europe trade routes through Syria and Egypt, allowing goods from the Indian Ocean to pass through this region and enter the Mediterranean via ports such as Antalya in southern Anatolia (STREUSAND, 2011: 104). Ottoman authorities extended their influence by establishing small ports along the Euphrates, particularly in Fallujah and later in Ridwaniyya, where they controlled trade and collected tribute (HUSSAIN, 2021: 45). By securing control over the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, the Ottomans ensured safe passage for merchants and armies traveling between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. In the 16th century, there was significant trade with India through the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea (İnalcık, 2022: 500). The development of river transportation on the Tigris and Euphrates further expanded trade and industry in cities such as Diyarbakır and Mosul (HUSSAIN, 2021: 36-46).

The Ottomans strengthened their presence in Iraq by transporting essential resources such as grain, metal, and timber southward via the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, effectively

meeting their military needs and benefiting from the region's wealth until the 18th century (HUSSAIN, 2021: 13-14). This logistical strategy not only bolstered the empire's ability to exert control over Iraq but also ensured a steady supply of vital materials to support its broader military and economic objectives. In contrast to the mountainous terrain that separated Iraq from Anatolia, Syria and Anatolia enjoyed more integrated commercial and economic relations. This integration was facilitated by direct transportation routes and the ease of travel provided by the plains, which allowed for smoother trade and movement between these regions (MASTERS, 1988). Moreover, the geographical advantages of Syria and Anatolia promoted a more robust exchange of goods and ideas, fostering stronger political and economic ties that were less hindered by natural obstacles compared to Iraq's more isolated position.

The basic relationships between the Ottoman state-in-geography and economy:

Anatolia and Balkans	Heartland	Agricultural System, Recruitment of Soldiers
Arabian Peninsula	Religious center and Bedouin control.	Expenditure for the Ottoman treasury – Legitimacy (In Islamic Context)
Syria, Levant, Iraq	Trade hubs	Asia, Africa, and Europe connection
Egypt	Agricultural wealth and trade	Grain supply, commercial security problem, limited intervention of bureaucracy
Mediterranean	Connection Between Europe, Asia ve Africa	Problem of Control of Trade Routes
Crimea and Black Sea	Russian Problem and Steppe frontier	Grain Trade, Buffer Zone, Cavalry,
North Africa	Frontier Relations	Semi-autonomous local rulers, naval power aid

2.1. Ottoman Heartland: Anatolia and Balkans

The Ottoman Empire, which was established and expanded as a Eurasian state spanning the Anatolia-Balkans region, continued to thrive based on the strategic importance of Anatolia and the Balkans, particularly as it expanded towards the Middle East, Africa, and the North (DAVUTOĞLU, 2001: 206-207). Anatolia and the Balkans formed the heart of the Ottoman Empire. In the 15th century, the Ottoman Empire began its rise as a "Balkan Empire" after moving from Anatolia to the Balkans, with a focus on expansion in this region (ORTAYLI, 2007). This dual focus on the Balkans and Anatolia was not unique to the Ottomans; for the Byzantine Empire, these two regions were complementary, with the security of both being crucial to one another (BASKICI, 2016: 16). Despite occasional challenges in establishing political dominance, the Ottoman Empire aimed to exert greater control over these core regions, Anatolia, and Balkans, compared to others. However, central control over the mountainous areas of the Balkans was not absolute, and monasteries in remote regions sometimes served as local defense and protection centers against Ottoman forces (FAROQHI, 2010: 76-77).

Anatolia and the Balkans formed a permanent political union under the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire and the Ottoman Empire, from the 4th century to the 19th century. Under the rule of these two empires, these core regions were of vital importance for ensuring the security of areas beyond the Balkans and Anatolia. The political union that included these two regions provided the resources necessary to expand influence into Central Asia, Eastern Anatolia, the Caucasus, Iraq, and Syria (INALCIK, 2012: 2). Anatolia, a region bordered by seas on three sides, served as a bridge connecting the east-west and north-south regions of Europe, Asia, and Africa. This strategic location made Anatolia a key crossroads for trade, culture, and military movements between continents. Due to its dynamic position at the intersection of these major regions, every political entity that controlled or sought influence over Anatolia had to remain constantly vigilant, aware of the shifting balances of power and the need to secure its borders and resources (ÇALIK, 2002: 373-374).

Between the 14th and 17th centuries, Anatolia and the Balkans were of vital importance not only for luxury consumption and production for public but also for mining, which played a crucial role in the war industry. These regions were central to the export of textile products and provided key transit routes to the north of the Black Sea and Western countries (INALCIK, 2022A: 304). In mining, copper was particularly strategic for the war industry, as minerals like tin, iron, and copper were used as raw materials for weapons such as firearms, cannons, swords,

and shields. Major copper mines were located in the Balkans, including Kratova and Maydenek (Serbia), and in Anatolia, such as Gümüşhane, Küre (Kastamonu), and Keban-Ergani (SAKA, 2019: 224). Between 1500 and 1700, the silver mines of Serbia, Bosnia, and Macedonia accounted for the majority of silver production (INALCIK, 2022: 5). The most active silver mining centers in Rumelia included Novaberda, Rudnik, Karatova, Sidrekapsa, Srebrenica, and Zablina (INALCIK, 2022: 10).

Anatolia was a region that the Ottoman Empire sought to control more economically and socially than other geographic regions. Despite frequent uprisings, Anatolia was relatively calmer compared to the Balkans and Arab regions in terms of resistance against the Ottoman state apparatus and the emergence of rural rebellions (QUATAERT, 2010: 36-38). This historical fact stemmed from Anatolia's security concerns, primarily due to the density of warrior Turkmens. For the Ottomans, Anatolia had to be kept under constant pressure due to these security threats and was difficult to control because of its geographical and socio-economic conditions. The central government managed to assert control over key land and sea routes passing through Anatolia, but this control was limited to major cities, the grain-producing areas around them, and coastal ports (HOURANI, 2013: 274). In the interior, the presence of the Kizilbash Turkmens, who had religious ties to Safavid Iran, remained a security challenge. The Ottoman-Safavid conflicts, particularly in Anatolia and Eastern Anatolia, along with the ongoing presence of pro-Safavid social groups in the region after the 16th century, were major concerns for the Ottoman palace. The new Safavid State posed a significant threat to the Ottoman Empire, particularly because it offered new economic opportunities for the warrior Turkmens. When threatened or when their privileges were undermined, tribal communities relied on their unique social structures as powerful tools of resistance. Turkmen tribes, in particular, used their mobility as a weapon against oppression. During times of famine or political turmoil, they would abandon designated areas, hide in the mountains, or roam the countryside (KASABA, 2009: 36-37). Simultaneously, under the strain of the Celali rebellions, producers, intermediaries, and consumers within the supply system faced significant challenges. Villagers fiercely resisted surrendering their mills and flour, often engaging in armed conflict at the cost of their lives. This period saw widespread devastation in many Anatolian cities (KARADEMIR, 2014: 100-101). Additionally, both empires in Eastern Anatolia relied on tribal aristocracies, particularly the Kurds, to establish military and political dominance, creating a risky security dynamic (ŞAHIN, 2013: 91).

Apart from major cities like Edirne, Sofia, Thessaloniki, and Athens, the population in the Ottoman Balkans was sparse, but the region excelled in agricultural production. By the end of the 17th century, the rural Balkans were supplying food for Istanbul's population, which had surpassed half a million. Due to the ease of transportation and the fertility of the soil, the Balkans became Istanbul's primary wheat depot, surpassing Anatolia in this regard (INALCIK, 2022A: 202-203). Istanbul was the intersection point of the Balkans and Anatolia and was the transit point of East-West and South-North trade. Trade in foodstuffs such as wheat, barley, meat, oil, salt, fish, and raw materials such as leather, cotton and iron could only be made by land and sea through Istanbul (INALCIK, 2022A: 302).

The Ottoman administration placed great importance on internal trade to ensure the livelihood of the capital. Istanbul's food supply was a critical issue for the central government. Products such as wheat, lamb, sheep, and beef were closely monitored by the administration and were central to trade. Wheat traders typically supplied wheat through contracts made with the state (KÖSE, 2020: 3896-3897).[17] A large amount of goods came to Istanbul by sea, and among those engaged in this trade, those with the largest capital were generally merchants. The merchants, who became rich especially in the Anatolia-Istanbul-Balkans line from the 16th century to the mid-17th century, had a key place in the trade between the Ottoman Empire and Europe and provided a significant amount of capital to the cash needs of the state (INALCIK, 2022A: 283-285).

The political and economic unity established by the Ottoman Empire in Anatolia and the Balkans during the 16th century sparked a commercial revival in cities such as Istanbul, Bursa, Edirne, Gallipoli, Thessaloniki, and other Balkan towns. Industries like cotton in Western Anatolia, sofa manufacturing in Ankara and Tosya, and silk production in Bursa and Istanbul were exporting goods to Europe and the North. The broadcloth industry thrived in Istanbul and Thessaloniki, while leather works and the shoe industry were particularly important in Edirne (INALCIK, 2022A: 123). These products were not only exported directly but also sold through fairs. During the Ottoman period, numerous fairs operated between the Balkans and Anatolia. While the Balkan fairs, such as those in Uzuncaova, İslimye, Petrich,

[17] In addition to being one of the important centers supplying copper to the armoury, Gümüşhane was also used to provide the raw materials required to print copper money (SAKA, 2019: 229). Copper and silver were important mineral resources in Anatolia. Regionally, salt and alum mines were prominent in Western Anatolia (ŞAHİN, and EMECEN, 1991: 124). The main silver mining centers in Anatolia were Gümüşhane, Keban, Ergani and İnegöl, but the amount of silver obtained from these old mines was not sufficient (INALCIK, 2022: 11)

Siroz, and Silivri, had a more international character, those in Anatolia were smaller in scale (ERDOĞAN, 2016: 126-127).

2.1.1. Anatolia

The Anatolian peninsula was a transit trade center that formed a bridge between Asia and Europe due to its rich natural resources and different climates during the Ottoman period. In addition to fertile lands and developing agricultural techniques, nomadic animal husbandry also came to the fore after the arrival of the Turks in Anatolia (TABAKOĞLU, 1999: 17). Although it had significant advantages in terms of the Anatolian crossing bridge, it was also a geography that created problems in the security of economic and social life due to problems arising from physical geography, especially in this period when transportation facilities and state capacity were limited. Difficulties arising from the logistical complexity of the Black Sea and Mediterranean (Taurus Mountains) coasts (GOFFMAN, 20004), the existence of many autonomous units resulting from the rugged terrain of Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia caused perpetual difficulties. State sovereignty in certain geographical regions was under the challenge of various alternative political, economic, and social structures due to the difficulties of geography as well (KLEIN, 2011).



General Directorate of Mapping. Turkey Physical Map, 2023, https://www.harita.gov.tr/uploads/files/products/turkiye-fiziki-haritasi-dilsiz-1768.pdf.

In terms of Ottoman sovereignty, the problems encountered by the Ottoman state apparatus were not only economic and social but also related to physical geography. Although

transportation in Anatolia under Ottoman rule initially seemed easy due to its proximity to the palace, it actually faced many difficulties. Transportation in Anatolia primarily occurred in the east-west direction, influenced by the shape of the peninsula and the orientation of its landforms. North-south roads became widespread only in later periods with the advancement of technical capabilities. Since the rivers in Anatolia were not very navigable, real river transportation was not possible (TUNCEL, 1991: 110). The main source of transportation difficulties was the mountainous nature of Anatolia, with the high steppe plateaus in the interior being surrounded by mountain ranges running almost parallel to the coast in the south and north, converging in the east (BASKICI, 2016: 17).

Topographic Map. *Euphrates River Map*. Topographic-map.com, https://en-gb.topographic-map.com/map-fj4z4s/Euphrates/?center=38.47939%2C37.70508&zoom=5.

Anatolia was an important part of the silk road system. It was the last stop for road transportation coming from the east and sea transportation coming from the west. It served as a road-sea integration area where caravans from the east could reach their final destination by road (BAKIRCI, 2014: 65). Ports such as Istanbul, Izmir, Antalya, Alanya, Sinop, and Trabzon were also located at the ends of the main roads. The roads connecting Istanbul to the Far East followed two main routes through Anatolia, contributing to the development of various cities. Additionally, Istanbul and Edirne were connected to Albanian ports, the Danube, and Dubrovnik, and were organized as a free trade zone for the West (especially Venice), Egypt, and Syria (TABAKOĞLU, 1999: 20).

Starting from the early 15th century, until the end of the 17th century, Ottoman rule in Erzincan, Amasya, and Tokat narrowed the sea route of Trabzon by shifting the Silk Road to Bursa. With the annexation of Antalya and Alanya, the Ottomans gained some control over the West's trade with India and the Arab world (TABAKOĞLU, 1999: 21). The main Silk Road reaching Bursa followed the Tabriz-Erzurum-Tokat route. Other important trade routes, such as the Damascus-Aleppo-Bursa road and the Alexandria-Antalya sea route, were also connected to this line. Commercial goods such as spices, sugar, paint, and soap were transported to Bursa from Syria and Egypt via these roads (INALCIK, 1992: 448).

What distinguished Anatolia from other regions along the Silk Road was its strategic location, connection between Asia, Europe, and Africa. This made Anatolia a key hub for the movement of goods, people, and ideas, increasing its importance in global trade. Additionally, the Balkans played a critical role in linking Anatolia to Europe, further amplifying the region's significance as a crossroads between East and West (BAKIRCI, 2014: 69-70). Recognizing the potential of this advantageous position, the Ottomans placed great emphasis on ensuring Anatolia served as a key transit trade zone, offering merchants an efficient and profitable route for their goods. To encourage trade and maintain the region’s role in the Silk Road network, the Ottomans kept customs duties low, and thus attracting merchants and stimulating economic activity (TABAKOĞLU, 1999: 20).

In the 16th century, Anatolia emerged as a significant exporter of textile products to Europe, particularly to the Balkans and the northern regions of the Black Sea. The region’s textile industry became an important center in international trade, with Anatolian products being highly sought after in these areas. Anatolian producers were able to partially compete with European products, maintaining a foothold in the market until the end of the 18th century, despite the rise of European industrialization (INALCIK, 2022A: 305). Different regions of Anatolia specialized in the production of silk, cotton, and other woven textiles, meeting both domestic and foreign demand. Once domestic needs were satisfied, Anatolian producers turned their attention to international markets, particularly in northern countries and Europe, where cotton could not be grown. These regions relied heavily on Anatolian exports to meet their textile needs, solidifying Anatolia’s position as a key supplier in global trade (INALCIK, 2022E: 493).

Since the 16th century, the cities that stood out in silk fabric production in Anatolia were cities such as Bursa, Istanbul, Edirne and Amasya, and they continued these features even

though production decreased in some periods (KIVRIM and ELMACI, 2011: 718).[18] From the beginning of the 17th century, in addition to silk production in Bursa and silk production in Ankara, Kastamonu, Manisa, Isparta and their surroundings became important centers in cotton weaving. Trabzon and its surroundings stood out in linen fabric production. Tokat, on the other hand, became another region that came to the fore in the weaving industry because it was on the caravan route extending from Iran to Western Anatolia (ERGENÇ, 1988: 519-521).

Between the 16th and 17th centuries, the supply of Ottoman and Persian silk increased significantly due to rising demand and soaring prices in Europe. While this supply growth remained steady in Syria and Greece, it was disrupted in Anatolia due to political unrest. The Celali rebellions of the early 17th century were the primary cause of decreased silk production (ÇIZAKÇA, 1985: 360). These rebellions not only hindered the silk trade but also severely affected the exchange of other goods, particularly disrupting trade routes through Syria and Iraq (UZUNÇARŞILI, 1988C: 125). With widespread chaos dominating rural areas, the turmoil led to interruptions not only in Anatolia's silk production but also in Iran's silk supply (ÇIZAKÇA, 1985: 361).

The 16th and 17th centuries marked the peak of Anatolia’s silk fabric production. Istanbul emerged as the second-largest silk weaving center in Anatolia after Bursa. In addition to Bursa and Istanbul, Edirne, Tokat, Amasya, Manisa, Erzurum, Bilecik, and Mardin were significant silk weaving hubs (GUDIASHVILI, 1999: 90–94). The transportation of silk and its raw materials relied heavily on strategic routes. The Erzurum–Erzincan–Tokat–Amasya–Bursa route gained significant importance during this period, offering a more efficient alternative to the older sea route starting from Trabzon. This overland route facilitated quicker access to Bursa's bustling silk markets, linking it with production centers in eastern and central Anatolia (ERGENÇ, 1988: 504–507). Bursa’s prominence extended well beyond production. The city served as a processing and trading hub, receiving silk from various regions of Anatolia, and integrating it into the wider Ottoman and international silk trade networks. This dominance continued until the 18th century, reflecting the city's enduring significance in the production, refinement, and commerce of silk goods (GUDIASHVILI, 1999: 89; ERGENÇ, 1988: 503–552).

[18] Bursa was initially dominated by Italian merchants coming from the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea, but when Mehmed II excluded Italian merchants, it came under Ottoman control, but Genoa and Venetian merchants continued to trade (STREUSAND, 2011: 104-106).

The Bursa silk industry was a vital market not only for Persian silk but also for Arab and Indian spices, medicines, and dyes. Various types of silk fabrics, such as velvet, kemha, and satin, were woven in Bursa (INALCIK, 2022A: 306–307). Spices were exported from Bursa to Florence, Wallachia, Bogdan, and Lviv. Florentine traders favoured Bursa as a marketplace, finding it more profitable to exchange spices for fabric there than to trade gold in Egypt and Syria. Bursa also served as a hub for shipping Europe's high-value woolen products to eastern countries. Silk merchants would purchase these woollens in Bursa and take them to Iran on their return journeys (INALCIK, 2022A: 124). Iranian silk, in turn, was transported along a complex network of trading cities across Anatolia, connecting production centers in the East with major commercial hubs like Istanbul, Bursa, and Aleppo. These cities served as pivotal nodes in the vast trade routes of the Ottoman Empire, ensuring that Iranian silk reached domestic markets and European buyers. This intricate trade system underscored Bursa's dual role as both a destination for global luxury goods and a gateway for their redistribution, solidifying its importance in the transcontinental trade of the early modern period (HOURANI, 2013: 279).

The ease of transportation to Bursa also influenced other regions. Although not in its immediate vicinity, Amasya (in inner Anatolia) emerged as a significant area due to its proximity to the Black Sea and accessible transportation options. In various economic activities, such as silk production, weaving, and dyeing, Amasya stood out because of its close connection to the Sinop Port, which was linked to the Black Sea. Regarding the southern segment of this trade route, the Antalya Port on the Mediterranean coast was an important export hub for Anatolia during the 16th century until the end of the 17th century gradually contracted. However, by the 18th century, Antalya's trade activity declined due to shifts in Mediterranean commerce and the rising prominence of Izmir crystallized. On the Black Sea coastal strip, Trabzon Port gained prominence in the Eastern Black Sea region's commercial activities from the 16th century onward but began to decline in the 18th century. Goods were transported directly into Anatolia from the port of Trabzon, highlighting its strategic role in the region's trade networks (ERGENÇ, 1988: 524–527). The port of Trabzon served as a critical route for transporting commercial goods directly into Anatolia, playing a vital role in facilitating domestic trade. The goods traded through this port included copper, hazelnuts, iron, wood, and various handicrafts, highlighting the region's diverse economic activities (ERGENÇ, 1988: 524–525). Valuable silk fabrics produced in Amasya were transported to Kefe via Sinop, demonstrating the interconnectedness of Anatolia's trade networks. By the 16th century, Sinop

had become a major hub for silk, henna, various dyes, and goods imported from India and the Arab world. This flourishing trade underscored the strategic importance of Sinop and Trabzon as key nodes in the broader regional and international trade systems, linking Anatolia with both the Black Sea and beyond (KIVRIM and ELMACI, 2011: 717).

The thriving trade in valuable silk fabrics from Amasya, transported through Sinop and reaching Kefe, was indicative of the broader interconnectedness of Anatolia's trade networks, which also included vital goods like cotton. Cotton was processed, and fabrics with various patterns were woven in different cities across Anatolia. The cotton grown in the villages was sold to local tradesmen in the cities, and after being processed, it was offered for sale in the cotton market. Weavers then used this cotton to create a variety of fabrics (ERGENÇ, 1988: 519–520). Cotton was brought to the production centers from regions such as Western Anatolia, including Isparta, Burdur, Silifke, Beypazarı, and the Yeşilırmak Valley. Key raw material regions included Denizli, Tire, Menemen, Manisa, Çine, and Bergama in Western Anatolia; Karaman, Konya, and Niğde in Central Anatolia; and Merzifon, Zile, Tokat, Kastamonu, Küre, and Tosya in the north. Additionally, northern countries, ranging from the Danube to the Caucasus, largely imported Anatolian and Rumelian cotton (INALCIK, 2022E: 496).

The main cotton basins were the Adana, Gediz, Büyük Menderes, and Küçük Menderes plains (TUNCEL, 1991: 109). Most of the raw cotton came from these regions and was transported to provinces such as Istanbul, Bursa, Kastamonu, Amasya, Sinop, Kayseri, and Konya. It was dyed and processed in these cities as well. In the final stage, it was exported as a completed product. In Istanbul, one of the most important production centers, raw cotton primarily came from the Gelibolu, Manisa, Bergama, Kırkağaç, and Akhisar regions (INALCIK, 2022E: 495). The main caravan routes of Anatolia, particularly at the Kayseri junction on the northern caravan route connecting Istanbul to Erzurum, were known for cotton and leather products woven by local weavers from the Adana-Tarsus region (FAROQHI, 2002: 42-43). [19]

[19] Leatherworking was one of the oldest arts in Anatolia. Manisa and its surroundings were a highly active region in this regard. After the skins were purchased, they were washed and placed in pits to be processed using special methods. Leather and leather were obtained as a result of long processes, and these products were sold to tradesmen who made all kinds of shoes (ERGENÇ, 1988: 521-522).

Until the 17th century, the centers and routes mentioned above were dominant. However, starting in the 17th century, Izmir (in western Anatolia) became the most important center for domestic, foreign, and transit trade. The land route leading to Izmir via Aleppo and Central Anatolia gained significant importance (TABAK, 2008: 180). Izmir became the final stop for caravans coming from Anatolia. Iranian silk, which had previously travelled to Europe via Aleppo and Iskenderun until the 17th century, shifted direction in the second half of this century and began to pass through Erzurum and Tokat before arriving in Izmir, from where it was sent to Europe. From Izmir, Bursa silk, Aegean cotton, Uşak carpets, acorns, grapes, and figs were exported (KÜTÜKOĞLU, 2001: 522).

In the 17th and 18th centuries, Izmir emerged as a crucial center in global trade networks, particularly in textiles. British and Dutch traders sourced high-quality Angora goat yarn from Izmir, a key commodity in the European textile industry. Despite the Ottoman Empire's restrictions on the export of Angora goat wool, which were enforced to protect domestic production, illegal shipments continued, underscoring the growing demand for this prized material (ERGENÇ, 1988: 518). At the same time, Izmir's position as a commercial hub was strengthened by the influx of raw silk from Iran, which created new economic opportunities for Armenian merchants in the city (FAROQHI, 2010: 85). This development reflects Izmir's integration into broader trade routes, where the city's merchants played a vital role in connecting the Eastern Mediterranean to European markets, facilitating the exchange of valuable commodities such as silk and wool. Wheat, barley, grapes, figs, olives, and vegetables generated significant income for Izmir. In addition to these exports, materials such as pomegranates, almonds, pears, turmeric, soap, wax, rope, hemp, sailcloth, and olive oil were supplied from Izmir to the people of Istanbul, the palace, and the army (KÜTÜKOĞLU, 2001: 521). By the 18th century, Izmir had grown into an even larger trading center, surpassing Aleppo in importance for both France and England. While Aleppo's share in France's Middle Eastern purchases remained around 10 percent, Izmir's share increased to 38 percent by the end of the century (MARCUS, 1989: 171). Izmir became France's primary supplier of silk, cotton, wool, and camel hair in the Middle East. Both Izmir and Istanbul absorbed most of the French fabric, making them the largest buyers of French products in the region (MARCUS, 1989: 172).

Although Ankara (central Anatolia) did not experience the same growth as Izmir, its significant role in textile production, particularly from the late 16th century, allowed it to maintain its commercial importance throughout the 17th and 18th centuries. Fabrics woven from Angora goat wool, produced in the region, were especially popular among the elite

(ERGENÇ, 1988: 516). While Ankara was geographically distant from major trade routes, it remained an active participant in interregional trade due to its production of high-quality mohair textiles, made from Angora goats indigenous to the area. Foreign merchants, including Poles, Venetians, and the British, visited the city, contributing to its commercial vitality and facilitating its integration into broader trade networks (FAROQHI, 2002: 26–27; 100–105). In this context, Izmir, as a rapidly growing trade center, became a major hub for Angora goat yarn, with British and Dutch traders sourcing this material despite restrictions on its export (ERGENÇ, 1988: 518). Meanwhile, raw silk imported from Iran created new market opportunities in Izmir for Armenian merchants, further solidifying the city's status in the regional and international trade systems (FAROQHI, 2010: 85). While Izmir flourished as a key commercial gateway, Ankara's continued prominence in mohair production highlights the diverse and interconnected nature of Anatolian trade during this period.

Ankara, long recognized for its production of soft fabrics, became a significant center of textile trade starting in the 16th century. The city's soft fabrics, particularly those made from Angora goat wool, were exported to France in considerable quantities. However, imports of soft fabrics from Ankara to France began to decline in the last quarter of the 17th century as French production of similar goods increased, though trade picked up again in the 18th century (ERGENÇ, 1988: 518). Despite this, European competition had a relatively minimal impact on Ankara's textile industry in the 17th and 18th centuries, with a steady volume of textiles continuing to be exported to France through the mid-1700s (ERGENÇ, 1988: 517). In addition to soft fabrics, trade in fine cotton fabrics, Indian cotton textiles, and mixed silk and woolen fabrics was common in Ankara during this period, reflecting the city's active involvement in both regional and international markets (FAROQHI, 2002: 28–30). This trade was part of a broader pattern of textile exchange in Anatolia. While cities like Izmir and Ankara were vital in exporting Angora goat wool, Izmir itself flourished as a major hub for raw silk from Iran, attracting foreign merchants from various regions. British and Dutch traders sourced Angora goat yarn from Izmir, and the city became an important center for trade in silk and textiles despite restrictions on wool exports (ERGENÇ, 1988: 518; FAROQHI, 2010: 85). Thus, both Ankara and Izmir played crucial roles in the interconnected textile trade of the 17th and 18th centuries, contributing to Anatolia's prominence as a textile producer and exporter.

Wheat production played a significant role in Anatolia's agricultural economy, with many sanjaks (administrative units) relying on it as a staple crop, often constituting half or more of total agricultural output. However, in regions where specialized crops such as rice, cotton,

and vineyards were cultivated, the share of wheat production decreased, falling to 25-30 percent. Areas such as the Tosya-Boyabat regions, Adana, Manisa, and Harput saw a shift toward other agricultural products, particularly cotton in some areas (ÖZ, 1999: 70). In 16th century onwards, agricultural production struggled to keep pace with population growth, leading to a decline in wheat availability per capita across the country. Social turmoil and wars exacerbated this issue, as lands were abandoned and the population decreased, further diminishing production (KARADEMIR, 2014: 37). As a result, wheat had to be imported from Egypt to meet domestic demand, a pattern that was repeated several times throughout the period (KARADEMIR, 2014: 75).

The supply of timber for shipbuilding played a crucial role in the economic and military strategies of the Ottoman Empire, with the forests of Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia, particularly those in Maraş and Malatya, providing essential resources. Pine, valued for its buoyancy and workability, was especially critical due to its resin content, which made it ideal for various boat parts (HUSSAIN, 2021: 74). In addition to timber, the Ottoman navy also relied on Anatolia for a range of other materials, including honey, cooking oil, rice, bread, wheat, and timber. These supplies were often coordinated by local authorities, and penalties were imposed on those who attempted to avoid their obligations (FAROQHI, 2010: 103-105). In this context, Urfa Birecik emerged as an important center for shipbuilding, benefiting from its strategic location near the Taurus foothills and the Euphrates River, which provided the ideal conditions for the construction of river vessels (HUSSAIN, 2021: 60-61).

In the 17th century, Ottoman miri lands were increasingly allocated to animal husbandry rather than grain cultivation. The declining demand for high-priced grains such as wheat prompted a shift towards the production of forage crops and animal feed. Barley, millet, oats, and corn became more significant, especially due to their links to animal husbandry (TABAK, 2008: 171). During the late 16th and early 17th centuries, many villages in Central Anatolia saw a decrease in population, with some settlements being completely abandoned. The flatter, more accessible parts of Central Anatolia remained largely unstable until the mid-19th century (FAROQHI, 2010: 66-68). By the early 17th century, the conversion of vacant timars into iltizam (the practice of selling land tax in cash) had become widespread. However, local conditions continued to influence land management, and some fief-like landowners in Anatolia persisted in their traditional practices into the 18th century (FAROQHI, 2010: 90-95).

In addition to the agricultural production of settled communities, nomadic and semi-nomadic Turkmen groups played a vital role in the economy. They contributed to agriculture by migrating between regions to participate in harvests and engaging in farming activities during their movements. Furthermore, they participated in the manufacture of textiles, soap, and other commercial goods, and provided essential transport animals such as camels, horses, and mules (KASABA, 2009: 32-34). In the first half of the 16th century, the nomadic population, particularly those who settled in the plains, played a key role in accelerating the process of colonization and settlement. While the volume of nomadism declined after the 17th century, it remained a significant and often problematic issue until the end of the 19th century (TABAK, 2008: 128-129).

During the late 16th century, some of these nomadic and semi-nomadic communities became actively involved in the Celali rebellions, turning to alternative forms of a plunder economy to sustain themselves. This period was marked by a complex interplay of factors, including widespread famine, systemic issues in land distribution, and the destabilizing influence of Safavid propaganda among Turkmen tribal warriors in Ottoman Anatolia (AKDAĞ, 1975). The influence of these groups persisted into the 17th century, and even by the late 18th century, they continued to generate centrifugal effects. These communities, along with others who were armed but ostensibly settled, significantly disrupted economic stability. Their destructive actions included road robberies and other forms of banditry, which were strongly associated with the Celali uprisings and later similar actions. These movements, involving warriors and other plunderers from the lower classes seeking material gain, caused widespread turmoil, and impeded both local and regional commerce (FAROQHI, 2010: 18).

Even during the classical age, a period when the Ottoman state apparatus was at its strongest, warrior Turkmens in Anatolia could easily abandon their families to join plundering campaigns in the Caucasus (YILDIRIM, 2017). This dynamic had existed in Anatolia before the Safavids, but it became more pronounced with the establishment of the Safavid State. The rise of the Safavid Dynasty rendered the eastern borders of Ottoman Anatolia increasingly ambiguous. Although the Ottoman Empire expanded its sphere of influence by capturing Iraq in the southeast, the empire's borders remained unstable (FAROQHI, 2010: 57).

In the classical age, Anatolia served not only as a crucial trade route but also as a region with significant security challenges for the Ottoman Empire. The mountainous terrain of Anatolia, combined with the alternative war economies and social resistance of warrior

Turkmen communities, contributed to a persistent state of insecurity and social disorder. In this region, where the Ottoman palace, along with its military and bureaucratic apparatus, was most concentrated, the state faced a dual challenge: it had to enforce its authority through oppressive measures while simultaneously struggling to control the export of essential raw materials. Despite efforts to regulate trade, the state apparatus failed to prevent the smuggling of banned primary products along the Aegean and Mediterranean coasts (GOFFMAN, 2004). This reflects the broader socio-political dynamics of the time, where nomadic and semi-nomadic communities, such as the Turkmen, played a disruptive role, often engaging in plunder or resistance.

These groups, alongside the Celali rebels, contributed to instability by exploiting opportunities in alternative economies and defying state authority. The inability to fully subdue such groups and regulate the economy further emphasized the limits of Ottoman control in Anatolia. As is clearly seen, even in the classical period, the Ottoman state apparatus had difficulty in establishing sovereignty in Anatolia, its core geography, despite mobilizing all state capacity. Especially in the 16th and 17th centuries, they could not escape the centrifugal effect created by the Turkmens, Kizilbash, Celali rebels and smugglers at different times. State activity was more intense on trade routes and coastal strips, but it was more limited, especially in the inaccessible inner and mountainous regions of Anatolia. Under these conditions, the influence of local notables, which would increase in the 18th century, found a fertile dynamic to crystallize. The dynamic of decentralization increased the possibility of the formation of an opposing founding power against Ottoman dynasty, which the dynasty had feared most since its foundation and even made the core geography of Anatolia fragile.

2.1.2. Balkans

For the Ottomans, the primarily important geographies in the Balkans were regions directly governed by the Ottomans, as opposed to vassal states, or allied regions such as Moldavia, Wallachia, Transylvania, and Ragusa-Dubrovnik (SUGAR, 1996: 60-64).[20] Located away from the main routes of Ottoman expansionism, the Principality of Transylvania was an

[20] The princes of Moldavia and Wallachia theoretically had absolute power but were "officially" elected by the nobility and clergy by popular acceptance. They ruled with an advisory council consisting mostly of high-ranking figures drawn from prominent noble families (SUGAR, 1996: 118-120).

autonomous Ottoman vassal state in its internal affairs (AGOSTON, 2018: 293; SUGAR, 1996: 114-116). Full autonomy and tax exemption were granted in hard-to-reach mountainous regions such as Northern Albania and Montenegro, where the Ottomans encountered resistance. Certain regions, such as Athens, Rhodes, Yanina, and the region of Timok, were exempt from regular imperial rule. Moldavia and Wallachia were given autonomy in exchange for tribute (STAVRIANOS, 1958: 101).

Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection. (n.d.). Europe, 1815-1905. University of Texas Libraries. https://maps.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/europe1815_1905.jpg

Ottoman settlement in the Balkans was predominantly focused on low plains, fertile river valleys, and areas of low altitude, reflecting both strategic and agricultural priorities (TABAK, 2008: 124). The Balkans, situated in southeastern Europe, occupied a pivotal geographical position as a crossroads linking three continents: Europe, Asia, and Africa. The region's natural topography, marked by mountain ranges, extensive river networks, and its surrounding seas - the Marmara, Aegean, Ionian, and Adriatic - made it both a natural barrier and a vital corridor for migration, trade, and military campaigns (KURT and YAŞAR, 2018: 429-430). This geographic configuration positioned the Balkan Peninsula as a key land passage and a melting pot of diverse cultures, religions, and political systems. Its strategic importance as the intersection of major trade and military routes heightened its vulnerability to external pressures, internal divisions, and frequent episodes of political and social upheaval, especially

during the expansion of empires like the Ottoman. The region's history has been shaped by its dual role as both a gateway and a contested frontier zone. [21] Specifically, the Danube River historically served as a link between the region and Central Europe. Its location made it a historical battlefield for empires and cultures and shaped its destiny from ancient times to the present day (STAVRIANOS, 1958: 1).

> "The Danube River stands out as the most remarkable river due to its length and historical importance. Starting from southern Germany, it passes through Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary before entering the peninsula. The river passes through the historical Yugoslav plains, passes through the Carpathians via the Iron Gate, and then flows eastwards, marking the borders between countries such as Romania and Bulgaria. It eventually reaches the Black Sea and serves as a navigable waterway connecting the Balkans to Central Europe and the Russian steppes" (STAVRIANOS, 1958: 4-5)

The mountainous structure of the Balkans was a significant impediment to agriculture, internal trade, political unity, and transportation. Its rugged and fragmented terrain restricted the development of expansive agricultural lands, disrupted the flow of goods and commerce, and created natural barriers that complicated efforts to unify disparate regions under a single political authority. Additionally, the challenges of constructing efficient transportation networks through the steep and inaccessible landscape further isolated communities and hindered economic and social integration (MAZOWER, 2017: 47-50). The Balkans presented both

[21] Selim I's successor, Suleiman the Magnificent, continued to expand westward, capturing Hungary and besieging Vienna. Simultaneously, Ottoman forces engaged in conflicts with the Persians in the East, the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean, and the Venetians and Hapsburgs in the Mediterranean (STAVRIANOS, 1958: 67). As it expanded in the Balkans, Western European states, especially France, Hungary, Poland, Venice, and Genoa, were politically influential in the Balkans. However, by the 15th century, the influence of some states in the region had diminished, and in the 16th century, the border between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans advanced to the vicinity of Vienna (FAROQHI. 2010: 56). Due to the Mediterranean climate, the Balkans experience irregular rainfall and produce olives, grapes, figs and citrus fruits. Goats and sheep are common in these regions due to the scarcity of forests and grassy pastures. In contrast, the Continental climate has a more even distribution of precipitation throughout the year and longer, colder winters. The central mountainous areas are covered with forests, and wheat, rye, oats, corn, and flax, similar to Central European agricultural products, can be grown in the valleys (STAVRIANOS, 1958: 6). The Great Hungarian Plain in particular experienced deforestation and population decline due to the Ottoman-Habsburg wars, which led to soil erosion and population flight, turning these lands into a permanent border battlefield (SUGAR, 1996: 93-98).

obstacles and passageways to invaders and settlers due to its diverse geography, consisting of fertile valleys, barren limestone areas, mountains, forests, fjords, numerous islands in the Aegean and Adriatic seas, and numerous mountain ranges extending in equal directions. The Carpathian Mountains in the north, the Balkan Range, the Rhodope Mountains, and other mountain ranges in the south made the Balkans open to occupation (STAVRIANOS, 1958: 2-3).

> "There are four main mountain ranges in the Balkan peninsula. The Dinar range, which is a continuation of the Alps in the west, descends to the south along the Adriatic Sea. These mountains, which cover the west of today's Yugoslavia and Albania, extend to Greece under the name of Pindus and reach the Mediterranean in the Peloponnese peninsula. The second mountain range is the Carpathians. It descends from the north of Romania to the south. The third mountain range is the mountains known as the Balkan mountains, which divide Bulgaria in two from west to east. The fourth mountain range is the Rhodopes. These mountains, which curve towards the east after descending from the west of the Balkan Mountains to the south, pass through the north of Thrace and extend to the Black Sea" (KARPAT, 1992: 25).

Silent Resident. "Topographic Map of the Balkan Peninsula." Wikimedia Commons. Last modified November 14, 2015. Accessed December 14, 2024. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Balkan_topo_en.jpg.

Roman roads, vital for both military and commercial purposes, remained functional in the Ottoman Balkans, serving as key transportation arteries. While northern regions of the Balkans were conducive to various forms of transport, reaching the central and southern areas was considerably more challenging. All major roads were connected to Istanbul, with two prominent routes: the Belgrade–Niš–Plovdiv–Edirne–Istanbul road and the Belgrade–Niš–Thessaloniki–Kavala–Keşan–Istanbul road. Cities along these routes emerged as economic hubs (KARPAT, 1992: 26-27), playing a crucial role in generating tax revenue for the state, supporting production, and facilitating trade (SUGAR, 1996: 72-73). The road from Edirne to Thessaloniki, which passed through the historic Via Egnatia, held significant importance for transportation and commerce (HACISALİHOĞLU, 2013: 587). Thessaloniki, a key city along this route, served as a major supplier of raw wool to Ottoman producers. This demand for wool persisted until it intensified with the rise of industrial production in Venice and Genoa (TABAK, 2008: 135).

From the earliest period of Ottoman presence until the mid-19th century, merchants traveling with armed caravans faced significant security challenges along the trade routes in the Balkans (STOIANOVICH, 1994: 190-193). In this region, the state initially controlled the valuation of raw materials and collected taxes prior to their allocation to guilds. However, over time, merchants gained considerable influence by actively participating in local decision-making processes. These merchants, who engaged in long-distance trade and played a crucial role in boosting customs revenues, were indispensable to the Ottoman economy, serving as key facilitators of commerce and state revenue (SUGAR, 1996: 81-86).

The state initially controlled the valuation of raw materials and collected taxes before distributing them to the guilds. However, in later periods, influential figures such as merchants and notables gained considerable sway in local decision-making processes due to their wealth and connections. These merchants, engaged in long-distance trade and making significant contributions to customs revenues, played a vital role in the Ottoman economy (SUGAR, 1996: 81-86). On the other hand, it was common for producers to bypass state channels when sending grain from the Danube and Rumelian coasts to Istanbul. Instead of supplying the state or European markets, they often sold to private intermediaries in Anatolia due to the low prices offered by the central bureaucracy. Notably, some products from regions such as Morea, Trikala, Euboea, and Lepanto were occasionally sold to Europeans outside the state's oversight (ÇAĞMAN, 2016: 135).

The Ottoman Empire prioritized trade in the Balkans to enhance economic integration and maintain political stability in the region. The city-state of Dubrovnik exemplified this approach, serving as a key Adriatic trading hub that connected the empire to European markets. To support its economic role, the Ottomans granted Dubrovnik significant privileges, including reduced trade taxes, which incentivized commerce and fostered mutual benefit. In addition, the empire adopted a flexible administrative approach, allowing limited autonomy in distant regions such as Dubrovnik and vassal states like Transylvania, where direct control was logistically challenging. This strategy reflected the Ottomans' pragmatic approach to governance, ensuring the continued flow of goods and strengthening their influence across diverse territories (SUGAR, 1996: 190-191). This pragmatic arrangement allowed Dubrovnik merchants to pay lower import taxes than foreign traders within Ottoman territory (SUGAR, 1996: 182-183; FAROQHI, 2010: 81-82). Such policies fostered a stable environment for trade and strengthened the empire's connections with regional networks, boosting its economic resilience. Additionally, Dubrovnik's favourable tax conditions contributed to its prosperity, making it a model of mutually beneficial Ottoman diplomacy.

Although formally recognized as a vassal state, Dubrovnik's relationship with Istanbul diverged significantly from the typical Ottoman vassal model. Its republican governance structure presented a contrast to the empire's hierarchical systems, fostering a unique diplomatic dynamic. Dubrovnik negotiated special agreements that secured extensive commercial privileges in key trade hubs, enabling it to thrive economically (SUGAR, 1996: 175). As a tax-paying city-state, Dubrovnik not only contributed substantial revenues to the Ottoman treasury but also served as a critical site for exchanging prisoners of war, highlighting its strategic importance (FAROQHI, 2010: 38). The substantial taxes paid by Dubrovnik were particularly advantageous for the Ottoman sultans, exceeding the revenues derived from some of the empire's wealthiest directly governed port cities of the era (FAROQHI, 2010: 131). This financial arrangement underscored Dubrovnik's exceptional status, as its contributions both bolstered the imperial economy and reinforced its position as a vital intermediary in Ottoman-European relations.

It facilitated sea and land trade connections with neighbouring powers such as Dubrovnik, Venice, Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia, Hungary, and Naples (SUGAR, 1996: 170-171; UZUNÇARŞILI, 1988B: 407). Additionally, Dubrovnik exported various types and qualities of its own and European woven fabrics, as well as European glassware, medicines, needles, soap, and salt to Anatolia. From the Turkish provinces, goods such as wool, leather, silk, grain, high-

quality wood, and wax for carpentry were exported (PASKALEVA, 1967: 41). These trade exchanges not only bolstered the economic strength of Dubrovnik but also strengthened its diplomatic ties with the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, the city's strategic role as an intermediary facilitated cultural exchanges, influencing artistic and commercial practices across the region.

During the 17th century in the Balkans, animal husbandry emerged as a significant economic activity, and the introduction of corn production in the 16th century reduced reliance on grains, providing partial security to producers (WALLERSTEIN and TABAK, 1999: 205). From the late 17th century, the Balkans increasingly supplied livestock and animal products, such as wool and leather, to Ottoman cities and global markets, a trend accelerated by Ottoman economic policies and growing urban demand in the 18th and 19th centuries. Meat, a basic staple for sustaining Istanbul's population, was predominantly supplied from the Balkans. In particular, live sheep herds were transported by road from the Balkans to Istanbul. The plains of Thrace greatly facilitated transportation from the region to the city. Conversely, the Bosphorus posed a significant challenge for transporting sheep from Anatolia to Istanbul (ÇAĞMAN, 2016: 141). This logistical advantage positioned the Balkans as a critical supplier of livestock to the Ottoman capital. Additionally, the development of organized trade routes and market networks in the Balkans strengthened the region's economic integration into the Ottoman system.

Livestock breeding constituted a significant commercial activity in the Balkans, particularly in and around Edirne. Among the substantial capital owners in this region, those engaged in animal husbandry occupied a prominent position (INALCIK, 2022A: 290). While agricultural production declined under Ottoman rule due to widespread land abandonment, livestock farming experienced considerable growth as unused fields were repurposed for animal husbandry (KÁLDY-NAGY, 1974: 505). By the 17th century, the majority of farms in Edirne specialized in livestock breeding, reflecting its centrality to the local economy (INALCIK, 2022A: 330). In addition to providing meat, other essential goods such as grain, oil, honey, cheese, and bacon were transported from the Balkans and the Black Sea to meet the needs of Istanbul's growing population. Merchants typically procured these commodities from regions including Wallachia, Moldavia, Silistre, Ruse, Zištovi, Nicopolis, Prevadi, Ibrail, Ismail, Kili, and Akerman, leveraging the productive agricultural and pastoral outputs of these districts (ÇAĞMAN, 2016: 138). The integration of these regional trade networks not only supported

Istanbul’s provisioning system but also reinforced the interconnectedness of rural production and urban consumption within the Ottoman economic structure.

Today's Moldavia supplied products such as grain and timber to the Ottoman Empire. Additionally, products like wax, honey, salt, and fish were supplied to Istanbul (FAROQHI, 2010: 137-139). Further south, metal, leather, fur, tobacco, fabric, and other commercial goods were produced in present-day Bulgaria (ERDOĞAN, 2016: 128-132). Grape growing was an important activity in southeastern Bulgaria, especially near the sea. Vineyards and olive groves existed in the southwestern part of Macedonia, and production increased, particularly from the 17th century. The demand for olive oil in empires like Venice, the Ottoman Empire, and France, as well as in capitals such as Madrid and Istanbul, accelerated the proliferation of olive groves (TABAK, 2008: 165).

Further to the west, Sarajevo served as a significant hub for the supply and trade of a wide array of goods, including fabric, wax, leather, linen, silk, coffee, sugar, metals, and various household items, highlighting its central role in the regional economy (HUSIĆ, 2020: 1107-1109). Additionally, the region stretching between the eastern part of today's Croatia and the Danube River was a crucial source of wood, which was essential for military operations, emphasizing the area's strategic importance in the logistics of warfare (VLASIC, 2019: 199-201).

The Balkans played a critical role in Ottoman warfare, serving as both a strategic military frontier and a vital source of resources for the Empire’s military campaigns. The region's geographic location provided a direct route for military movements into Central and Eastern Europe, while its agricultural and logistical output supported Ottoman forces in numerous conflicts across Europe and beyond. In the Balkans, the distribution of surplus products was managed through a system of sharing between the central government and local leaders. The Ottomans encountered a class of professional armed cavalry holders, known as "pronoia" (timars), whom they considered a military elite distinct from tax-paying subjects. These cavalrymen were incorporated into the timar armies, strengthening the Ottoman military apparatus (INALCIK, 2012: 169). Since the Ottoman system was bureaucratic and military-oriented, it did not recognize feudal rights in principle, and this structure was also evident in Southeastern Europe. The timar system controlled rural agriculture, ensuring that land production was aligned with the state's needs, while guilds regulated urban production,

maintaining a balance between rural and urban economic activities (LAMPE and JAKCSON, 1982: 24-25).

As in the Byzantine Balkans, the timar (pronoia) served as a fundamental financial unit in the Ottoman Balkans. Certain tasks inherited from the pre-Ottoman feudal system, such as providing hay for the sipahi's horse, working on farms, and participating in construction projects, continued in the Ottoman period. However, a notable distinction was that, under the Ottoman system, most of these services were transformed into paid labor, marking a shift from the previous feudal obligations (INALCIK, 2012: 170). However, feudal tendencies became more evident in the Ottoman Empire due to the existence of de facto local powers that could not be legally defined during the 14th and 15th centuries. The dynamics that emerged in the last quarter of the 16th century and intensified in the 17th century further contributed to this trend, leading to a gradual weakening of central authority. By the 18th and 19th centuries, these local powers had grown in influence, causing the state to lose its control over various regions, undermining its ability to effectively govern and enforce policies. [22]

Building upon the growing influence of local powers and the weakening of central authority, a new land regime began to take shape in the Balkans, particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this region, a tendency to establish farms emerged, reflecting broader shifts in land use and social dynamics (GÜRAN and UZUN, 2006: 867-868). The formation of farms was especially prominent in Southern Albania and Northern Greece during the 17th century, where this new dynamic became common (INALCIK, 1968: 47-48).

Although the system did not fully allow for land ownership, an aristocratic class resembling feudal structures began to form within the existing system in the 17th century (KÁLDY-NAGY, 1974: 507-508). By the 17th and 18th centuries, control over surplus production shifted to this emerging aristocratic segment and the rising gentry, whose increasing power further reshaped the region's social and economic structures. This trend continued into the 19th century when the strengthening of local elites and the consolidation of landholdings further eroded the Ottoman central authority (ÇAĞMAN, 2016: 145).[23]

[22] During the early Ottoman period the average Balkan peasant had a lighter tax burden than peasants in other parts of Europe. They had hereditary land use with minimal dues and were independent of feudal services and feudal authority (STAVRIANOS, 1958: 99-100).

[23] One of the concrete reflections of this situation was that tax collectors, known as tax farmers, earned significant income by the end of the 17th century with the right to collect the taxes they purchased from the central government (LAMPE and JAKCSON, 1982: 37-38).

These feudal tendencies were present from the beginning of Ottoman dominance, which were more strictly eliminated in Anatolia, continued to exist in the Balkans, the Ottomans sought to control these powers through alternative methods. One such method was to grant local leaders positions of authority. In the conquered regions of the Balkans, high-ranking noblemen were recruited to the palace and appointed to important positions. As a result, many nobles from the pre-Ottoman Greek, Bulgarian, Serbian, and Albanian aristocracies served as Ottoman lords and viziers during this period (INALCIK, 2022A: 206). This practice was widespread throughout the Balkans, but in certain areas, particularly along the Adriatic coast and in Albania, it sometimes exceeded controllable limits. In Albania, the Ottomans kept local lords loyal by granting them lands as fiefs. Over time, the class formed by the allocation of state lands in Albania expanded their estates and mansions, seizing every opportunity as the state weakened (BİLGE, 1991: 385-386). The region's mountainous and rugged terrain hindered the development of transportation networks for an extended period. Only one-tenth of Albania's land was arable. Wheat, corn, citrus fruits, figs, apples, cherries, peaches, pears, and chestnuts were cultivated in the coastal plains, and local powers were dominant in agricultural relations (BİLGE, 1991: 384).

Bosnia-Herzegovina, Vidin, Thessaly, and Macedonia gradually became regions with large farms in parallel with the weakening of central authority in the 17th and 18th centuries. Practices such as forced labor, which were legally prohibited, also emerged in some of these regions (GÜRAN and UZUN, 2006: 870-871). The prevalence of forced labor intensified with the economic downturn of the 17th century, as local elites sought to maintain or expand their agricultural output under increasingly strained circumstances. In the second half of the 17th century, political and social changes took place in the Danube principalities. Fiscal pressure, administrative consolidation, and the shift to a monetized economy resulted in local leaders gaining increased control over cattle breeding, grain trade, and serf labor (WASIUCIONEK, 2019: 33-36). This growing control over rural economies in the Balkans mirrored broader trends across the Empire, where the decline of central authority allowed local powers to expand their influence, often to the detriment of the rural small peasantry in the 18th and 19th centuries.

Another reflection of these developments occurred in the military field. Starting in the 17th century, the number of janissaries in the border regions of the Balkans decreased, while the number of local soldiers increased (AGOSTON, 2018: 300-303). As the salaries of soldiers in these border regions could no longer be paid, maintaining a military structure under the strict control of the central government became increasingly unfeasible (AGOSTON, 2018: 298-

299). This situation became so evident that, by the late 17th and early 18th centuries, Moldavia and Wallachia were effectively divided among the Ottomans, pro-Russian factions, and local forces seeking the support of Austria (SUGAR, 1996: 131-134). As a result of the conflicts between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs in Hungary, some regions gained vassal principality status. Although Transylvania remained a dependent principality for an extended period due to its struggles with the Habsburgs, it could not become an Ottoman province for these reasons (FAROQHI, 2010: 116-118).

As a consequence, the flexibility of the Ottoman state apparatus in the Balkans led to the emergence of local power structures that persisted beyond the official central authority, further entrenching decentralization. Despite being a core region for the empire, like Anatolia, the Balkans could not be controlled by the state apparatus to the same extent as Anatolia. The Ottoman state apparatus had to exhibit a more flexible approach in the Balkans compared to Anatolia, due to both the region's mountainous terrain and its distinct socio-economic conditions. As will be explained in the relevant section below, the increasing decentralization of the 18th century had a more profound effect in the Balkans than in Anatolia. This more evident decentralization occurred because, in classical times, the Ottoman state apparatus was more inclined to accept the existing economic relations as they were, even though the Balkans were considered a core region in terms of center-periphery relations in the Empire. The main difference between the Balkans and Anatolia regarding the geographical structure of the Ottoman state apparatus was that the local dominance of families such as the Mihaloğulları, Evrenosoğulları, and many others was consistently accepted in the Balkans after the conquest (LOWRY, 2010). These families owned exceptionally large estates, and their relations with the villagers followed a course that diverged from the official Ottoman ideology. Although not legally recognized, in practice, these families functioned as a landowning class resembling the aristocracy, which distinguished the Balkans from Anatolia in terms of the practices of the Ottoman state apparatus.

2.2. Middle East and Africa

The level of political sovereignty the Ottoman Empire achieved in Anatolia and the Balkans was never reached in the Middle East and Africa. Within these regions, the degree of political sovereignty varied as well. From Mesopotamia to Egypt, the level of sovereignty was not matched in the rest of North Africa, except for Egypt. During the reign of Sultan Selim I,

he expanded the Ottoman Empire by conquering Syria (1516), Palestine (1516), and Egypt (1517), although certain regions of Central Arabia remained de facto outside Ottoman control. (MANSFIELD, 2012: 47-51). After the conquest of Syria and Egypt, the Ottoman Empire turned its attention to the Iraq region. The fact that Baghdad was under Safavid control posed a significant threat to the Ottomans, who controlled the Syrian ports. Establishing sovereignty over the Baghdad-Basra line was crucial for securing trade routes extending to Anatolia and Syria (MANTRAN, 1999: 91). In many areas that appeared to be under Ottoman sovereignty on the map, the Ottoman state apparatus had little to no presence in the economic and social spheres, or it maintained a limited sovereignty relationship with the symbolic allegiance of local centers of power in the region. Syria, in particular, was home to autonomous mountain and desert regions. Although it was governed from Baghdad, the imperial bureaucracy had limited involvement in the social relations of the region, which operated according to its own dynamics (MANSFIELD, 2012: 53-55).

The Middle East, Egypt, and the Maghreb are generally divided into two broad geographical production areas: coastal strips where olive trees grow, plains and river valleys where grain is cultivated, and oases where date palms are found (HOURANI, 2013: 133). The Arabian Peninsula, located in the easternmost part of this vast region, is a landmass separated by the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Oman Sea. Parallel to the Red Sea, the Tihama coastal plain rises to various hills and plateaus, followed by high mountain ranges such as the Hejaz, Asir, and Yemen ranges (HOURANI, 2013: 120). Geographically separate from the peninsula, Egypt is divided by the Nile River into two large desert areas: the Western (Libyan) Desert, which covers 68% of the country's total area, and the Eastern (Arabian) Desert, which covers more than a fifth of the country. These were largely uninhabited regions (IBRAHIM and IBRAHIM, 2003: 57–59). The liveable areas were limited, and there were autonomous regions within these areas. These autonomous regions often held symbolic dominance along the coasts of the Middle East and North Africa. Partial control was maintained through loyalty relations and symbolic ties (FAROQHI, 2010).

The Middle East, which includes Anatolia in the north, Egypt, Iran, the Gulf of Oman in the west, the Gulf of Aden in the east, and Yemen in the south, has always been prone to instability due to its shaping by north-south and east-west migrations and cultural interactions from the Eurasian steppes (DAVUTOĞLU, 2001: 146–147). Ottoman rule in the Middle East evolved within the constraints of this geography. It was primarily based on the existence of autonomous administrations within a symbolic relationship in which local power centers

expressed their loyalty to the empire. The province of Syria, while appearing to be governed from the center, was in reality administered by local nobles. Syria and the Arabian deserts further south did not generate any income for the Ottoman treasury. On the contrary, local tribes received annual financial and food aid from the central bureaucracy's treasury and depots to ensure the safety of pilgrim caravans traveling to Mecca (FAROQHI, 2010: 108–111).



(QUATAERT, 2005: 23).

The security of this region was also relatively costly, as Bedouin robbers remained a persistent threat along the hajj routes during Ottoman rule (FAROQHI, 2010: 20–23). Even in Syria, where the Ottoman presence was relatively strong, the boundaries between the central government and the local nobility were often blurred. Further south, in the Hijaz region, Ottoman administration was largely under the control of local families (FAROQHI, 2010: 120–121). The region was a significant expense for the Ottoman treasury. Protecting the area, regarded as a holy land by Islam, was a symbol of sovereignty for the Ottoman dynasty. The sherifs who governed the Hejaz, in addition to being exempt from paying taxes to Ottoman administrators, were financially supported by annual payments sent from Istanbul and Cairo (FAROQHI, 2010: 125). This support was necessitated by the region's frequent climate challenges. Due to low agricultural production, the Ottomans had to provide direct aid to the

Hejaz sherifs and take special measures to ensure food supplies for Mecca, home to the Kaaba, Islam's holiest site. Additionally, local forces were permitted to operate in the port of Jeddah, collecting half of the customs duties, which provided vital income as a gateway for pilgrims (FAROQHI, 2010: 127). Since agricultural production in the Meccan countryside was extremely limited, an efficient food trade was essential. From the early 16th century onward, even short-term interruptions in the Red Sea food trade, primarily supplied from Egypt, caused panic and uncontrollable price increases (FAROQHI, 2008: 24).

The Ottoman conquest of the Middle East and Egypt, along with their domination of the Red Sea in 1516–1517, facilitated the revival of the Indian spice trade route, enabling the flow of Indian and Indonesian spices into Ottoman territories. Indian commercial goods and spices, which were transported to the ports of Antalya and Alanya via Egyptian and Syrian ports, and subsequently to Bursa, played a particularly significant role in this resurgence (ŞAHİN and EMECEN, 1991: 125). The Ottoman conquests of the Middle East established a vast free trade zone, significantly enhancing regional and intercontinental commerce. This facilitated the circulation of diverse products, including wheat, timber, animal skins, cloth, and Indian spices. The integration of these trade networks strengthened the Ottoman economy and reinforced its position as a central hub in global trade. Furthermore, the increased movement of goods fostered cultural and economic interactions across the empire's territories, contributing to the development of urban centers and markets (HATHAWAY, 2016: 287).

However, the situation was different on the Mesopotamian and African coasts. The state's capacity to intervene in economic and social affairs varied significantly between coastal areas and deserts, as well as between regions with accessible river transportation and those dominated by desert landscapes. The Ottoman Empire's dominance in North Africa began in the 16th century. While the region was initially integrated into the central administration, its governance structure gradually weakened over time, leading to increasing autonomy from the center. This administrative decentralization allowed local powers to assert greater control, shaping distinct economic and political dynamics in the region. Additionally, the challenges of maintaining effective control over vast and diverse territories further complicated efforts to centralize authority in these areas.

The Ottoman Empire's control over North Africa was marked by the coexistence of central authority and local autonomy. Despite initial attempts to integrate the region into the imperial system, the pre-existing socio-political structures often persisted, shaping local

governance. The ties of local power centers to the Ottoman capital gradually weakened, and Egypt emerged as the territory where the Ottoman central powers were relatively more influential in North Africa. Nevertheless, the socio-economic order of pre-Ottoman local powers continued in Egypt, functioning according to its own dynamics. Power struggles and conflicts between the entrenched Mamluk hierarchy and Ottoman representatives in Egypt profoundly shaped the region's history. From the 17th century onward, Ottoman authority declined, allowing the Mamluks to regain significant influence. Rival Mamluk households competed for dominance, leading to frequent power shifts and conflicts that further fragmented governance in the region (SHAW, 1962: 5-7).

2.2.1. Mesopotamia and Arap Peninsula

The Ottoman conquest of Syria and Iraq in 1515 secured their dominance over the Silk Road trade, granting control over the crucial routes connecting the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean (MANTRAN, 1999: 92). For the Ottomans, the Syria-Iraq corridor was significantly safer and more reliable than the alternative routes passing through present-day Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Palestine. Despite the strategic importance of the Syria-Iraq line, the Ottoman central bureaucracy struggled to fully integrate key areas of Mesopotamia, such as Revandiz and Sulaymaniyah, into its sphere of influence. Local emirates in these regions maintained substantial autonomy, and it was not until the 19th century that the empire could establish even symbolic control. This lack of integration posed a persistent obstacle to achieving comprehensive regional dominance (ÇETINSAYA, 1999: 93).

After the conquest of Iraq in 1534, Ottoman rule became more limited compared to Syria (1517). The extent of its control remained uncertain due to frequent wars and regional conflicts with Iran. The presence of a large Shiite population in Iraq hindered the spread and stability of Ottoman authority throughout the region. Ottoman power was largely confined to urban centers such as Basra and Baghdad, while local tribal leaders dominated and maintained control over rural areas and trade routes (NISSEN and HEINE, 2009: 144-145). The Ottoman state apparatus was unable to reach many Arab regions in Mesopotamia until the 18th-century reforms. In this context, the Shaban Regiments were established in the Baghdad and Basra provinces of Iraq from the 1850s onwards. These regiments, composed of tribes affiliated with the state and acting as a paramilitary force, were a result of centralization efforts prompted by disruptions in public order and the threat of banditry, particularly to rural security (KURT, 2019:

633-635). Although regions like Damascus and Saida were under the control of the sultan during the classical period, centralized reforms did not have a transformative effect on Ottoman rule in areas governed by local officials (MANSFIELD, 2012: 72-75).

This region posed significant challenges for the Ottoman administrative framework, particularly in terms of supplying the area due to food shortages. The Ottoman administration struggled with grain and mineral shortages in the southern alluvial regions of the Tigris-Euphrates basin, a problem that had persisted since the decline of the Sassanid irrigation system in the early Middle Ages. As a result, Ottoman authorities were compelled to organize regular grain shipments from Anatolia and Syria, and at times, as far as Ottoman Egypt (HUSSAIN, 2021: 48-49). In this context, agriculture served as an important source of income throughout Syria and played a crucial role in food supply, with crops such as wheat, barley, corn, millet, legumes, oil crops, citrus fruits, apricots, grapes, figs, cotton, and tobacco being grown (ÖNSOY, 1986: 825). Syria held significant advantages in food trade and supply due to its close ties with the rest of the Levant, facilitating both sea and land routes to Egypt. Additionally, the mountain valleys along the Syrian coast were particularly fertile for raising sheep and goats, while the plains were well-suited for grain cultivation, offering advantages over other regions (HOURANI, 2013: 123).

Syria and Iraq had an integral character in terms of economic geography, and in this respect, east-west dominance was crucial for any claim to political sovereignty. Shepherds in the Baghdad-Damascus east-west region utilized the plains both for herding sheep and for hunting truffles, which are rich in protein and can be lifesaving in emergency situations. Nomadic shepherds in Iraq also cultivated wheat, barley, sesame, cotton, legumes, and millet in the fixed regions where they stayed during their seasonal migrations (HUSSAIN, 2021: 117-119). Although Syria and Iraq had an integral economic geography, they were two separate administrative regions, each following different policies due to differences in soil fertility and agricultural suitability. Unlike Syria, in Iraq, the Ottoman Empire encouraged agriculture through region-specific tax exemptions, land improvement rights, and the draining of marshes. Rice cultivation in marshlands was labour-intensive but highly profitable for both farmers and the Ottoman state (HUSSAIN, 2021: 127-128).

In terms of the geography of Syria and Iraq, the canal system where the Tigris and Euphrates meet and flow toward Baghdad was a crucial economic element. Baghdad lay on the strategic route to Iran and beyond, leading to the grain-producing Jazira in Northern Iraq, Syria,

and Egypt (HOURANI, 2013: 58-59). These two rivers, the Euphrates and Tigris, were essential for transportation, irrigation, and agriculture, serving as lifelines that made the region habitable. However, managing the dynamics formed within the natural rhythm of these rivers was of vital importance. The Tigris and Euphrates remained navigable during the summer months, which were critical for grazing. The northern plains of Iraq, which received abundant rainfall, contrasted with the southern alluviums that were largely dependent on river water for irrigation due to insufficient and irregular rainfall (HUSSAIN, 2021: 110-112). This situation often led to conflicts between shepherds and farmers, which could only be resolved with the active intervention of the Ottoman bureaucracy. The Ottoman administration systematically used this dependency to organize food supply and protect food producers under a single state authority (HUSSAIN, 2021: 77-78).

These two rivers and the roads from Baghdad to Basra were important both for transportation and for agricultural irrigation. Ships going to the Far East set off from the Persian Gulf where these two rivers meet, and transportation was supported by five roads centered in Baghdad. These were the southwestern roads to Arabia and the Hijaz, and the western roads to Raqqa, Syria, and Egypt (KÜÇÜKAŞCI, 1999: 86). The Tigris and Euphrates both served a transportation function and were extremely important in the agricultural practices of farmers in the region with their various water collection methods. The water collection areas built on the water route, as well as the natural floods and sedimentation of the Tigris and Euphrates, were of vital importance. Therefore, a structure based on political organization was necessary. Farmers needed large canals for their crops and were dependent on irrigation construction that required Ottoman assistance (HUSSAIN, 2021: 101-102).

World Atlas. (n.d.). Euphrates River, 2024. https://www.worldatlas.com/rivers/euphrates-river.html

In this context, the Ottomans took responsibility for three canals on the Tigris and Euphrates. Both the repair and the necessary public works of these canals were conducted, and the task of preventing conflicts over water sharing was undertaken. These canals were of vital importance for agriculture and provided significant income to the Ottoman treasury both directly and indirectly (HUSSAIN, 2021: 97-98). For this reason, this region was the most active area of the Ottoman state apparatus in the Arabian Peninsula. The Ottoman state emphasized its role in public works activities as a source of legitimacy in this geography. Iraq always posed a challenge for the Ottomans due to its dense Shiite population. Even after Iraq was established as a modern state, problems related to irrigation persisted (TRIPP, 2007; SLUGLETT, 2007). The Ottoman state apparatus, with a capacity far below that of a modern state, struggled to maintain its presence in this region. Geographies prone to tribal-based uprisings, such as Sulaymaniyah, Jangal, Rewanduz, Koy, Erbil, and Hanaqin, were particularly challenging for political entities attempting to assert their presence, especially before modern times (AHMAD, 1994: 122-123).

Baghdad was located at the point where the Tigris and Euphrates converged and was an important economic region due to its canal system. It was situated on the strategic route to Iran and beyond, connecting the grain-producing Cezire in Northern Iraq, Syria, and Egypt (HOURANI, 2013: 58-59). Indian goods transported from Basra to Baghdad, across the Syrian desert to Syria and Egypt, or from Anatolia to Constantinople and Trabzon, were a significant source of income (HOURANI, 2013: 70). Basra, in particular, was a hub where carpets, fabrics, woolen yarns, cotton, barley, sheep, and horses from Iran were sold. Textile products, indigo, and spices from India were traded along the upward routes (MANTRAN, 1987: 1441-1443). The extensive trade networks in this region fostered the development of vibrant marketplaces, attracting merchants from across the Ottoman geography and beyond. This economic activity also reinforced the strategic and administrative importance of Baghdad and Basra within the empire.

Unlike the Nile, the Tigris and Euphrates remained open during the summer months, which were critical for grazing (HUSSAIN, 2021: 110-112). In the Arabian Peninsula, which was a geography limited in terms of grazing, the deserts extending from the Euphrates Valley to the borders of today's Saudi Arabia and Jordan were unsuitable for agriculture and farming. However, the river valleys provided vital oases for pastoralists, offering seasonal pastures and water sources for their livestock. These areas also served as critical hubs for trade and communication, connecting different regions of the empire. The areas between the Euphrates

and Tigris, including the deltas and swamps formed by the Shatt al-Arab, created by the confluence of these rivers, were covered with alluvium. Since the Syrian desert constituted 40 percent of Iraq's geography, the Euphrates and Tigris riverbeds gave life to Iraq (AKKAN, 1999: 83).

Another region of comparable significance to Damascus, Baghdad, and Basra was the city of Aleppo and its surrounding areas. Aleppo was a hub for trading grains from the plains in the interior of Syria, fruit trees, forest products, and livestock such as sheep and camels from the hills extending to the north (HOURANI, 2013: 143). From the 16th and 17th centuries onward, Aleppo assumed significant functions in the process of integration with Anatolia, particularly in terms of commercial and social relations. The key factor that enabled Aleppo to surpass Damascus and become the largest trade center in the region was its central role in trade (MASTERS, 1988: 11). Aleppo was also an important production center, supplying goods to both local and regional markets in textiles, metalwork, and other industries. Its commercial ties extended to the lands in the North and East, making it a vital region for the trade of Syrian and Middle Eastern goods with Europe (MARCUS, 1989: 168-170).

The importance of Aleppo derived from its strategic location, which facilitated transportation between the Mediterranean and interior regions. Aleppo functioned as a key trade and production hub, linking the Mediterranean coast to the Euphrates Valley and beyond (Davis, 1967: 39-41). The city occupied a pivotal position on trade routes while also serving as a significant center for agricultural production. Its proximity to a fertile plain and critical trade routes were major factors contributing to its prominence. Aleppo played an essential role, particularly in supplying food to other urban populations in the region. In comparison to Aleppo, Damascus was less prominent during the 16th and 17th centuries due to its limited access to primary products and the challenges associated with maritime transportation (MASTERS, 1988: 8-10). Aleppo’s dual advantage of productivity and efficient transportation further solidified its dominance over Damascus during this period.

Although Aleppo continued to serve as a significant trade route in later periods, its role as described thus far persisted with considerable strength until the beginning of the 18th century, maintaining its production and trade activities without notable decline until the second half of the 17th century (ÇIZAKÇA, 1985: 364). The city's thriving market was bolstered not only by its strategic location but also by its integration into expansive trade networks spanning Asia and the Mediterranean. In this stable trade hub, the influx of Indian goods, including textiles and

spices, alongside Iranian silk transported through Hormuz and Basra, played a critical role in the growth and dynamism of Aleppo's economy (INALCIK, 2022E: 501). These goods not only diversified the market but also strengthened Aleppo's position as a regional center of commerce, attracting merchants from Europe and the Middle East alike.

Aleppo's trade was largely dependent on the export of Persian silk. In the early 17th century, efforts by the Shah of Iran, as well as the British and Dutch merchant activities, disrupted the silk trade through Ottoman lands and the Mediterranean, aiming to redirect it through alternative routes under their control. Despite these challenges, Armenian merchants eventually resumed using the traditional trade routes, successfully restoring this profitable commerce (MASTERS, 1988: 20-23). The resilience of Aleppo's silk trade was further reinforced by its merchants' ability to adapt to shifting political and economic circumstances. Armenian traders, in particular, established complex networks that facilitated the flow of silk despite external pressures. These networks allowed Aleppo to maintain its position as a critical intermediary in the silk trade, linking Iranian producers to European markets during the early 17th century. Europe's demand for Iranian silk led to increased imports of this product to Aleppo. Silk found a ready market in Europe, especially in England, where the silk fabric industry expanded significantly (MASTERS, 1988: 27-29).

The increasing importance of Aleppo, particularly in the raw silk trade, and its proximity to İskenderun, a more accessible port, connected Aleppo to maritime trade. During this process, the Ottoman bureaucracy recognized Aleppo's potential and made room for the work of foundations, ensuring that investments were channelled through them (MASTERS, 1988: 14-17). The decisions made by the Ottoman bureaucracy in this region had positive effects on the implementation of policies, leading to an increase in export levels. In this context, the Ottoman bureaucracy played a facilitating role in the economic relations of the region. These opportunities helped facilitate the export of silk and cotton fabrics produced in Syria (ÖNSOY, 1986: 826-828). Furthermore, the Ottoman state’s strategic support of local markets and trade routes strengthened Aleppo's position in regional and international commerce.

This political action by the Ottoman bureaucracy, which facilitated economic activities in the regions, was shaped by both internal governmental decisions and external market demands. The Ottoman state’s support for trade and production was driven in part by the growing demand for goods in European and other foreign markets. Venetian merchants helped sustain Syrian trade by purchasing goods from Syria to supply cotton to Central Europe

(FAROQHI, 2010: 201-202). In addition to raw materials, industries such as weaving, leather processing, soap production, olive oil production, woodworking, rope making, blacksmithing, carpet weaving, and weapon making were developed in Syria (ÖNSOY, 1986: 827). This dynamic was not unidirectional towards the West. Indian merchants reached Aleppo via Basra, trading cotton and dyed fabrics that had been popular among Ottoman customers for centuries. The Syrian region played a crucial role in facilitating this trade, linking the East and West in a sustained commercial exchange (FAROQHI, 2010: 197-198). This symbiotic trade environment allowed Syria to become a pivotal hub for goods from both the East and West, driving its economic growth.

Further south, in present-day Lebanon, a unique method of Ottoman land administration was implemented. In these area, the right of inheritance was granted to ethnic or tribal chiefs under Ottoman control, specifically for farm ownership based on large landholdings. The iqta system was established, which allowed large landowners the right to engage in tax farming. In this regard, unlike other regions, the area saw an early development of international trade, particularly in silk production, starting in the 16th century, an unusually early date (TRABOULSI, 2007: 3-4). As part of this unique situation, the Ottomans allowed a relationship between peasantry and large landownership to form, a relationship they actively prevented in Anatolia. The peasants faced a triple exploitation system through the local and general tax mechanisms, rentier intermediate classes, and usury practices required for trade. A significant portion of the silk harvest was controlled by elites and merchants, leaving only a small share for the working population in Lebanon, given the prevailing production and distribution relations (TRABOULSI, 2007: 15-18).

The Ottomans' economic initiatives, including their promotion of silk production in Mount Lebanon, were part of a trend that continued to develop over time, especially during the 17th century. These efforts were aimed at boosting local industries and integrating them into international trade networks, helping to expand the Ottoman Empire’s economic influence (TABAK, 2008: 243-244). The incentive policies implemented specifically for Beirut also had a positive impact on surrounding regions. As a result, Beirut became a crucial port for regional trade, facilitating the movement of goods throughout the area. These goods were often stored in Damascus, which benefitted from its role as a commercial hub. The city's strategic position allowed it to serve as a critical intermediary between the port and inland areas. Damascus gained significant advantages due to its central role in trade, which helped bolster its economy. Most

of the products produced were exported to countries such as France, England, and Italy (ÖNSOY, 1986: 826).

Like the unique land system in Lebanon, a distinct land system operated in the region of present-day Palestine. The Musha system, which was widespread in this area, was based on the circulation of lands that were periodically redistributed among eligible individuals according to traditional quotas and capacities. Within this framework, the system relied on the cooperative cultivation of the redistributed parcels (KRÄMER and HARMAN, 2008: 48-49). The Ottoman administration in this region was quite limited, and taxes collected were generally routed through the governor of Damascus and directed towards the pilgrimage (KRÄMER and HARMAN, 2008: 53-54). The Ottoman bureaucracy did not actively participate in or regulate trade within the region. Trade was largely centered on wheat and cotton brought by merchants from Akka, with other goods being limited. Barley, olives, and fruit trees were also key agricultural products in the region (CARMEL, 2011: 16-17).

It was intricately linked to regional trade and pilgrimage routes, mostly running north-south through Palestine. Agricultural activities such as herding sheep and cattle in the mountains were common, and fishing also served as a significant source of income in the 17th century (CARMEL, 2011: 43-44). The east-west trade routes, however, were relatively less important in terms of trade volume. Despite this, they facilitated the exchange of fruits and products such as grain, grapes, olives, almonds, figs, and tobacco. In the city center, the main production included cotton fabrics, soap, glassware, and souvenirs, which were important both for local consumption and trade. Soap, cotton, and tobacco were among the common exports. Additionally, the region's strategic location allowed it to function as a key point for the exchange of goods between the Mediterranean and inland areas (KRÄMER and HARMAN, 2008: 47).

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2.2.2. Egypt and Beyond

Since Egypt was almost entirely flat, the vast majority of settlements were concentrated along the Nile River, which formed a fertile belt stretching across the country. Consequently, the course of the Nile largely determined the distribution of land in Egypt (HATHAWAY, 2016: 30). Despite the apparent simplicity of the physical geography, land disputes were frequent, particularly in relation to the flood regime. Given the limited arable land in the Nile Valley, regulating the land regime with state support was a critical necessity. The absence of such regulation posed a significant risk of conflict over land usage and ownership (DOĞANER, 2004: 554). In response, the Ottomans developed highly effective practices to preserve local social and economic relations while respecting local autonomy. The Ottoman state bureaucracy addressed regional demands with notable flexibility, avoiding any transformative measures that might disrupt the existing economic and social structures.

The Ottoman administration in Egypt prioritized protecting local economic interests, particularly regarding water resources for subsistence and economic growth. While the Ottomans were not directly involved in managing the region's waterways and trade networks, they facilitated the continuation of pre-existing local organizations (MIKHAIL, 2011, 2017). The water management system inherited from the Mamluks was preserved in its original form. This continuity ensured that the established relationships between water management, production, and trade remained largely intact. Villages in the region were interconnected through waterways and trade networks, particularly in the Eastern Nile Delta, where managing limited water resources posed a significant challenge (MIKHAIL, 2011: 50-52).

Unlike core regions, where centralized policies often reshaped local structures, the Ottomans in Egypt relied on existing networks of tribal leaders, merchants, and landholders to sustain economic and social stability. This approach not only ensured minimal resistance but also facilitated the integration of regional agricultural and trade practices into the broader imperial framework (HATHAWAY, 2016: 12). Local elites were instrumental in managing irrigation systems and overseeing agricultural production, functions that were essential to Egypt's economic prosperity and its fiscal contributions to the Ottoman treasury. Economic

activity and state control in Ottoman Egypt were highly flexible and operated with minimal central oversight (HANNA, 2014: 67-68). Upper Egypt, in particular, was initially governed by Arab tribal sheikhs, reflecting the region's decentralized structure. The governor-general, appointed by the sultan, headed the provincial administration, and convened an assembly that included various local leaders to address governance and administrative matters (AL-SAYYID MARSOT, 2007: 48). The Ottoman military presence in Egypt remained relatively small, focusing on defensive tasks such as guarding ports, and protecting pilgrim caravans. Additionally, Egypt's distinctive agricultural system, reliant on intricate irrigation networks, precluded the implementation of the timar system seen in other provinces. Instead, the Ottomans allowed local practices to continue, recognizing their essential role in ensuring agricultural productivity and stability (WINTER, 1998: 5-6).

In some areas, such as Cairo, the authority of the central Ottoman state was significantly weak. Following the conquest of Egypt, much of the territory was effectively governed by Arab tribes or Mamluks (HANNA, 2014: 67). Until the mid-19th century, lands were divided into revenue areas for tax collection, with taxpayers remitting fixed sums to the Ottoman sultan while retaining the ability to impose higher demands on tenant farmers. The Mamluks, who controlled extensive estates, held significant influence over agricultural lands. This decentralized governance allowed the Mamluks to establish quasi-autonomous rule, further weakening direct Ottoman control. Consequently, local elites maintained a pivotal role in managing agricultural production and tax collection, shaping the socio-economic structure of the region (IBRAHIM and IBRAHIM, 2003: 114-115). [24]

The Ottoman Empire largely accepted the existing economic and social conditions established by the local chambers of power. The urban wealth of Ottoman Egypt, derived primarily from trade and industry, was managed by self-sustaining professional associations (SHAW, 1962: 100-104). The commercial role of the Ottoman administration was limited to collecting transit customs duties from Egyptian ports, much like the preceding Mamluk regime (CASALE, 2023: 67-68). Direct taxation by the central government had largely become obsolete, as local elites retained control over fiscal responsibilities. Representatives appointed by the state from among the local population continued to exercise authority over tax collection until the late 17th century. This arrangement ensured the continuation of traditional local power

[24] Land was sold at auctions and prices were supposed to be eight times the expected annual profit, but actual profits were often uncertain (SHAW, 1962: 37-41).

structures, allowing the Ottoman state to maintain nominal control without disrupting regional economic networks. However, this decentralized approach also limited the state's ability to implement broader reforms or directly influence local economic activities.

When the Ottomans conquered Egypt, they established numerous military units to secure their control. Although unit commanders were sent from Istanbul, local recruitment for other officers and members meant these units gradually became integrated into Egyptian society (HOURANI, 2013: 275). By the early 17th century, the janissaries emerged as a powerful force in the urban centers of many Arab provinces, assuming control of tax offices and dominating the profitable Red Sea coffee trade (HATHAWAY, 2016: 86). During Selim's reign (1512–1520), ensuring the safety of communication routes and consolidating Ottoman influence in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea became strategic priorities. Selim expanded shipyards, constructed an arsenal, and strengthened the navy to protect vital trade routes, particularly those linking Egypt, a key supplier of grain, to the rest of the empire (EMIRALIOĞLU, 2016: 17-19).

Through the 17th century onwards, the Mukataa system in Egypt was increasingly controlled by the Egyptian Beys. This arrangement allowed the state to collect revenue and manage agricultural production but also empowered local governance and created semi-autonomous power structures (SHAW, 1962: 30-34). The weakening of central authority in the 18th century further exacerbated this trend, as local Arab military structures began to dominate taxation, which destabilized rural communities and prompted many peasants to flee to urban areas (SHAW, 1962: 21-25). The growing autonomy of local elites posed significant challenges to the Ottoman central government. By the mid-1820s, comprehensive administrative reforms were necessary to reassert control over Egypt’s rural areas. These reforms included the reorganization of land ownership and the implementation of stricter taxation systems, aiming to centralize authority and restore order (MITCHELL, 2001: 89).

Tribal chiefs were appointed as governors, responsible for ensuring security and delivering fixed annual taxes to the central government (SHAW, 1962: 15-18). In Ottoman Egypt, villagers were indispensable for maintaining the irrigation systems essential for agricultural productivity. Local communities held significant authority, and villagers participated collectively in the maintenance of canals and waterways (MIKHAIL, 2017: 22-23). The dynamic land structure shaped by the Nile’s shifting patterns required constant regulation of land rights. This system not only reinforced the influence of local authorities but

also ensured flexibility in responding to the Nile's unpredictable nature. The collaboration between the state and local communities allowed for the sustainable management of resources, ensuring long-term agricultural stability and regional prosperity. The Ottoman bureaucracy preserved traditional methods for managing these rights, granting significant initiative to local forces (MIKHAIL, 2017: 46-49).

In the early 17th century, a separatist movement against Ottoman authority emerged, led by Mamluk lords and Ottoman regiments. Although the movement was suppressed, the Mamluks retained significant political influence and continued to occupy high-level positions in both military and financial administrations (AL-SAYYID MARSOT, 2007: 50-51). Military rebellions during this period were fuelled by economic hardship, ethnic tensions, and dissatisfaction with policies such as the "tulba", an additional tax imposed on the population (WINTER, 1998: 17-19). This unrest gave way in the latter half of the century to a taxation system based entirely on the sale of tax collection rights in advance, marking a shift toward tax farming. By the mid-17th century, the Ottoman bureaucracy in Egypt had abandoned all other forms of taxation, relying exclusively on tax farming to collect state revenues (HATHAWAY, 2016: 64). This system concentrated fiscal power in the hands of wealthy and locally powerful tax farmers, further reducing direct control by the central government. The reliance on tax farming also deepened inequalities, as rural populations often faced increased exploitation under this arrangement.

> "During the Mamluk resurgence, soldiers sought to increase their income by forming alliances with artisans. The weakening of the regiments due to constant internal conflicts enabled the Mamluks to return to power and establish the principality system, which lasted until the French occupation in 1798. Conflicts among Mamluk lords led to power struggles in which each house competed for a greater share of the wealth. Mamluks replaced urban tax-controlled regiments and formed alliances with long-distance merchants" (AL-SAYYID MARSOT, 2007: 53-54)

Egypt's status as the empire's largest grain producer was vital for feeding the entire Ottoman population (MIKHAIL, 2017: 113-114). Rice, maize, sugarcane, apricots, peaches, plums, and citrus fruits were among the most important crops in Ottoman Egypt (IBRAHIM and IBRAHIM, 2003: 122). Maize, a relatively new crop, became an indispensable component of the diet of peasants in Egypt by the 17th century (HATHAWAY, 2016: 193). Since the 16th

century, the exchange of goods between Istanbul and Egypt had been intense, with legumes and spices brought from Egypt being marketed and offered to consumers (KÖSE, 2020: 3889-3890).

The main consumer of spices coming from Egypt in Istanbul was the palace. Pepper, saffron, ginger, cumin, cinnamon, mustard, anise, sumac, tamarind, and cloves were the primary products (BILGIN, 2004: 245-248). A large portion of the rice needed for the palace and Istanbul in the 16th and 17th centuries was supplied from Egypt (SHAW, 1962: 274). Ottoman-European connections developed in the 17th century through the coffee and tobacco trade, also facilitated by Egypt's strategic geography. These products reshaped consumption habits and expanded traditional trade routes. Cairo's control over the global coffee trade further boosted profits by displacing spices as a key commodity (HANNA, 2014: 12-14). As coffee became increasingly popular in the Ottoman Empire and Europe, Egypt's role in the global trade network became even more crucial, contributing to both economic growth and cultural exchange.

In the 17th century, Egyptian textiles were highly sought after worldwide, serving as a conduit for textile technologies from India to Europe. During the 17th and 18th centuries, Egypt's fabric exports shifted from luxury goods to everyday products, adapting to evolving market demands. Cairo guilds specialized in Diyarbakir and Indian styles, adapting them to local tastes (HANNA, 2014: 69-84). Egypt's textile industry in the 17th and 18th centuries was diverse, encompassing various weaving techniques and fabrics such as silk, cotton, linen, and wool. During this period, Egyptian textiles spread to global markets. Affordable and diverse, these textile products were in high demand, marking the transition from luxury goods to mass trade (HANNA, 2014: 74-76). This shift also facilitated the integration of Egyptian textiles into broader global trade networks, boosting Egypt's economic importance. The widespread use of Egyptian textiles contributed to the cultural exchange between the East and West, influencing fashion trends and manufacturing techniques. Egypt had a long-standing presence in the textile trade with high-quality linen fabrics, especially those made from the famous linen (HANNA, 2014: 73). As part of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt played a role in importing Indian textile techniques and designs and sharing them with Europe. It was also a geography that facilitated the exchange of information and technology between the Ottoman, Safavid and Mughal states (HANNA, 2014: 25-27).

The presence of the Ottoman state apparatus in the three provinces of the Ottoman Empire in North Africa - Maghreb, Tripoli, Tunisia, and Algeria - was more symbolic than in Egypt. In these regions, local army leaders held significant power. Ottoman rule was characterized by a symbolic relationship of loyalty (HOURANI, 2013: 301). Direct Ottoman rule in Tunisia lasted a relatively short time. Before the end of the 16th century, Janissary officers rebelled and effectively seized power (HOURANI, 2013: 277). Although Algeria was the most important region for the Ottoman presence in the Maghreb, the influence of pirates was significant. Algeria housed an Ottoman naval power that engaged in piracy against European merchant shipping, and by the mid-17th century, a delegation of high-ranking Janissary officers took control of tax collection (HOURANI, 2013: 278).

Local aristocrats, military and paramilitary communities, and local racketeering leaders operated in North African regions such as Algeria, Tunisia, and Tripoli. Over time, within this dynamic, governors appointed from the center were replaced by a council consisting of Janissary units and pirate captains (FAROQHI, 2010: 122-123). This shift in power allowed local leaders to strengthen their autonomy, as central authority was often limited. Under Ottoman rule, Algeria became an autonomous region within the empire. The Ottoman Empire also reinforced its authority by issuing coins bearing the name of the sultan (MCDOUGALL, 2017: 38-39). While the Algerian region was already unstable, it became even more so with the Ottoman-Spanish rivalry that emerged after the Ottomans entered the region (MCDOUGALL, 2017: 9-11). This rivalry further complicated the balance of power in North Africa and played a key role in shaping the region's geopolitical dynamics during this period.

By the early 17th century, Ottoman control over Tunisia, Tripoli, and Algeria had largely diminished. North African pirates were highly active in the region, and there was an economic concentration based on barter and ransom networks. These pirates targeted vulnerable coastal communities and lone merchant ships, disregarding established rules, and influencing trade (MYLONAKIS, 2021: 14-15). As the central administration of the empire weakened in the second half of the 17th century, conflicts broke out between the Janissaries and governors in Algeria (SHUVAL, 2018: 351-352). Since it was an agricultural society, with approximately 90% of the population residing in rural areas, agricultural production was the main source of wealth that sustained the political organization and social order in the region. The trigger for conflicts was largely rooted in distribution problems (MCDOUGALL, 2017: 13; 30-33).

2.3. Sea Hinterland: Black Sea and Mediterranean Basin

The Ottoman Empire emerged as a naval power at the beginning of the 16th century due to its strategic geographical location and the presence of a seafaring population. Following the Venetian War of 1502, the Ottoman Empire strengthened its navy and became the dominant power in the Central and Western Mediterranean (SOUCEK, 2011: 118-119). It also expanded into the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, taking control of Levantine trade, and establishing dominance in a way that benefited Venetian merchants (TABAK, 2008: 55). By 1616, English ships entered the region, and the Persian Gulf, which had been under Portuguese control, became a focal point of conflict. During the critical period between 1616 and 1622, the British successfully blocked Portuguese naval dominance in the Persian Gulf (SOUCEK, 2011: 83).

The Ottoman Empire did not establish a significant presence in the Indian Ocean until the 16th century. Prior to the conquest of Egypt, their knowledge of the region was limited, and their trade was conducted through intermediaries. During this period, the Ottoman Empire increased its expansionism and political influence, largely due to its superiority in firearms and advances in military technology (CASALE, 2023: 28-31). Under the rule of Yavuz Selim (1512-1520), the Ottoman Empire extended its influence beyond the Mediterranean, incorporating the Hejaz region and parts of the Indian Ocean. However, the Indian Ocean did not hold a central place in the Ottoman imperial project (EMİRALIOĞLU, 2016: 20-21). Despite this, the Ottomans played a key role in maintaining control over critical trade routes in the region, which facilitated their access to lucrative commercial networks.

Portuguese voyages around Africa to the Indian Ocean reshaped global trade routes and marked the beginning of territorial and commercial expansion in Asia. Especially during the period of Yavuz Selim, the Ottoman efforts to control the Red Sea and the spice trade displayed a cautious presence in the region (EMIRALIOĞLU, 2016: 119).[25] The Ottomans did not build a large shipyard and a naval base in Basra, and so the empire missed the opportunity to challenge the Portuguese domination in the Indian Ocean. Although Basra had the advantage of establishing and maintaining a war fleet, the Ottomans tried to get Hormuz instead of Basra (SOUCEK, 2011: 87-89).

[25] With the emergence of coffee as a commodity on a global scale in the 17th century, Red Sea ports gained importance again (ALTINTAŞ, 2019: 108). By the 18th century, large merchants dominated Red Sea trade, facilitating the distribution of Indian textiles to distant regions and acting as conduits for fashion trends between distant consumers and local manufacturers (HANNA, 2014: 86).

The Mediterranean economy thrived during the 15th and 16th centuries, driven by robust trade networks and political stability. However, it began to decline in the early 17th century, partly due to the Spanish crown's bankruptcy, which disrupted financial systems and reduced economic activity in the region. Despite this decline, Mediterranean city-states remained active in trading key commodities such as olive oil, grain, cotton, and silk throughout the 16th century. Their continued participation was bolstered by trade connections with both the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg monarchy, even as their overall influence in global commerce diminished. However, with the shift in lucrative trade routes, Venice's sea trade diminished, and land trade through the Ottoman Empire gained prominence (TABAK, 2008: 184). Levantine trade and the exchange of goods such as black pepper faced significant challenges. Nonetheless, products like wheat, grapes, and olives retained their importance (TABAK, 2006: 56-59). The emergence of Atlantic trade further reduced the significance of Mediterranean commerce, as European powers prioritized colonies in the Americas and India. Despite this, the Mediterranean region remained vital for local and interregional exchanges within the Ottoman domains.

With their 16th-century conquests in the Middle East, the Ottomans gained control over key ports across the predominantly Muslim regions of the Mediterranean, as well as strategic gateways to the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Through this process, the role of the Ottomans as intermediaries in trade between the Far East and the Near East increased (MANTRAN, 1987: 1434). The main purpose of the Ottoman conquest of Egypt (1517) was to re-establish the Middle East as a corridor for the spice trade from India and Indonesia, countering the Portuguese sea route. This strategy was part of the Ottomans' broader aim to secure economic dominance in the region. Critical transit ports such as Suez, Jeddah, Aden, and Basra were brought under Ottoman control, although maintaining control often faced obstacles (SOUCEK, 2011: 26-27).

The Ottoman Empire's control of the Arabian coast played a vital role in revitalizing the spice trade route, allowing them to assert influence over key maritime passages. However, despite this advantage, the Ottomans struggled to challenge Portuguese dominance in the Indian Ocean, where their naval capabilities were limited. The ship types and techniques employed by the Ottomans were not as advanced as those of the Portuguese, who had superior naval expertise and technology (SOUCEK, 2011: 28). While the Indian Ocean became a region of intense political and military competition during the reign of Sultan Suleiman, the Mediterranean remained the primary focus of Ottoman naval and economic power, as it was central to their

empire's trade, defense, and territorial ambitions (EMIRALIOĞLU, 2016: 120). Furthermore, the Ottomans' limited naval power in the Indian Ocean reflected broader challenges they faced in competing with emerging European maritime powers.

In the 16th century, both the Ottoman and Spanish Habsburg empires sought to strengthen their control and consolidate their power in the Mediterranean, a region crucial for demonstrating imperial strength. The Mediterranean was vital for proving imperial ambitions (EMIRALIOĞLU, 2016: 91-93). Despite the ongoing struggle between the Habsburg and Ottoman empires for Mediterranean dominance in the 15th and early 16th centuries, the merchant republics of Venice and Genoa continued to play a central role in shaping the economic life of the Mediterranean. Their commercial influence persisted, as they facilitated trade and maintained critical economic networks that the empires themselves relied upon (TABAK, 2008: 34-35).[26] In the first half of the 16th century, the Ottoman Empire was unable to establish dominance in the Mediterranean, partly because it missed the opportunity to develop Tunisia as a major naval base. The empire also shifted away from this goal after its failed attempt to capture Malta in 1565. This defeat significantly weakened Ottoman naval ambitions in the western Mediterranean, as it lost a key strategic location that could have served as a launching point for further operations against European powers. Moreover, the failure to secure Malta highlighted the challenges the Ottomans faced in overcoming the well-fortified defences of European maritime powers (SOUCEK, 2011: 137-138).[27]

The imperial dynamic in the Mediterranean basin was such that the settled rural population produced grain, fruit, wine, and olive oil, while trade along the sea routes led to the formation of a wealthy class in the large cities (Hourani, 2013: 27-28). However, the vital element for the functioning of this dynamic was ensuring trade security. In this context, Cyprus was a strategic point. The Ottoman conquest of Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean was crucial for the security of trade routes between Istanbul, Alexandria, and Syrian ports. Despite the conquest, Ottoman naval forces were unable to fully ensure security, as persistent threats from

[26] Although Venice's influence waned due to the diversion of the spice trade, commercial activity remained strong in the Levant. The Hormuz connection and land routes continued the spice trade (TABAK, 2008: 119)

[27] When the Island of Rhodes fell into the hands of the Ottomans in 1522, the knights who were removed from there took refuge in the island of Malta and participated in the campaigns against the Ottomans. The Spanish knew that the Ottoman navy would come to Sicily, Naples, and their surroundings as a result of the capture of Malta, and therefore they gave importance to the defense of Malta. Despite this, the Malta expedition was made. (UZUNÇARŞILI, 1988B:367)

European powers and pirates disrupted the stability of these key trade routes. This failure highlighted the limitations of Ottoman naval power in securing the Mediterranean region (SOUCEK, 2011: 135).[28]

In the 16th century, the Ottomans engaged in an internal trade network that could be expanded from time to time, thanks to Genoese, Venetian, and Pisan merchants. However, despite their military power, the Ottomans were not strong or organized enough in trade (MANTRAN, 1987: 1434-1435). Complex relations were maintained with various powers in the Eastern Mediterranean, including the Venetians and the Mamluks. While the capture of Rhodes partially ensured Mediterranean dominance, pirates and various European powers continued to disrupt Ottoman control over trade (ŞAHIN, 2013: 42-44). The golden age of the Mediterranean began to end in the early 17th century, as the spice trade shifted from the Levant to Atlantic and North Sea ports (TABAK, 2008: 1-3). This transition marked a decline in the region's maritime dominance, as new global trade routes were established. From the 17th century onwards, Venetian, and Genoese merchants adapted to the diminishing significance of maritime trade. Land trade gained importance in the Eastern Mediterranean, including the Ottoman Empire (TABAK, 2008: 12-13). Venetian merchants expanded their influence across the Alps to capture overland trade and compensate for losses during the Thirty Years' War (1618–48). Venice's withdrawal to the inner regions and its emphasis on land trade left the Mediterranean more vulnerable to piracy and competition from other sea merchants (TABAK, 2008: 181). As a result, the region's role in global trade became increasingly contested by emerging European powers.

The collapse of the spice trade route passing through Ottoman territory in the 17th century and the eventual seizure of the sea route by the Dutch and British reshaped the boundaries of the Ottoman merchant marine (SOUCEK, 2011: 175-178). After the 1630s, as the spice trade moved away from the Mediterranean, this gap was filled with silk, coffee, and cotton fabrics. Although economic flows in the region decreased, they remained at a significant level after the 1650s (TABAK, 2008: 58-60). While Venetian woolen manufacturers flourished until the 1650s, their Ottoman counterparts faced difficulties. By the 1650s, urban textile centers

[28] The Holy Alliance fleet embarked on a voyage in 1572 to capture Navarino and avoid conflict with the Ottoman fleet, but this expedition ended in a draw. Through diplomatic and military manoeuvres, the Ottoman Empire not only retained Cyprus but also consolidated its control over two-thirds of the Mediterranean, eventually conquering Tunisia in 1574. (SOUCEK, 2011: 133-134).

in the Mediterranean had lost their vitality (TABAK, 2008: 157). Despite these challenges, some Ottoman textile production continued, particularly in regional markets, though it struggled to compete with the growing industrialization in Europe.

Unlike European shipping, the Ottomans lacked a vibrant merchant marine, long-distance maritime trade, and a formulated maritime policy (SOUCEK, 2011: 46). Although the Ottomans tried ships similar to those used by the Portuguese, their influence in the open seas remained limited. They adapted traditional galley technology to the Indian Ocean and captured part of the spice trade (CASALE, 2023: 32-33).[29] The unsuccessful siege of Hormuz in 1552 and the subsequent unsuccessful attempt to capture Bahrain in 1559 marked the closing chapter of the Ottoman limited maritime role in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. Although Portugal faced logistical difficulties due to its remote bases in Hormuz, the Ottomans could not benefit from this advantage due to limited shipping technology (SOUCEK, 2011: 90-93).[30]

2.3.1. Ottomans in Mediterranean Basin

Before the 16th century, thanks to intense commercial relations with Genoa and Venice, the Ottoman Empire was obtaining substantial amounts of cash from the trade of raw materials such as wheat, leather, wool, and cotton. In the opposite direction, in the same period, Italy's major cities were fed with wheat exported from Western Anatolia (INALCIK, 2022: 11-12). During their travels to Venice, Ottoman merchants traded through specialized agents they sent, not only to procure fabric but also to sell Ottoman products in European markets and receive various goods in return. Ottoman merchants exchanged raw materials for finished goods, such as fabric and paper, with Venice. Key items were grain, spices, cotton, silk, and leather (TURAN, 1968: 253–256). The interruption of the spice trade in the first half of the 16th century prompted Mediterranean merchants to seek opportunities further afield, leading to a spatial redistribution of production (TABAK, 2008: 56).[31]

[29] Maritime technologies improved with the emergence of steamships from the 1820s onwards. Steamboats made it easier to travel regardless of wind or current. However, disadvantages such as dependence on scarce coal were also evident (MYLONAKIS, 2021: 30-31)

[30] In Iraq, Mosul, closer to Istanbul, had a more stable presence, while in Basra, local leadership that cooperated with the Portuguese dominated. (NISSEN and HEINE, 2009: 146-148)

[31] The previously neglected wool industry in Venice experienced remarkable growth during this period when the spice trade was disrupted. Venetian textiles gained a great reputation, especially in Levantine markets (TABAK, 2008: 152).

Despite its naval power, the Ottoman Empire could not transform into a maritime trade-focused empire in the 16th century. They were content to support the Mamluks against the rising Portuguese power until the invasion of Egypt (SOUCEK, 2011: 15–16). This reflected the Ottoman strategy of prioritizing territorial dominance over maritime commerce. There were naval wars between the Ottomans and the Spanish for a while in the 16th century, but as Spanish energy and interest shifted to the Atlantic, Spain and the Ottomans established peaceful relations starting from 1580 (HOURANI, 2013: 262). This peace facilitated greater focus on Mediterranean stability and trade for both empires. The Ottomans, who besieged Cyprus and captured Nicosia and Famagusta in 1570, were defeated in the Battle of Lepanto in 1571. Despite this, the Ottoman arsenal rebuilt the navy and took back Tunisia from the Spanish in 1574 (EMİRALIOĞLU, 2016: 46–49). This swift recovery demonstrated the resilience and strategic importance of Ottoman naval power in the Mediterranean.

At the end of the 16th century, the conquest of Cyprus marked a turning point, as the Ottoman Empire improved its relations with European states through commercial privileges and capitulations. In particular, commercial privileges and diplomatic agreements were established between the Ottoman Empire and France (INALCIK, 2022A: 168–172). These agreements solidified France's role as a key ally and trading partner within the Ottoman economic framework. The Ottoman conquest of Cyprus and the capitulations it granted did not disrupt Venice's spice and other trade, as Venice remained an influential power. On the contrary, the Ottoman Empire's creation of a large, unified economic area benefited Venetian merchants and contributed to the revival of the spice trade (TABAK, 2008: 53). This collaboration showcased the adaptability of Venetian commerce within the Ottoman-dominated Mediterranean system.

In the second half of the 16th century, British merchants entered the Mediterranean to dominate the Iranian silk trade. They transported Iranian silk to Aleppo and Izmir, then exported it to England. This move allowed British merchants to distribute silk in Northern Europe and secured their dominance in the trade (FAROQHI, 2010: 211). Their success in the silk trade marked the beginning of stronger British commercial ties with the Ottoman Empire. In addition, the Dutch arrived in the eastern Mediterranean in the late 16th century and played a key role in meeting the needs of the developing textile industry. The product called "greinen," produced in the city of Leiden, was made from Angora goat hair instead of wool. This raw material was exclusively sourced from Ottoman lands (FAROQHI, 2010: 213). The reliance on Ottoman

Angora goat hair underscored the economic interdependence between the Dutch and the Ottoman Empire.

While there were naval wars in the 17th century, the Ottoman Empire could not completely restrain the Venetian navy in its own waters. Venice's conquest of the Peloponnese, in Morean War (1684–1699), highlighted the limits of the Ottoman navy (SOUCEK, 2011: 19–20). This loss marked a significant challenge to Ottoman maritime dominance in the region. However, despite Venetian resistance, the superiority of northern sailors became evident. In the 17th century, the understanding of maritime and trade changed in the Mediterranean, and the influence of Northerners increased. The Dutch and the British expanded their presence in the Mediterranean and partially demonstrated the ability to curb piracy activities (ABULAFIA, 2012: 519–521).

By the 17th century, the Atlantic sugar industry threatened sugarcane cultivation in the Eastern Mediterranean, leading to a decline in the Levant's sugarcane production (TABAK, 2008: 102). This shift marked the increasing dominance of Atlantic economies in global sugar trade dynamics. By the 1650s, the spice trade in the Eastern Mediterranean had significantly declined as a result of shifting global trade routes and the rise of new economic centers. In response, the region's commerce adapted by diversifying into other goods, such as coffee, silk, wool, leather, and cotton, which became prominent commodities in Mediterranean trade networks (TABAK, 2008: 176). This diversification underscored the adaptability of Mediterranean commerce in response to changing global markets. Apart from these, the trade of olives, olive oil, wine, and soap contributed to economic life in the Eastern Mediterranean in the 17th century. The rise of tree crops occurred alongside the emergence of wheat as a modest crop and the merging of small livestock farming with small-scale agriculture (TABAK, 2008: 168). These changes reflected a gradual transition toward a more localized and diversified agrarian economy. Although the Ottoman Empire benefited from these dynamics to a certain extent, it remained outside many trade networks. The Ottoman presence was extremely limited in the southern coastal ports, which were of significant importance for the coffee trade starting in the 17th century (HOURANI, 2013: 276). This limitation highlighted the empire's struggle to compete with European and Arabian traders in critical maritime markets.

While Venice in the 17th century aimed to protect or expand its maritime trade and colonies, the Ottomans sought to expand their territory. The 1645–1669 war, Cretan War (Ottoman-Venetian War), sparked by Ottoman actions such as the capture of Crete, signalled

the decline of Ottoman naval forces (SOUCEK, 2011: 17). [32] This marked a turning point in the shifting balance of power in the Mediterranean. As Ottoman rule declined, the dominance of city-states increased. By the mid-17th century, the demand for raw materials controlled by city-state merchants, such as cotton and silk, grew in Mediterranean trade (TABAK, 2008: 61–62). This increased demand reflected the growing integration of Mediterranean economies with emerging global markets.

The general scarcity of wheat in the Mediterranean region was a fundamental problem for the islands, and the hot winds blowing in the Mediterranean before the harvest caused the wheat to dry out during the growth phase and to fall off if it was ripe (KARADEMİR, 2014: 216). This environmental challenge significantly impacted agricultural productivity and food security in the region. The problem of supplying wheat and other grains was one where the central government was expected to take an active role in ensuring adequate supply and distribution. Given the importance of grain for both food security and economic stability, it was the responsibility of the state to manage resources and coordinate efforts to address shortages and support agricultural production across the region. In particular, the Aegean islands served as a bridge, providing communication networks and economic cooperation between neighbouring shores in the Mediterranean. Due to the scarcity of raw materials and limited agricultural products, the islanders had difficulty engaging in maritime activities (BALTA, 2006: 96–97). This limited the islands' ability to fully exploit their strategic position for economic and trade purposes.

The Ottoman Empire sought to expand and secure its maritime borders to protect its islands. It regarded the islands and coasts as vital border areas under its authority and took measures to defend them from foreign pirates and raiders (MYLONAKIS, 2021: 4–8). Strategic islands like Rhodes (1522), Crete (1645–69), and Cyprus (1570–71) played a crucial role in maintaining Ottoman control over the Eastern Mediterranean (SOUCEK, 2011: 114–115). The waters extending north and west starting from these islands were also important for security.

[32] Venice adapted well in the 16th century despite the new Eastern route initiated by the Portuguese in 1497. Although there were 12 trading houses in Istanbul by 1560, its medieval commercial importance waned. The alleged decline in Venice's naval power must be considered alongside economic developments during the expansion of Continental Europe. Glassmaking and woolen textiles boomed, and textile production increased tenfold from 1516 to 1565. Venice also benefited from Spain's wool supplies and trade routes; Despite losing Cyprus and facing local threats, it retained its vital position in Western trade. Peace with the Ottomans ensured Venice's control over Crete. (ABULAFIA, 2012: 515-518)

The Aegean Sea held critical significance for the security of the Eastern Mediterranean due to its strategic positioning, which linked key geopolitical territories and vital maritime trade routes. Serving as a nexus for maritime traffic between Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa. The Aegean Sea, in particular, was an important maritime zone for both Turkish and Greek ships as well as countries engaged in Western maritime trade. The island-rich and mountainous coastal structure of the Aegean made it susceptible to piracy but also provided key opportunities for trade routes. Pirates often used the Aegean's bays and caves as hideouts (MYLONAKIS, 2021: 9–11). Major sea routes passed through key Mediterranean ports, including Gibraltar, Marseille, Genoa, Livorno, and Venice, and then continued towards the Peloponnese Peninsula, Crete, the Greek islands, Izmir, Istanbul, and Alexandria. These routes were critical for the movement of goods and the strategic positioning of naval forces in the region (MANTRAN, 1988: 686). [33]

Rhodes (1522) was a strategic island in maritime trade, connecting Istanbul to the Black Sea, Alexandria, and the Syrian coast (SOUCEK, 2011: 136). Although Rhodes was vital for trade security, capturing it alone was insufficient. The real challenge was to eliminate the pirate activity surrounding the island. The pirates of Rhodes plundered goods and captured ships of merchants traveling between Anatolia, Egypt, and Syria, as much as they could, and their activities were not effectively curtailed (UZUNÇARŞILI, 1988B: 145). Crete also held vital importance in this regard and was conquered in this context (1645-69). In this sense, Crete, like Rhodes, was of critical importance, and its conquest was essential (1645-69). While the Ottoman conquest of Crete was a significant step in securing trade, the state of the Ottoman navy failed to prevent piracy, and trade security could not be fully ensured (MANTRAN, 1988: 687–691).

2.3.2. Black Sea

The Silk Road, which extended from China to the Mediterranean basin, had two main routes. One route travelled west from the lower Volga and led to the Venetian colony of Tana on the Sea of Azov. Later, in the 15th century, another Silk Road emerged, connecting the Iranian provinces of the Mongol Empire to the Black Sea. After the conquest of Istanbul, the

[33] Although the decisive naval battle of Lepanto in 1571 was an important victory, it did not change the strategic balances in the Mediterranean. Venice later left Cyprus to the Ottomans with the peace treaty signed in 1573 (STAVRIANOS, 1958: 156).

Ottomans reorganized Black Sea trade to serve their interests, maintaining strict control, which reduced the importance of international trade through the region. The conquest of Constantinople resulted in the Ottomans securing dominance over the Black Sea and disrupting existing trade routes. It was not until the 18th century, when the Russian Empire reached the Black Sea, that this trade was revived to its pre-Ottoman form (ASCHERSON, 2002: 33–34). After the fall of Constantinople and the conquest of Crimea, the Ottomans established control over the Black Sea, excluding foreign powers.

Although the Ottomans secured the northern borders and the Black Sea in the 16th century, Russia's southward expansion over the next three centuries continually threatened Istanbul's trade routes and grain supplies (FAROQHI, 2019: 79–80). The Russian efforts to reach the Mediterranean and the Ottoman attempts to defend its territories around the Black Sea and the Straits (Istanbul and Çanakkale) ignited conflicts and wars that spanned nearly three centuries, culminating in the Crimean War due to increasing French and British interests in the region (ASCHERSON, 2002: 128). These long-lasting tensions significantly shaped the geopolitical dynamics of the region and had lasting consequences for the Ottoman Empire's control over trade and strategic territories.

After securing control over the Black Sea region, the Ottomans, leveraging their geopolitical position to dominate maritime trade, granted commercial privileges to the Genoese, Florentines, and later the Venetians, ensuring that trade continued under their authority (MANTRAN, 1987: 1436). Capturing the Black Sea and the Balkans established regional political unity, transforming the Black Sea into an Ottoman internal market. This reorganization centralized the region's economy under Ottoman authority, consolidating resources and trade routes. The transformation of the Black Sea into an Ottoman-controlled internal market played a crucial role in the growth of Istanbul into Europe's largest city. The region's integration allowed for the efficient production and transportation of essential goods, such as grain, timber, and other resources, which were critical in sustaining the city's rapidly expanding population and economic activity (ÇAĞMAN, 2016: 131).

Most grain was transported by sea, but this method had certain limitations. Sea transportation was not feasible year-round due to seasonal conditions. During periods when maritime transport was entirely impossible, grain was shipped from the Black Sea to Izmit by land and stocked there to prevent shortages and ensure the people of Istanbul would not suffer (ÇAĞMAN, 2016: 134). Goods imported from Russia included items such as caviar, cheese,

meat, dried fish, tea, iron, rope, fur, wax, and sailcloth (BOSTAN, 1995: 373). Conversely, the Russians procured a variety of goods from the Eastern Mediterranean islands, Izmir, and its surrounding areas, including olives, vinegar, lemons, oranges, pastries, fish, diverse fruits, almonds, sugar, coffee, soap, cotton fabrics, and silk (BOSTAN, 1995: 371-372).[34]

The ancient trade route, known as the Greek Road, extending from Istanbul to Novgorod and from there to the Baltic countries, regained importance with the conquest of Istanbul, Kefe, and the Crimean Khanate. This development allowed for the flow of luxury Eastern products such as silk, spices, gold thread, and fine incense, which were distributed as far as Norway. The Ottomans' control over key territories and trade routes facilitated the exchange of various fabrics, spices, sweets, luxury goods, and Turkish horses (ÖZCAN, 2011: 724-726). During this period, the Black Sea became an inland sea politically, administratively, and commercially, a status that was maintained throughout the 17th century. The Ottoman Empire's strategic control ensured that the region remained within its sphere of influence, furthering its economic and political dominance. However, after the Ottoman defeat in Vienna in 1683, Russia emerged as a rising power, forming alliances with European states to challenge Ottoman territories. Russia's first attempt to open to the Black Sea by capturing the Azov Castle failed, although the 1699 Karlowitz Treaty shifted the balance of power in the region (BOSTAN, 1995: 355-356). At the beginning of the 18th century, the Ottoman Empire, unwilling to allow foreign dominance in the Black Sea, sought to control Kili and Akerman, along with the Straits, in response to Russia's territorial expansion (BOSTAN, 1995: 353).

Apart from these strategic ports, control of the port of Kefe was especially important. Difficulties in maintaining control over the port were resolved by allowing the Crimean Khanate to retain part of the trade tax. The Crimean khans, who were under Ottoman influence, were independent in their internal affairs, and in return, they played a crucial role in preventing the Russians from entering the Black Sea (UZUNÇARŞILI, 1988B: 396). On one hand, there was the threat of Russian landings in the Black Sea, and on the other hand, Kefe's critical importance in controlling the trade of silk fabrics, weapons, mohair, and mohair wool exported to Poland was another significant factor (FAROQHI, 2010: 203-204). Crimean military support,

[34] Among the goods that Russian merchants took from the Ottoman country to their own country were hazelnuts, vinegar, wine, coffee, cotton, cotton thread, tree saplings and items that were not prohibited for export. On the other hand, the goods they exported to the Ottoman Empire included caviar, meat, wheat, barley, fish, tobacco leaves, wax, iron, tiles, rope and fur. (BOSTAN, 1995: 362-363)

vital for Ottoman power projection in the Black Sea region, was secured through negotiations and bargains due to the differing statuses of the Crimean rulers (WASIUCIONEK, 2019: 91-92). Thus, the alliance with Crimea was both a strategic and economic necessity for the Ottomans in the region.

In the 17th and 18th centuries, the coastal plains around the Black Sea were especially important for meeting the needs of Istanbul. The decrease in grain cultivation in the Mediterranean climate led to a shift towards northern latitudes. As a result, crops such as rye, rice, and corn, which thrived in the Black Sea climate, became more prominent, while the importance of wheat declined (TABAK, 2008: 226-227). By the 18th century, 80-90 percent of the grain coming to Istanbul was supplied from the Black Sea, with the rest coming from the Mediterranean (ÇAĞMAN, 2016: 132).

The Black Sea also supplied Istanbul with fish and other seafood (KÖSE, 2020: 3879-3880). This shift in agricultural production contributed to the transformation of trade routes and port activity, particularly in the Black Sea region. Additionally, the reliance on northern grain sources further solidified the economic integration between the Ottoman Empire and its Black Sea neighbours. The dominance that the Ottomans had established in the Black Sea since the 16th century began to erode in the second half of the 17th century. During the 17th century, the British and Dutch were trading in the region using Ottoman ships, and agreements made in the 18th century granted foreign powers access to the Black Sea (ISSAWI, 1974: 111-112). The support that the Ottoman Empire received from the great powers in Europe to survive was primarily driven by the European powers' fear of Russia gaining influence in the Straits and the Mediterranean. This was particularly significant as, especially since the 17th century, the focus of relations with Russia shifted from the north to the south of the Black Sea (EFE and KIZIL, 2018: 299-300). Notably, the British entry into the Black Sea was made possible by an agreement with the Ottoman Empire in 1799, aimed at countering French presence in Egypt and seeking support in this context (VLAMI, 2015: 123-124).

A fleet under Russian command sailed to the Eastern Mediterranean, and a Russian army occupied Crimea, which was annexed to the Russian Empire a few years later as a result of the war of 1768-74. The Black Sea was no longer an Ottoman lake, and Russia's new port, Odessa, became a significant trade center (HOURANI, 2013: 310). The closed sea status of the Black Sea meant that a strong sovereignty claim emerged for the first time, leaving aside Austria, which made its presence felt in this sea from time to time, with the seizure of Crimea by Russia

in 1783 (BEYDILLI, 1991: 688-689). This shift marked a pivotal change in the balance of power in the region, signalling the decline of Ottoman influence. The annexation of Crimea by Russia also disrupted the Ottoman Empire's control over key trade routes and maritime access, reshaping the geopolitical landscape of the Black Sea for the years to come.

The Ottoman Empire's efforts to defend itself against Russia's expansion from the north and around the Black Sea since the late 17th century were at the center of relations with Western powers (HOURANI, 2013: 273). Russia's expansion towards the northern shores of the Black Sea also encompassed a vital market area where Anatolian Ottoman textile manufacturers flourished. This change in borders led to restrictions or complete interruptions in the flow of goods and people between the two empires (QUARTAERT, 2005: 127). The shifting borders not only disrupted economic relations but also intensified the geopolitical rivalry between the Ottomans and Russia, drawing in European powers seeking to influence the outcome of these territorial struggles. Additionally, the loss of these market areas further weakened the Ottoman Empire's economic base, contributing to its gradual decline in the face of rising Russian power.

2.4. The State's Economic Character at the Dawn of Peripheralization within Core-Periphery Relations

In Anatolia and the Balkans, where central authority was strong, tax collection, price control, and similar regulations were more effectively implemented. In regions such as Arabia, Egypt, and North Africa, where control was weak, local leaders were given more autonomy, limiting the applicability of economic policies. As an Anatolia-centered state, customs laws in newly conquered lands in the Balkans, the Arabian Peninsula, and North Africa were retained as they were before the Ottoman Empire (BULUNUR, 2019: 24). In regions where the timar system existed, tax officials were appointed in the 17th century when the system became dysfunctional. “Initially, bureaucrats were assigned to the tax collector's office to collect taxes, but later this responsibility was taken over by local families, such as the Karaosmanoğulları, Cihanzadeler, or İlyaszadeler in Anatolia. Similar families were also prominent in the Balkans (DEMIR and ÇELIK, 2019: 81). This transformation in the taxation method, which was primarily effective in Anatolia and the Balkans, occurred in regions where the Ottoman land system (timar system) had been most prominent during the classical period. These areas represented the core of the state's military and political power, reflecting the strong integration of the land system (timar system) into the Ottoman administrative and fiscal structure.

The strong central authority in Anatolia and the Balkans not only enabled effective tax collection and economic regulation but also facilitated other mechanisms of control, such as the confiscation of property, to consolidate state power against local elites. In the Ottoman Empire, confiscation practices (the state's seizure of property from deceased individuals or those found guilty) were more common in regions where central authority was strong. Anatolia and the Balkans were at the forefront of these practices, particularly Anatolia in administrative and commercial centers such as Istanbul, Bursa, and Edirne, being a key focus of the state's forcible seizure of property and capital. Forced seizures were frequently applied in the Balkans and Anatolia to diminish the power of influential local nobles. By the early 19th century, this practice played a significant role in centralization efforts aimed at countering these local power groups (ÖGÜN, 2006: 87). In cities like Istanbul, where the central bureaucracy exerted greater influence, the Ottomans maintained tighter control over prices. However, even in Anatolia, as one moved further from the capital, local dynamics, and the influence of local elites on prices increased, despite state interventions (GOFFMAN, 2004).

During the 17th and 18th centuries, the Ottoman economy, political significance, and military power declined dramatically compared to Western Europe and China. While the Ottoman state was among the most powerful in the world at the beginning of the 16th century, by the 18th century it had transformed into a weakened apparatus unable to resist the decentralizing forces of local power centers within its own territory (QUATAERT, 2005: 75-76). The collapse of the traditional land system in which surplus value from land was redistributed within the framework of reproducing the military system in the 17th century led to military bureaucrats purchasing peasant farms. In cases where peasants abandoned their lands, timar lands were rented to wealthy civilians at high prices through the mukataa system (INALCIK, 1993: 314). The military structure, strained by the rapid pace of change in military technology, began to struggle to meet urgent cash demands from the first half of the 17th century onwards. To address this financial crisis, the state accelerated to selling tax collection rights in advance. These developments collectively marked the end of the Ottoman Empire's classical age, signalling a shift away from the traditional systems that had supported its earlier strength (FAROQHI, 2010: 94). The military defeats, coupled with escalating financial and logistical problems, gradually entrenched a chronic state of decline for the Ottoman Empire. By the second half of the 17th century, the empire faced a series of devastating defeats that culminated in the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699). This treaty marked a significant turning point, as it severely diminished the Ottoman presence in Europe, primarily due to the anti-Ottoman coalition led by

the Habsburgs (STAVRIANOS, 1958: 155). The territorial losses in Hungary, Transylvania, and Croatia, resulting from the treaty, not only reshaped the empire's borders but also symbolized the end of the war economy that had once supported its expansionist policies. Following this defeat, the Ottomans shifted from a conquest-oriented mentality to a defensive stance aimed at preserving the remaining territories (KASABA, 2009: 52).

The decline in Ottoman military power became more apparent after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, when the modern state system began to take shape across Europe, and the Ottomans struggled to keep pace. The wars and diplomatic setbacks that began with the negotiations for the Karlowitz and continued throughout the 18th century were clear indicators of this process (QUATAERT, 2005: 79-80). During this period, the empire engaged in a series of conflicts with Austria, Russia, and Iran, suffering significant military defeats, territorial losses, and the rise of national movements in the Balkans as Serb and Greek nationalist movements. The situation worsened with the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774, which further strengthened Russian influence in the region and further undermined Ottoman control over its territories (BARKEY, 2008: 204-205).

Various local rebellions and regional wars, which became more frequent, especially from the 1770s onwards, had a negative impact on Ottoman treasury expenditures. Events such as the Mora Rebellion (1770), the Egyptian unrest, the Iranian intervention in the Basra province in 1776, and the 1787 Russian War precipitated a period of severe financial strain for the Ottoman Empire (CEZAR, 1986: 78). As the financial burden of war escalated in the 1780s, particularly with regard to the rising costs of material supplies, the Ottoman state apparatus faced increasing difficulty in sustaining its operations across its extensive territorial holdings. The Crimean War of 1787, along with the conflicts with Austria in 1788 and Russia in 1792, significantly exacerbated the empire's fiscal challenges, pushing it to the verge of financial insolvency (CEZAR, 1986: 97-112).

The mounting financial strain from continuous wars and regional unrest further exacerbated the Ottoman Empire's vulnerability, making it increasingly difficult to address emerging threats, such as the rising military challenge posed by Wahhabism in the Arabian Peninsula mid-18th century onwards. Wahhabism, a religious movement that emerged in the Arabian Peninsula, began to pose an increasing military threat to the Ottoman Empire. As the empire's military power gradually declined, particularly following the 1774 Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca with Russia, the Wahhabi threat became more aggravated, pronounced, and

highlighted the empire's vulnerability. The weakening of Ottoman sovereignty, especially in the Arabian region, was a consequence of both internal decline and external pressures. By the end of the 18th century, the Ottoman Empire had become highly decentralized, with its central control weakened and its territories steadily eroded by European rivals. In addition to the loss of key lands like Crimea, Wallachia, Moldavia, and Ragusa following the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, the empire's military and political cohesion further deteriorated, making it increasingly difficult to maintain authority over distant regions (HANIOĞLU, 2008: 6-8). The combination of military setbacks and territorial losses severely diminished the empire's ability to counteract both internal and external challenges effectively.

The wars were lasting longer than before, which was unforeseen by the ailing Ottoman financial system, and this situation made war financing increasingly difficult. Under these conditions, the local influence of the local influential people, the ayans, increased, and this situation led to a radical decrease in the influence of the central government compared to before (CEZAR, 1986: 31). With this decentralization dynamic, financial, military and land regime crises turned into a total depression due to the continuous wars with Austria, Russia, Poland, and Iran (BARKEY, 2008: 204-205). Later territorial losses, especially the de facto secession of Egypt, were the result of difficulties experienced in centralization, the historical process in which the Ottoman Empire continued to shrink towards Anatolia with the secession of geographies such as Serbia (1811), Greece (1828), Moldavia and Wallachia (1856) were the results of the 18th century process in which the central action capacity of the state decreased radically (BOZARSLAN, 2015: 111-112).

3. Nation-State Genesis in Periphery as a Geographically Shrinking Empire: Establishment Problem and Fragmented Population

The most significant internal factor behind the transformation of the Ottoman Empire into a fragile state, vulnerable to economic periphery and external political pressures in the 19th century, was the decentralization effect that began in the 18th century and continued into the 19th. In Anatolia and the Balkans, which were the core regions of the Ottoman Empire during the classical period, local power centers and decentralization increased throughout the 18th century, reaching their peak at the beginning of the 19th century. This decentralization, fuelled by emerging nationalist sentiments within these regions, led to a growing challenge to the authority of the Ottoman state. As the empire struggled with the rise of national identities and

the quest for sovereignty in the 19th century, it found it increasingly difficult to maintain control over its territories. The fundamental problem that hindered the state reforms necessary for centralization in the 19th century was the incompatibility between the non-Muslim bourgeoisie and the Turkish-Muslim bureaucracy. This discord between the accumulation of military-political power and economic power was the greatest obstacle to the state apparatus in reversing these conditions through reforms and re-centralization. The emergence of nation-state dynamics, characterized by the rise of nationalist movements and the demand for self-determination, further complicated the Ottoman Empire's ability to adapt. This situation formed the primary internal dynamic that increased the vulnerability of the Ottoman Empire to external pressures, especially as European powers pushed for a more capitalist world order and led to the empire's peripheralization.

During this period, when the processes of peripheralization and the transformation from empire to nation-state were experienced simultaneously, the state bureaucracy attempted to establish a new order with Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism, in chronological order, to prevent the disintegration of the empire. The primary goal of these three ideological frameworks were to preserve the integrity of the empire. Ottomanism initially aimed to unify the diverse populations of the empire, but its influence began to wane as separatist movements gained momentum among the Christian populations. Following the decline of Ottomanism, Islamism emerged as the next unifying ideology, yet it too faced significant challenges, particularly as separatist movements began to rise among the Muslim nations. As both Ottomanism and Islamism lost their capacity to maintain cohesion within the empire, Turkism gradually became the dominant ideology. This shift marked a transition toward a more ethnonational framework, reflecting the empire's transformation in response to internal and external pressures. Turkism, shaped by the Turkish and Muslim cadres predominant in the military and civilian sectors of the state, integrated Islamic religion but also emphasized the development of a new Turkish identity. As a bureaucratic and militaristic ideology, Turkism represented the final establishment attempt to address the question of unity, particularly in the existing of Christian communities in Anatolia, directing the population engineering seen in modern nation-state building. In the broader context of nation-state dynamics, this shift reflected the empire's struggle to adapt to the changing global order, where national identities became the primary markers of political legitimacy. The final solution to the problem of the incompatibility between the non-Muslim bourgeoisie and the Turkish-Muslim bureaucracy was realized through Turkism, as it aimed to

consolidate power and establish a cohesive national identity, marking a decisive move towards the construction of a Turkish nation-state.

As it is mentioned above, the negative impact of European goods on local artisans in the Ottoman Empire became evident in the 19th century and created dynamics that made it increasingly difficult for local producers to continue their production (HANNA, 2014: 66-69). By the end of the 18th century, the Ottoman Empire had lost its sovereignty over its core lands and had become the periphery of industrialized Europe, caught in the broader historical process of centralization struggles throughout the 19th century. However, this process also had a military and social dimension. The order that emerged after the Janissary-guild alliance in the 1830s, which made possible the above bureaucratic reforms and free trade agreements, also created a social cohesion problem by undermining traditional power structures (ÇIZAKÇA, 1985: 354). This change marked a critical moment in the empire's transition from a self-sufficient economic system to a dependence on European economic structures.

During this period, after the collapse of the Guild-Janissary coalition, ethnic groups such as Greeks, Armenians and Jews increasingly found ground to emerge as an intermediate class (AGIR, 2022: 70). Moreover, Europe’s growing demand for raw materials, including raw silk, wool, mohair yarn, and cotton, significantly influenced the economic dynamics of Ottoman territories, exacerbating the already evolving patterns of commercial dependency (ÇIZAKÇA, 1985: 358). By the 19th century, the demand for commodities such as tobacco and cotton from European markets catalysed the shift towards single-crop farming in the Ottoman Balkans. This agrarian transformation, geared towards European markets, fostered the rise of local landowners and the expansion of large-scale agricultural estates, particularly in regions like Bulgaria, Thessaly, and Macedonia (ORTAYLI, 2008: 356).

In the early 19th century, the weakening of Ottoman guilds, coupled with the shifting dynamics of the empire’s periphery, created conditions highly favourable to foreign merchants (AGIR, 2022: 55-57). These economic transformations accelerated structural changes that would later intersect with modernization efforts throughout the century. By the late 19th century, the Ottoman state’s modernization policies facilitated the emergence of a Muslim Turkish middle class, though this development occurred after a prolonged period of marginalization under peripheralization dynamics. However, economic advancements continued to primarily benefit non-Muslim minorities, who controlled the majority of industrial and commercial capital. This disparity created a fundamental contradiction: while political

power remained concentrated in the hands of Muslim Turkish elites, economic power was dominated by non-Muslim groups (GEORGEON, 2006: 26-27). Muslims, particularly Muslim Turks, held dominant roles in the Ottoman military and bureaucracy, occupying the majority of administrative and governmental positions. In contrast, non-Muslims, especially Jews, were predominantly engaged in trade and commerce, with Muslim Turks constituting only a small portion of the merchant class (IPEK, 2011: 2-5). This economic and social disparity became a significant point of tension, influencing the political and economic reforms of the late Ottoman period.

Behind all these historical conditions and outcomes in the 19th century was the expansion of the capitalist world system, as well as the weakening of the central state bureaucracy and the rise in power of local landowners during the 18th century. Compared to other empires, the Ottoman state apparatus never possessed the capacity for integrative and bureaucratically centralizing action and implementation across its territories, as the second section attempts to demonstrate (BOZARSLAN, 2015: 66). During the gradual decline of the empire throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, local large landowner elites (ayan) expanded plantation-like farms, further diminishing the already limited power of the central bureaucracy in the 18th century (INALCIK, 2022E: 422-423). The influence of the ayans, who controlled vast territories and resources, became a significant obstacle to the state's modernization efforts, as they resisted reforms that threatened their economic and political power. A centralized and modernized state apparatus would have been more dominant in taxation and redistribution, undermining the privileges the ayans held in these areas.

The collapse of the timar system in the 17th century initiated profound changes in Ottoman landownership, as the military bureaucracy began purchasing peasant farms. As peasants abandoned their lands, timar properties were increasingly leased to wealthy civilians at high rates (INALCIK, 2012). This shift disrupted traditional redistribution relations, as the timar system had previously functioned as a means of redistributing land and resources to military elites. The decline of the system, combined with advancements in gunpowder and cannon technology, created significant challenges for the Ottoman military, which could no longer rely on the old structure to meet the demands of modern warfare. This situation not only strained the already fragile Ottoman financial system but also heightened the need for cash to finance military modernization, which exacerbated the empire's fiscal crisis. The weakening of the timar system and the growing pressures of militarist modernization exposed fundamental problems in the functioning of the Ottoman state, as it struggled to generate stable revenue and

maintain military effectiveness within the context of a rapidly changing dynamics in global scale.

In practice, the local powerful leaders took on a more active role by managing local economies, organizing militias, and even commanding troops during military campaigns. They often negotiated with the central government, securing privileges, and expanding their influence, which further diminished the authority of the Ottoman state in these regions in 18th century (HANIOĞLU, 2008: 16-19). This change marked the end of the traditional system in which soldiers, supplies, and taxes were allocated in the form of products, and the transition to a system in which the right to collect taxes was sold in advance to finance military organization. As the empire faced increasing financial pressures, the need for cash to finance the military led to the monetization of taxes and the replacement of non-monetary forms of taxation (KUNT, 1997: 64). This change exposed a critical problem for the Ottoman state: the inability to establish a centralized, modern fiscal system capable of effectively managing revenue and military expenditures. The rise of the ayans, who capitalized on local tax collection, further undermined the central authority's capacity to implement the necessary reforms for modernization, leaving the empire increasingly dependent on decentralized structures.

The loss of political sovereignty and peripheralization in the 19th century stemmed from the 18th-century decentralization, which saw local powers dominate. As shown in the second part of this thesis, even core regions like Anatolia and the Balkans experienced intense decentralization. This weakening of Ottoman central authority was driven by military decline, tax collection issues, the financial strain of the ineffective sipahi cavalry, and corruption within the Janissaries (JELAVICH, 1995: 45-47). In the 17th and 18th centuries, the Ottoman Empire was able to transfer less than 4% of its national income to the center of the state apparatus as tax revenue, whereas this rate was over 10% for the Netherlands and England, where the central bureaucracy’s ability to collect taxes was much higher (YILDIRIM, 2023: 2). This internal tax collection problem came with a decline in military organization and military technology on the battlefields and with territorial losses and created the need to restructure the state apparatus. However, despite this reality, centralization efforts aimed at restructuring were insufficient and, as we will show below, prevented top-down reforms (FAROQHI, 2010: 111-114). With the rise of tax farming, the ayan shifted from intermediaries to powerful figures, maximizing their own income at the expense of the state treasury, which increased their social and economic influence (ZÜRCHER, 2017: 10; SHAW, 1965: 136-141). As their influence grew, they became politically problematic, with status issues persisting until the early 19th century.

Even in the Balkans, a region close to the palace, the central state apparatus lacked the capacity to control the local powers of the notables, to whom it had to delegate tax collection authority (ZÜRCHER, 2017: 13). The issue was not merely a matter of tax collection practice but also a crucial turning point, demonstrating that the state could no longer fulfil its primary action of authority. This process reflected a political sovereignty crisis resulting from the removal of tax collection authority from the direct control of central powers (ZÜRCHER, 2017: 9). However, this crisis did not lead to a political outcome that was economically, socially, or legally defined. The local leaders who emerged during this period initially gained social and economic power and sought to convert it into political power. These local power owners were unable to obtain official status in the regions where they held de facto control (HUSAIN, 2021: 153-154).

Within the framework of this crisis, large landowners and merchants became more open to external provocations, which led them to be effective in local rebellions that took place from the 18th century onwards (ORTAYLI, 2008: 360). Especially after the Russo-Turkish War (1768-1774), the need for war financing provided grounds for the ayans (local elites) to become even stronger. The military gaps that emerged due to the weakness of the Ottoman State as a central power provided the militia forces led by local notables with the opportunity to be effective and filled the gaps that emerged (GÖÇEK, 1999: 138).

Under these conditions, although the sultan tried to control the local elites with the threat of confiscation and the secondary heavy taxes he tried to collect from them, he was again unsuccessful due to the inadequacy of the action capacity of the central state apparatus. Another reason for this situation was that in conditions where the tax was controlled locally, it was impossible to implement and control the tax that was wanted to be collected again at this secondary level (GÖÇEK, 1999: 141). In addition to the decrease in the action capacity of the central power, there was no other power element at the local level that could balance these local powers. Since the non-Muslim villagers, who were thought to be able to resist these local leaders, traditionally had a distant relationship with the state, they did not resist the local leaders by keeping their distance and in time they established relatively closer relations. Under these conditions, some of the ayans resorted to regional rebellions and demanded a change of status or independence. The 1791-1808 rebellions in the Balkans made it difficult for the central powers to intervene effectively because the ayans stood behind the rebels and actively supported them (GÖÇEK, 1999: 144).

The weakening of central authority in the 18th century not only eroded tax collection authority but also facilitated the emergence of plantation-type farms through the decentralization process. Mukataa owners (tax farming unites) effectively became a new dominant economic class (INALCIK, 2012: 16-22). The biggest obstacle to the establishment of these farms—the prohibition of inheritance transfer, was overcome during this period, and such transfers began to occur in practice. From the early 18th century onward, the transformation of timars into mukataa paved the way for the rise of farms, enabling some of the rights of these farm owners to be transferred to their heirs (VEINSTEIN, 2012: 47). By the end of the 18th century, cotton had become the main export product of the Serres plain in Macedonia, with production concentrated among a few notable families. Farms also spread to Danube Bulgaria, Kosovo, Albania, Bosnia, and Anatolia (INALCIK, 2012: 25).

These plantation-like farms evolved into production centers, producing a wide variety of crops. Plant diversity was a notable feature of agricultural production. Initially, wheat, barley, and fruit were cultivated primarily for local consumption rather than export-oriented products like cotton and tobacco (VEINSTEIN, 2012: 50). This shift from subsistence farming to export-oriented production marked a significant turning point, linking the initial focus on local needs to the later commercialized agricultural economy driven by foreign demand. Over time, however, as foreign market demand grew, agriculture in these areas became increasingly commercialized. This transition not only shifted production toward export crops but also intensified the exploitation of peasants working on these farms compared to earlier periods (INALCIK, 2012: 22-23).

This level of exploitation was due to structural changes on these farms, as the authority to collect taxes was transferred from the central state bureaucracy to the farm owners. Over time, the level of exploitation increased as tax collection shifted from short-term farmers to large landowners who provided advance payments (ÖZDEMIR, 2009: 3-4; KUNT, 1997: 65; BARKEY, 2008: 218-219). These landowners evolved into an aristocratic class actively engaged in tax collection, trade, usury, and agricultural production. The central state, debilitated by the protracted wars of the 18th century, proved incapable of curbing the growing autonomy of local elites, resulting in the intensified exploitation of the independent peasantry that had historically constituted its primary social foundation (PAMUK, 2007: 143-144). The rise of farms and large landownership was driven in part by increasing market prices, especially in the Balkans, which made previously unused agricultural lands attractive (INALCIK, 2012: 29). But this dynamic was more complex than a simple conflict between local and central authorities.

During the same period, competition among local families for control of land and the prestigious title of ayan intensified. As this situation intensified, so did the exploitation of the peasantry (ORTAYLI, 2008: 357). Once ayans secured local dominance, they initiated large-scale efforts to convert previously uncultivated or idle lands into productive agricultural fields, focusing particularly on the fertile river valleys and coastal areas, which offered optimal conditions for expanding crop cultivation and meeting the increasing demands of both local and export markets (QUATAERT, 2005: 131-133).

However, these production centers were not plantations in the strict sense, as peasants were neither reduced to serfs nor transformed into wage labourers. Market-oriented production was primarily conducted on small-scale fields cultivated by free peasants (İSLAMOĞLU, 2012: 57). The central state, within the limits of its capacity, sought to protect the peasantry from the emergence of an autonomous landowning class. The inability of the ayans to transform the power they acquired in the second half of the 18th century into a permanent status was largely due to the alliance between the peasantry and the palace bureaucracy (KEYDER, 2012: 9-14). Although the central state lacked the authority it had wielded in earlier periods, it managed to maintain a balance of power and prevent these local leaders from institutionalizing their dominance as a hereditary status.

The interventionist approach of the central state bureaucracy toward the agricultural surplus of the free peasantry aimed to keep landowners in the position of tenants dependent on the state, a policy rooted in the classical period (İSLAMOĞLU, 2012: 68). In the 18th century, the relationship between the state and the Janissaries had a paradoxical feature in terms of the transformation of the relations between the state and the peasantry. On the one hand, especially in the regions dominated by the nobility, the Janissaries increasingly became merchants and craftsmen or established close ties with the guilds, posing a threat to the palace, but on the other hand, these forces were a locally functional force in the hands of the state to prevent the exploitation of the peasantry (HOURANI, 2013: 300). Although the Janissaries appeared to have degenerated as a military force, they simultaneously functioned as a resistance element within the slow transformation of the classical production and distribution relations. Their efforts to preserve their status served to slow down the commercialization of agriculture and the exploitation of the peasantry under purely market-driven conditions. The Janissaries' connections with guilds further complicated the implementation of reforms aimed at preventing military decline. This resistance delayed centralization efforts and hindered the transformation of production and distribution relations. However, this dynamic also prevented the ayans from

consolidating their power and thus served to prevent a transformation in classical relations of production that could have damaged the alliance between the state and the peasantry. The general opposition of the army, particularly the Janissaries, to opening the Ottoman market to European producers limited the ability of ayans operating on farms to expand their influence (FAROQHI, 2010: 15-17).

In the same period that the Janissaries functioned as a local resistance force, the Ottoman Empire was also facing external pressures, particularly from Russia and Western powers, which further strained its military and financial capacity. The 18th and 19th centuries were marked by military defeats and financial difficulties for the Ottoman Empire. The empire faced challenges both from Russia, which had strengthened its position by adopting Western military techniques, and from Western powers, as it struggled to protect its sovereignty (GÖÇEK, 1999: 104). “In the late 18th century, Russia emerged as the primary threat to the Ottoman Empire. After the independence of Crimea, Russia granted control over parts of the Black Sea, and allowed it to function as the protector of Orthodox Christians. The War of 1787-1792 further enabled Russia to gain control over the northern Black Sea and parts of Georgia” (ZÜRCHER, 2017: 14). During these two centuries, the empire faced unsustainable economic pressures due to rising military expenditures, declining revenues from war, and competition from emerging trade routes. These factors contributed to recurring financial crises. Ultimately, military defeats and the escalating costs of war pushed the Ottoman state toward external debt and financial collapse (VEINSTEIN, 2012: 43).

While the Ottoman Empire struggled to manage external threats and economic pressures, its internal financial strategies, such as the malikâne system, were increasingly insufficient to support military expansion, exacerbating the financial burden caused by both external and internal challenges. To finance the expansion of the central army, the Ottoman Empire employed the malikâne system, which sold mukataa to private individuals who made advance payments, but in practice, the tax obligations were minimal due to the clientelist corruption mechanisms within the bureaucracy. However, the limitations of this system, combined with rising military costs and stronger enemies, turned war into a financial burden rather than a success (CEZAR, 1986: 72-73). In the early 18th century, as the sipahi army (heavy cavalry) became less effective, the number of armed Janissaries and rural mercenaries increased, creating a strain on the central treasury (PAMUK, 2007: 140-142). Additionally, as the influence of the sipahi army diminished, the social and economic power of the Janissaries grew, making the situation more complicated. In a historical context where the central

bureaucracy weakened, de facto Janissary domination and fragile local aristocracies emerged (GÖÇEK, 1999: 200; KEYDER, 2014: 25).

Although the nobles did not achieve permanent status, they transformed into a social stratum resembling the aristocracy, creating a decentralizing effect by disrupting the vertical structure of traditional palace authority and marking the final end of the center-periphery dynamic that had persisted since classical times (BARKEY, 2008: 209-211). At the height of this rupture, the ongoing wars not only obstructed re-centralization efforts but also intensified the urgency of local tax collection due to the financial crisis. The war of 1768-1774 with Russians strained the finances of the Ottoman Empire, leading to substantial military expenditures and a war indemnity of 7.5 million kuruş, nearly half of the empire's annual income. This financial burden underscored the need for military reform and brought the tax issue to the forefront (CEZAR, 1986: 75-77).

The period of Selim III's reign (1789-1807) marked a critical juncture for the Ottoman Empire, as it became increasingly evident that modernization and Westernization, particularly in the military, were pressing imperatives (KUNT, 1997: 59). The Nizam-ı Cedid reforms, introduced by Selim III, represented the first substantial step toward modernization, but they encountered fierce resistance from the Janissaries. Concerned about their diminishing influence and their position in the new military structure, which was being influenced by Alemdar Mustafa of Rusçuk, the Janissaries opposed the reforms. This opposition culminated in the assassination of Selim III in 1808 (BOZARSLAN, 2015: 117-118). The local elites reached the zenith of their power with the Treaty of 1808 (Sened-i Ittifak), which compelled the central state to officially recognize their authority. However, despite this concession, the local elites were ultimately unable to resist the centralizing efforts of the bureaucracy. By the reign of Mahmud II (1808-1839), central authority was restored (ORTAYLI, 2008: 358-359).

One of the most significant obstacles to these centralization efforts was the traditional military system and the entrenched social and economic connections of the Janissary Corps (ORTAYLI, 2008: 362). However, after the old military units were abolished, Mahmud II was able to initiate the creation of a new military force. Unlike the Janissaries, the new army operated independently from social and economic affairs, remaining isolated within its barracks, and refraining from engaging in trade (GÖÇEK, 1999: 155-156; CEZAR, 1986: 244-245). This distinction meant that, unless local elites organized their own military resistance, the new army would not encounter a substantial opposition force from the provinces. The

restructuring of the military into a centralized, regular force supported the state's broader goal of reshaping the center-periphery relationship, consolidating power at the center, and reducing the influence of local powers (CEZAR, 1986: 247). In this context, the abolition of the Janissary Corps was not only a symbol of military reform but also a pivotal moment that accelerated the broader centralization of Ottoman authority. The centrifugal effect of the ayans in the Ottoman Empire, which weakened the central authority, not only facilitated the rise of separatist national movements in the Balkans but also profoundly shaped the emergence of the Turkish nation-state in the late 19th century. The decentralization driven by the ayans, as they consolidated local power, created a fertile ground for nationalist movements in the border regions. These separatist movements, which began gaining momentum in the early 1800s, fuelled the reactionary militarist modernization of the state, as well as the militarist ethos of the later emergent Turkish nation-state, following the decline of Ottoman central power (HANIOGLU, 2008: 51-52).



The dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire in Balkans, 1672–1913 (Quataert, 2005: 57)

By 1808, when the Ottoman state was forced to officially recognize the authority of the ayans through the Sened-i Ittifak, resistance to central authority had become more organized. This decentralized political environment allowed the first nationalist uprisings, such as those of

the Greeks and Serbs, which ultimately led to their independence. Soon, similar movements emerged among other ethnic groups in the empire, including the Bulgarians, Macedonians, and Armenians, who were motivated by aspirations for self-rule. By the end of the 19th century, these nationalist movements had spread further to include Muslim groups like the Albanians, Arabs, and Kurds, who also sought autonomy and independence (GEORGEON, 2006: 2). For the Ottoman Empire, this fragmentation posed a direct challenge to its unity and sovereignty. The rise of nationalism in its various constituent populations not only delayed the centralization efforts but also laid the groundwork for the ultimate disintegration of the empire. The Ottoman state's failure to effectively manage these centrifugal forces and curb the spread of nationalism contributed to the empire's weakening and eventual collapse. As the 19th century progressed, the Turkish nationalist movement, initially part of the broader struggle to maintain the empire, began to take shape. This movement, driven by the desire to preserve a Turkish-speaking, Muslim core within a crumbling multiethnic empire, was influenced by the rise of European style nationalism, by the Empire's struggle to adapt to modernization and was triggered to construction of the emergence of the modern Turkish nation-state.

3.1. Nation-State Genesis in Periphery

At the center of nation-state literature lies a fundamental theoretical distinction between approaches that view the state as the primary actor and those based on ethnicity. This distinction separates theorists such as Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson, and Eric Hobsbawm, who emphasize the central importance of the development and industrialization processes of modern states, from scholars like Anthony D. Smith, John Armstrong, and John Hutchinson, who focus on ethno-symbolic characteristics in nation-building processes. The latter group highlights the historical existence of fragmented populations and the interactions between ethnic groups that precede the formation of modern states. While proponents of the first approach stress the constructive roles of the state and leading elites in shaping nations, those aligned with the second approach emphasize ethnic and cultural characteristics as foundational to nation formation, arguing for their enduring role over the top-down activities of the state (ÖZKIRIMLI, 2009: 209). In the literature on nation-state formation, a key point of divergence has been the debate over whether nations are constructed or represent authentic, ancient entities. Since the 19th century, these discussions have often revolved around two fundamental models: the "French model" based on territorial land law and the "German model" rooted in blood-based

kinship and ethnicity (JAFFRELOT, 1998: 54-55). This duality underscores the broader tension in understanding the origins and nature of nation-states.

Before it was understood as a nation in its modern sense, the term "nation" referred to a community bound by common feelings, a shared language, common traditions, or a sense of comradeship (SCHULZE, 2005: 111). Until the French Revolution (1789), the French nation was defined by individuals with status politicus, comprising nobles and clergy. In the German context, the term "nation" referred to the Diet of the empire, while in Britain, it evoked the Westminster Parliament (SCHULZE, 2005: 100–105). During the 18th and 19th centuries, the notion of sovereignty expanded to encompass the nation, framed by popular sovereignty rooted in the idea of a culturally homogeneous community. This transformation generated tensions between the state and sub-state micro-identities (HOBSBAWM, 2014). The concept of the nation, as it is understood today, is a distinctly modern phenomenon. Modernist approaches emphasize the central role of modern states and the process of homogenization necessitated by industrialization in shaping the modern concept of the nation. In contrast, the ethno-symbolic approach argues that nations are not entirely modern creations but rather new manifestations of longstanding ethnic elements, reorganized and adapted to the conditions of the modern world. What is indisputable for both approaches is that the concept of "nation" has evolved and expanded significantly under the influence of dynamics associated with the rise of modern states. Historically, the term "nation" was primarily a conceptual framework representing the nobility, but its meaning broadened considerably with the expansion of the bourgeois class during the transition to modernity (HOBSBAWM, 2014). This transformation reflects a shift in societal structures, as the bourgeoisie sought to redefine political and social frameworks to align with their interests, contributing to the development of nations as we understand them today.

One of the core propositions of modernist approaches is that modern historiography, which emerges as a necessity of the modern state, plays a crucial role in constructing new collective identities by retrospectively shaping historical narratives (CALHOUN, 2007: 71-74). According to Ernest Gellner (2013), the "need for homogeneity brought about by industrialization" was a driving force behind the emergence of nationalism in modern nation-states. For Gellner, the organization of the state, characterized by specialization and concentration to establish and maintain order, was a prerequisite for the development of nationalism. Karl Deutsch, building on the distinction between traditional and industrial societies, argued that tools such as literacy in newspapers and books were instrumental in shaping nation-building processes (JAFFRELOT, 1998: 56). Benedict Anderson extended this

perspective by emphasizing the role of capitalist publishing in nation-building. He highlighted how efforts to create a homogeneous society, as required by the capitalist system, relied heavily on reducing linguistic diversity. The standardization of language, achieved through advancements in printing technology, played a fundamental role in these processes (2015: 51-58). This theoretical approach emphasizes the interaction between industrialization, state formation and cultural standardization, arguing that the modern nation is not an organic entity but a constructed one, shaped by the imperatives of modernity and the mass communication tools.

In Nations and Nationalism, Ernest Gellner explores the relationship between the modern state and culture, identifying it as a critical factor in nation-building. According to Gellner, while nations are a product of industrialization, the modern state necessitates a process of "homogenization" of its population to uphold its monopoly on violence and culture (2013: 234-235). This process involves aligning cultural and demographic characteristics within the framework of the state's authority. On one side, the industrialization-driven demand for homogenization seeks to create a unified cultural and social identity. On the other, the state faces the challenge of establishing its legitimacy among the newly homogenized population. Gellner defines the nation as "a theory of political legitimacy that prevents ethnic boundaries from extending beyond political boundaries and, in particular, ethnic boundaries within the state from separating those in power from those governed" (2013: 71). This dynamic illustrates the reciprocal relationship between the state's structural needs and the cultural unification required for national cohesion.

According to Gellner, the resolution of cultural fragmentation, a necessary step to build the homogeneous society required by industrialization, paved the way for the emergence of national movements and the crystallization of national consciousness. The modern state played a key role in this process by constructing the "individual" required by the industrial revolution: a mobile, literate person equipped with a standardized culture (GELLNER, 2013: 118-120). Gellner argues that the claim that the modern nation existed as an inherent or potential ethnicity prior to the rise of modern states is historically inaccurate. Instead, the nation, in its modern sense, is a construct, a myth created by the modern state and industrial society, both of which require a sense of historical depth for legitimacy. In Gellner's view, "Nationalism sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and transforms them into nations; it invents this cultural accumulation where it does not exist" (2013: 128). This process highlights the instrumental role of nationalism in aligning cultural elements with the needs of industrial and state structures.

Benedict Anderson agreed with Gellner on the modernity of nations but criticized him for claiming that nations were "invented." Anderson argued that Gellner's use of the term "invention" was misleading, as it overlooked the role of imagination and creation in shaping a nation's collective identity. Rather than being a fabricated construct, a nation is a design rooted in how a particular society envisions its political and cultural union. Nations should, therefore, be analysed based on the unique ways in which different societies imagine their collective identity (ANDERSON, 2015: 21). According to Anderson (2015: 18-19), the nation is a cultural product that emerges from the natural elements within a community, such as shared traditions, language, and history, and is further shaped by modern nationalist elites who attribute "sovereignty" to it. The term "invention" is problematic in Gellner's approach because it suggests that nations lack any pre-existing cultural foundation. Anderson instead emphasizes the role of imagination, which acknowledges the organic connection between cultural elements and the shaping of national identity by elites in the modern era.

Anderson argued that the concept of a nation as an imagined community first took shape in the American colonies and later spread to the European continent. In the colonies, nation-building was rooted in the idea of liberation from colonial rule, whereas in Europe, it evolved into a complex political and ideological challenge (ANDERSON, 2015). According to Anderson, language was not the primary trigger for the development of national consciousness in the American colonies. Instead, it was the declining influence of the colonial core states that paved the way for the emergence of a distinct identity. American-born civil servants, known as criollos, who were of European descent but denied the full privileges of being European, began to develop a unique sense of geography and history. Their administrative responsibilities across vast colonial territories exposed them to the realities of their shared environment and experiences, fostering a collective identity distinct from that of their European counterparts (ANDERSON, 2015: 66-74). This process highlights how geographical and social distance from the colonial metropole, combined with local administrative practices, played a pivotal role in the formation of an imagined community that sought to define itself as a nation. [35]

Eric Hobsbawm argued that Gellner was correct in treating nationalism as the overlap of political and national units, but he failed by neglecting the conditions of ordinary people and

[35] First, the influence of the states formed in Latin America in the early 19th century; second, Woodrow Wilson brought this problem to Europe during the Treaty of Versailles; The third is the period opened by the world order that emerged as a result of the independence of the colonies (HALL, 1993: 2; ANDERSON, 2015; ÖZKIRIMLI, 2009).

society from below. While ethnicity was always influential in the process of nationalization, Hobsbawm emphasized that it was not based on culture as something pure and intrinsic. Instead, ethnicity was an ideology that, in his view, was rooted in political economy and grounded in the principle of false consciousness (CALHOUN, 2007: 76). In this context, Hobsbawm acknowledged that the mobilization of pre-national movements within cultural structures played a role in the process of nationhood. However, for him, the main determinant was the processes of state-building. The religious and cultural foundations provided only partial advantages (HOBSBAWM, 2014: 85-92). According to Hobsbawm, nations and national movements were products of social engineering. The concept of "invented traditions," which were put into effect during the state-building process, played a crucial role in the construction of nations. These traditions gave nations a sense of historical continuity, thus shaping their identity as a collective and seemingly eternal structure (ÖZKIRIMLI, 2009: 147).

Hobsbawm argued that "invented tradition" refers to rituals, symbols, and sets of practices that aim to establish certain values and norms through repetition, creating the appearance of natural continuity with the past (HOBSBAWM, 2006: 2). In his thesis, national ideology and political economy are central to embodying the nation and constructing it as a collective entity through traditions invented to serve specific interests and processes (HOBSBAWM, 2006). Hobsbawm regarded elements such as a common language, ethnicity, and cultural categories as secondary factors, highlighting the decisive role of state-building in nation formation (HOBSBAWM, 2014: 84-86). According to his view, nation-building entails "the transition from a hierarchical group lacking national consciousness to a national order of anonymous masses sharing a common culture and protected by the state through the education system" (HOBSBAWM, 2012: 50-52).

Gellner's approach has been criticized for having a reductionist theoretical framework regarding the effect of industrialization on nationhood and for being limited in its understanding of the strong passions that nations evoke at ethnic and cultural levels (ÖZKIRIMLI, 2009: 172-180). Anthony D. Smith (1986), one of the most prominent critics of Gellner and the modernist approach, argued that while nationalism is indeed a modern phenomenon, the ethnic models influencing modern nation formations are rooted in a phenomenon that dates back thousands of years before the emergence of the modern state (2002b: 41). According to Smith's theoretical framework, national movements are modern creations, but they are continually shaped by cultural motifs, collective imaginations, and ideas stemming from ethnic elements. These elements, focused on their own identity and collective existence, have always existed, and

provide a historical foundation for the modern nation (SMITH, 2014: 118). Smith's perspective highlights the interplay between historical ethnic identities and modern nation-building, suggesting that nations draw on deep cultural and ethnic reservoirs to construct their legitimacy and cohesion.

Modernists argued that ethnic affiliation was not a primary concern for individuals or nations and that individuals could change their ethnicity. This perspective limited their ability to grasp the central role of ethnicity in shaping national and individual identities (SMITH, 2002A: 30-35). Smith contended that "ethnicity serves to distinguish one people from another by combining cultural difference with the context of community, marking how a people seeks to define both itself and those outside itself" (2002B: 46). In his view, ethnicity was a core element within modern nations that reminded individuals of their "essence" and provided them with a collective name, a sense of common ancestry, shared history, culture, regional identity, and solidarity (SMITH, 2002b: 40-50). These ethnic foundations were often shaped by a combination of factors, including migration memories, nostalgia for shared pasts, the institutional frameworks offered by organized religions, and the existential struggles brought about by interstate conflicts. Smith's emphasis on the enduring role of ethnic elements underscores their importance as both cultural anchors and mobilizing forces within modern nation-building processes (2002B: 58-68).[36]

According to Smith, although nations may appear modern in many respects, their roots run much deeper than modern states. The existence of nations depends on the presence of socio-political and cultural-psychological "others," which are shaped by the historical development of ethnic origins. Nations exist in relation to these "others" and rely on them for defining their identity. In this sense, nations must distinguish their ethnic origins through the contrast provided by these "others" (2014: 114). Smith argued that the complex structure of nations cannot be fully understood without considering these ethnic distinctions. He criticized Gellner for failing to grasp the significance of ethnic origins and for drawing superficial conclusions about their role in nation-building (2014: 174). Furthermore, Smith cautioned against overemphasizing the power of the modern state in explaining nations and national movements. He maintained that "states had transformed in many places before they could resist the power of ethnic groups"

[36] Although Marxists viewed ethnicity as merely an epiphenomenon, ethnicity was much more powerful and more resistant to class interests, state-building, or globalization (COHEN, 2011: 5-7)

(2002B: 37-39). This perspective highlights the enduring influence of ethnic identities in shaping nations, even in the face of powerful state institutions.

Smith's approach has been criticized for failing to adequately emphasize the differences between ethnic communities and modern nations (ÖZKIRIMLI, 2009: 227-229). Critics argue that Smith's theory overlooks the inherent uncertainties of the concept of ethnicity itself. Presenting ethnicity, a category that is constantly being constructed and reshaped, as the foundational basis of modern nations has been seen as problematic, as it introduces ambiguity into the explanation of nationhood. Moreover, in Smith's theory and in ethno-symbolic approaches more broadly, ethnic, cultural, and symbolic elements are treated as indispensable and decisive conditions for nation-building. However, these approaches have been criticized for not sufficiently explaining the processes by which these elements are formed and evolve over time. Breuilly (1996) notes that treating such elements as fixed points of distinction obscures the complex and dynamic nature of their construction. This critique highlights the need for a more nuanced understanding of how ethnic and symbolic identities are shaped within specific historical and political contexts.

Smith's emphasis on ethnicity has been a point of contention among his critics. Even in nation-building experiences where discourse on ethnic and cultural origins was dominant, the connections that dynasties established with ethnic and cultural identities were often a blend of fiction and historical fact, constructed through selective references (BREUILLY, 1996: 154). While Smith, like Gellner, acknowledged the homogenizing role of the state, he placed greater emphasis on ethnicity and culture as the driving forces in historical development. According to Smith, although states could reshape nations over time, ethnic elements remained ultimately decisive. For Smith, the formation of a nation was not possible through state intervention alone. It required the presence of common sentiments, shared myths, and collective beliefs within a social structure to provide the foundation for national identity (SMITH, 2014). This distinction underscores a critical discourse within nation-building theories, focusing on the relative significance of state-driven processes compared to pre-existing ethnic and cultural foundations in shaping the emergence and enduring stability of nations.

While Smith's ethnicity-centered approach left the creation of ethnicity itself unexplained, the modernist approach represented by Gellner failed to address what triggered experiences of nationhood in contexts where industrialization was not a significant factor (BREUILLY, 1996). Unlike other forms of organized human communities, a nation must

possess an emotional and cultural foundation. At the same time, a nation must rely on a sovereign state and political autonomy to sustain itself (BREUILLY, 1996: 148). Miroslav Hroch offered a synthesis of these perspectives, proposing that while an economic basis is always present in the formation of nations, the specific form a nation takes varies significantly depending on regional, cultural, religious, political, ethnic, and other contextual variables (2011: 26). This approach emphasizes the interaction between structural and contingent factors in nation formation, thereby avoiding a reductionist interpretation.

The attempt to understand nation-building processes by considering geographical, cultural, political, and other differences was categorized both geographically and temporally by Benedict Anderson. Following the nation-building experiments in the American colonies, European examples, and later, Asian, and African nations, adopted the nation-state models from Europe (ANDERSON, 2015: 155-160). Anderson argued that the global spread of capitalism, alongside homogenization policies and the expansion of mass education, led to the formation of bilingual, bi-referenced elites in regions where it spread (2015: 131-132). The most significant criticism of this approach came from Partha Chatterjee, a leading figure in postcolonial studies. According to Chatterjee, the claim that nation-states in the colonies simply mirrored European and American models was historically inaccurate and failed to address the specific conditions of the Asian and African contexts (CHATTERJEE, 2002).[37]

Extensive scholarly discourse has been devoted to the formation of nations and national movements, their interplay with ethnic categories, and the various factors influencing their emergence. A central question in these discussions is whether it is possible to define models that separate the experiences of nation-building into distinct causal sequences. Despite the ongoing debates, certain common points have emerged. The leading elites in nation formation, as pioneers in researching language, culture, and social history, seek opportunities to promote mass mobilization among populations and ethnic communities. In later stages, processes of massification, social structure reorganization, and homogenization take place (HROCH, 1996: 81). Although national movements often have a specific ethnic and cultural foundation, ethnicity and culture are constructed through "processes of conflict and negotiation." Nations

[37] In the process of nationalization, the formation of the national language and homogenization have played an important role in the new capitalist publishing, but there are only similarities in certain mechanisms, not a simple copy of the European models of the original features of the colonies (CHATTERJEE, 2002: 23).

are not eternal categories, nor can they be simply derived from nationalism; instead, they are shaped within the context of historical social realities (HROCH, 2011: 22).

This ongoing process of nation-building, with its focus on mobilization, ethnic construction, and the reorganization of social structures, was further consolidated by the emergence of the modern nation-state in the mid-18th century. The state's efforts to centralize and standardize information played a crucial role in solidifying these processes, facilitating the homogenization and regulation of its population. The transition to the nation-state, which took place in the mid-18th century, was marked by the state's increasing efforts to centralize, and standardize information. This process involved the meticulous collection of detailed statistics on births, deaths, ethnic origins, and occupations, all of which were linked to the specific social conditions from which the nation-state emerged (GIDDENS, 1985: 180). What set the modern state apart was its unparalleled capacity to penetrate the social fabric and manage the lives of its citizens. Unlike earlier forms of political organization, the modern state sought to homogenize its population within a clearly defined geographical territory, ensuring a uniformity of identity and control (GIDDENS, 1985: 10-19; 48-49).

Modern nation-states served as mechanisms for both absorbing the population's capacity for violence and homogenizing it as much as possible. In the context of capitalism, the nation-state played a crucial role in unifying diverse collective identities under a singular national identity (GIDDENS, 1985: 181-182). The process of homogenization, often linked to ethnic cleansing, involved assimilating various ethnic groups into a new social identity that was more structured and connected to the state apparatus (MANN, 2005: 6-21). This process reflected the state's capacity to reshape social dynamics and impose a cohesive identity through force or ideological means.

The Muslim-Turks, who were the dominant community controlling the Ottoman Empire's state apparatus, experienced a process of homogenization during the empire's transformation into a nation-state. This process, which involved unifying and standardizing the population, is highlighted in nation-state literature and aligns with the population engineering practices described by Mann. In this context, the formation of the Turkish nation-state followed patterns similar to those observed in the development of other nation-states. The Turkish nation-state began to take shape in the 19th century when the Ottoman Empire was simultaneously experiencing economic peripheralization and political transformation. During this period, the Ottoman bureaucracy and political elites made active efforts to prevent the empire's collapse by

proposing new frameworks like Ottomanism and Islamism, which aimed to maintain imperial unity in the face of growing internal and external pressures. However, these attempts often grappled with the challenges posed by the empire's ethnically and religiously diverse population. Over time, Turkism emerged as the ideological foundation of the Turkish nation-state, promoting a more homogenized national identity. This ideology evolved by integrating elements of Islamism and became the driving force behind a nationalist movement that sought to consolidate a unified "Turkish" identity, often at the expense of ethnic and cultural diversity. This movement grew alongside a newly formed bureaucracy rooted in the old empire's structures, marking a shift from a multi-ethnic imperial framework to a nation-state model centered on a dominant ethnic identity. This intensive effort to stabilize the empire served not only to delay its collapse but also reflected the formative stages and birth pains of the Turkish nation-state, which ultimately emerged from within the imperial framework and the dynamics it generated.

Ottomanism was an ideological framework aimed at preventing the separatist movements of the Christian population. Through this initiative, the non-Muslim population gained certain advantages compared to their previous status. However, Ottomanism, implemented largely under the influence of external pressures, financial dependency, and the process of peripheralization, coincided with the invasion of the domestic market by European manufactured goods through foreign trade agreements. During the Tanzimat period (1839–1876), when Ottomanism was the dominant ideology, various advantages were granted to the non-Muslim population. Despite these efforts, Ottomanism ultimately failed to prevent the rise of national movements and the separation of Christian nations. After Ottomanism failed to prevent the empire's disintegration, Islamism emerged as an alternative ideological framework. It sought to unify Muslim populations under a shared identity to preserve the Ottoman Empire and counter European expansion by fostering solidarity among Muslims globally. This approach also aimed to curb separatist tendencies among non-Turkish Muslim groups. However, Islamism proved ineffective in halting these nationalist movements. As Islamism fell short, Turkism rose to prominence as the dominant ideological framework. The growing nationalist movements among non-Turkish Muslims demonstrated the limitations of Islamism as a unifying strategy. Turkism, emphasizing a cohesive Turkish identity, eventually became central to the formation of the Turkish nation-state.

When Ottomanism and Islamism lost their effectiveness in addressing the challenges of peripheralization and the disintegration of the state, Turkism emerged as a new foundational

ideology promoted by bureaucratic elites and leading nationalist intellectuals. The predominantly Turkish and Muslim military and civilian cadres of the state advanced Turkism as a response to separatist nationalist movements, although Islamism did not entirely fade away. During this process, Turkism incorporated elements of Islamist discourse while emphasizing Turkish identity. As a bureaucratic and militaristic ideology, Turkism pragmatically utilized Islamism. The Muslim population, which had migrated to Anatolia over the course of a century, was integrated into this framework. On one hand, Islamist rhetoric included these Muslim communities, and on the other, they were mobilized to create a new demographic landscape in Anatolia, replacing the Christian communities who had been expelled. Turkism, deeply intertwined with the state apparatus, also sought to address the economic and social divide between the non-Muslim bourgeoisie, favoured by capitalist Europe's economic and political pressures on the Ottomans, and the Turkish-Muslim community, which dominated the bureaucracy.

The Turkish nation-building process was not driven by a bourgeois movement, as seen in other national revolutions, but instead unfolded within a political framework where a bureaucratic elite played a central role. This class, positioned at the top of the social hierarchy, steered the formation of the nation-state from above, aiming to integrate the broader population into a unified political structure. Rather than emerging from popular or capitalist forces, the process was largely orchestrated by state officials and intellectuals tasked with creating a cohesive national identity and political unity (GEORGEON, 2006: 21). In the absence of a national bourgeoisie, the state bureaucracy took the initiative to shape the national movement. The Turkish bourgeoisie was eventually created with significant state support. The formation of this bourgeoisie, which had not been achieved during the periods of Ottomanism and Islamism, became a pressing priority during the era of Turkism. Turkism emerged as the final ideological response of Ottoman bureaucratic elites in the face of national separatism (GEORGEON, 2006: 30).

This development in the national movement and the rise of Turkism coincided with a geographic transformation, as Anatolia emerged as the core of the Turkish nation-state. Once the territory to which the Ottoman Empire had been forced to retreat due to territorial losses, Anatolia became the new homeland for the Turks, forming the base for the Anatolian Empire, which eventually evolved into the Turkish nation-state (GEORGEON, 2006: 31). This transformation in the national movement and the creation of a national bourgeoisie were also reflected in the bureaucratic and militaristic character that defined the emerging Turkish nation-

state. Institutional modernization efforts, especially within the military and civil bureaucracy, reshaped both state and society, guiding the national movement from above. This new bureaucratic class, which emerged at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century, was modern in nature and distinct from the old Ottoman bureaucracy. For this class, loyalty to the state, rather than to the sultan, became essential. In tandem with the formation of this new mindset, the state ceased to be the personal property of the sultan, and power began to adopt an anonymous character, akin to other modern states (GÖÇEK, 1999: 79).

The initial efforts of the new bureaucratic class toward modernization created significant social divisions, as traditional power structures and established institutions were challenged by reforms. These divisions highlighted the need for a more anonymous, impersonal state structure, which was seen as a necessary response to the emerging legitimacy crisis. As the new bureaucrats sought to centralize power and modernize the state, the old system, characterized by personal loyalty to the sultan and the influence of conservative institutions, began to lose its authority. This shift was essential not only for stabilizing the state but also for consolidating the emerging nation's identity and power, distancing governance from traditional, personalized forms of rule. The creation of a modern European-style army and educational institutions conflicted with both the conservative militarist and civil cadres and traditional religious institutions (HANIOĞLU, 2008: 53-54). Resistance to modernization reforms and the creation of a new bureaucratic structure posed significant obstacles to the centralization of the Ottoman Empire diminished after the elimination of traditional bureaucratic elements, such as the clergy and above-mentioned janissary cadres (GÖÇEK, 1999: 116-117). This pivotal moment marked the beginning of the nation-state construction process, characterized by a shift toward militarist modernization (BELGE, 2012: 13-14). The Tanzimat reforms (1839–1856), which sought to reorganize the state along the principles of Ottomanism, became feasible only after this resistance was dismantled, clearing the path for institutional and administrative transformation.

3.2. Ottomanism as a Re-Establishment Attempt

The imperial state apparatus, dominated by a Muslim-Turkish bureaucracy that had failed to industrialize and develop a national bourgeoisie, fell significantly behind the major European powers in terms of economic and technological advancement during the 19th century. Within the bureaucracy, fears of the empire's collapse were widespread (ÖZDEMIR and

ÖZÇELIK, 2022: 2). A Muslim-Turkish national bourgeoisie was almost entirely absent, leaving the merchant class predominantly composed of non-Muslim communities who were divided along religious and ethnic lines. These non-Muslim groups, having been excluded from the Ottoman state apparatus for centuries, were perceived as outsiders by the state, reinforcing a significant divide between them and the ruling elite. This economic and political fragmentation significantly hindered the effectiveness of the state's top-down reforms. Additionally, the dominance of minorities within the merchant bourgeoisie created a substantial barrier to establishing a unified and cohesive nation-state (GÖÇEK, 1999: 9).

This historical phenomenon became particularly significant during the Tanzimat period (1839–1876), which began with the 1838 Balta Limanı Trade Agreement (British-Ottoman trade agreement), as discussed above, driven by factors such as foreign pressure, the Egyptian crisis, and concessions granted to non-Muslim populations. The privileges granted to non-Muslims and the tensions arising between them and the Muslim population were key factors defining the era. The Tanzimat period, coincided with the reign of Abdülmecid (1839-1861) was notable for marking the first shift of power from the palace to the bureaucracy (INALCIK, 2010: 140–141). This period saw the formation of the first bureaucratic structures shaped by Westernization and marked the Ottoman Empire’s initial experience of political, economic, and social transformation as part of its integration into the capitalist world system. The Balta Limanı Trade Agreement with Britain and subsequent agreements with other European states triggered a process of peripheralization, undermining the empire's political sovereignty. These agreements caused a decline in customs revenues and an increase in trade deficits (AKYILDIZ, 2012). During this period, foreign influence on Ottoman policymaking, particularly by the British, reached unprecedented levels. Despite the generally adverse effects of this process, the Ottoman bureaucracy identified a slight advantage: Britain's support for the continuation of the Ottoman Empire, driven by its strategic interest in maintaining the empire as a buffer zone against Russian expansion, provided the Ottoman bureaucracy with a critical opportunity, which it skilfully leveraged to its advantage (ZÜRCHER, 2017: 44–45). The Tanzimat period also witnessed the rise of the non-Muslim trade bourgeoisie, which provoked reactions from both the bureaucracy and the Turkish-Muslim population. These responses reflected growing discontent with the dynamics of peripheralization and signalled the fermenting tensions within Ottoman society.

Following the Balta Limanı Agreement, the Ottoman bureaucracy issued the 1839 decree known as the Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayun as part of a broader reform agenda aimed at

addressing internal and external pressures. This pivotal moment signified the formal initiation of the Tanzimat era, a transformative period characterized by extensive administrative, legal, and social reforms within the Ottoman Empire. This reform program primarily aimed to secure minority rights, regulate financial systems, and reorganize military employment conditions (CEZAR, 1986: 281–282). Its overarching goals were to prevent the empire's collapse, strengthen minority loyalty in the face of rising nationalist movements, and curb European intervention. In pursuit of these objectives, the reforms sought to establish a more egalitarian Ottoman institutional framework, based on the concept of creating an "Ottoman nation" that incorporated non-Muslim communities into the Ottoman system during the age of burgeoning national movements (KARA, 2014: 28–29). Although some progress was achieved in financial and military reforms, the Tanzimat efforts failed to improve relations between the non-Muslim population and the Ottoman state. Despite their intention to retain separatist communities within the empire, the reforms became increasingly irrelevant as Christian nationalist movements in the Balkans intensified, and the ideological foundation of the reforms, Ottomanism, proved ineffective.

The Tanzimat reforms, underpinned by Ottomanism as the dominant ideology, sought to promote a more egalitarian concept of citizenship that transcended religious distinctions. In this context, Greeks and Armenians occupied a relatively larger role in state cadres compared to earlier periods (AKGONUL, 2012: 42). However, their representation remained minimal when contrasted with the overwhelming predominance of Turks and Muslims in bureaucratic positions. A key motivation for including non-Muslims in this process was to counteract separatist national movements. A secondary impetus arose during this period, aimed at addressing the privileged position Greeks and Armenians had begun to assume following the British-Ottoman Trade Agreement of 1838. This agreement facilitated the positioning of non-Muslims as an intermediary merchant class, allowing them to gain economic strength relative to Muslims and to maximize their influence in international trade during the 19th century. Non-Muslim communities were especially active in banking, transportation, export-oriented agriculture, and modern industries (SHIRINIAN, 2021: 180). A distinguishing feature of these communities was their closer ties to European powers, derived from their religious, cultural, and linguistic affinities, which afforded them the significant advantage of benefiting from foreign protection.

Although the emergence of the ideology of Ottomanism coincided with the reforms that followed the 1838 free trade agreement, the roots of this approach lie in efforts to revise the

classical imperial logic in response to the first separatist national movements. The Greek revolts of 1821-1830 were the first significant nationalist movement within the Ottoman Empire, leading to the establishment of the Kingdom of Greece. This separation created a legitimacy crisis regarding the political sovereignty of the empire. The resulting sense of urgency necessitated a change in the millet system, which had been based on religious principles. Under this system, the empire was divided into different religious communities, each granted a certain degree of autonomy. This shift, which promoted Ottomanism and emphasized "Ottoman citizenship," was intended to unite the diverse populations of the empire under a common identity and was the first significant initiative aimed at preventing the empire's collapse (KUSHNER, 1998: 33-34). By offering a more inclusive approach to citizenship, it sought to move beyond the old millet system, which had granted autonomy based on religious affiliation, and integrate the empire's various ethnic and religious groups into a cohesive whole. However, this approach was met with resistance, particularly from the Muslim public and bureaucrats, who increasingly emphasized Islamic identity as a unifying factor (EROL, 2016: 101-103). This shift marked a critical turning point, as the previously dominant Greek community, once seen as loyal subjects of the Ottoman Empire, was increasingly viewed as a threat following the Greek Revolt of 1821. In response to the rise of Greek separatism, the Armenians gradually became the primary group of focus for Ottoman administrators, as they were seen as a more loyal and stable community. Despite the discomfort of the Muslim bureaucracy and other segments of Ottoman society, efforts were made to integrate these various ethnic groups by promoting the idea of equal citizenship. This approach challenged the traditional, religious-based structure of the empire and aimed to foster a more inclusive Ottoman identity that could withstand the pressures of nationalism and separatism (AKGONUL, 2012: 41-42).

The Tanzimat period (1839–1876) built upon the foundational reforms initiated by Sultan Mahmud II, who sought to modernize the Ottoman Empire in response to both internal and external pressures. While Mahmud II focused on consolidating central authority and eliminating traditional power structures, the Tanzimat period furthered these reforms by focusing on secularizing state institutions and establishing a more efficient, modern bureaucracy (GEORGEON, 2006: 13). The Tanzimat period was not a radical departure from earlier reforms but rather a continuation of efforts to centralize authority, modernize state institutions, and address both internal challenges and external pressures on the Ottoman Empire (HANIOGLU, 2008: 73-74). What distinguishes the Tanzimat period was the evident dominance of the West in politics and the emergence of a more comprehensive modernization

at the state level (FINDLEY, 2020: 64-65). Despite some progress during this period, the Tanzimat reforms were unable to achieve full centralization in financial management, and the goal of establishing a modern financial system was not realized. Although an attempt was made to eliminate the old tax system, it was unsuccessful, and the Tanzimat bureaucrats' efforts to create a new financial structure ultimately failed. The lack of innovations in tax collection and financial control underscored the absence of financial centralization. Tax collection and financial management remained ineffective and inefficient until the establishment of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration in 1881, a measure prompted by European pressure due to foreign debt, which will be explained below (ORTAYLI, 1983: 101-105).

The Tanzimat era presented the dual challenge of addressing growing Western dominance and overcoming internal resistance from traditional power structures. The increasing influence of European powers necessitated a recalibration of Ottoman policies, making the acceptance of Western dominance and modernization an unavoidable reality. At the same time, the urgency to modernize the state was met with resistance from the clergy, who viewed secularization and Westernization as threats to Islamic traditions (FINDLEY, 2020: 64–65). This opposition significantly slowed the early phases of the Tanzimat reforms, as the clergy class's resistance was broken only gradually and slowly (GEORGEON, 2006: 13). The resulting dynamic of conflict and compromise between the modernizing state apparatus and traditional Islamic groups shaped the trajectory of the Tanzimat period, highlighting its character as both a continuation of earlier reforms and a necessary adaptation to the unique geopolitical and domestic pressures of its own time (HANIOGLU, 2008: 73–74).

The challenges faced during the Tanzimat era, particularly in reconciling Western influence with internal resistance, were compounded by external pressures such as the Ottoman Empire's vulnerability to European powers, exemplified by the Baltalimanı Trade Agreement of 1838. The Agreement opened Ottoman markets to British influence and created a profound transformation in social, economic, and political areas (ORTAYLI, 1983: 84). The reason for signing the agreement, which triggered this revolutionary transformation, was the weakness of the Ottoman state apparatus, which required British assistance to suppress the Egyptian rebellion, making it vulnerable to external pressures (ÖZDEMİR, 2009: 7). The process that followed the agreement caused the collapse of domestic industry and clarified the dynamics that led to the superiority of Western goods. Agreements with countries such as France and the Netherlands, as well as Britain, produced similar results. Ottoman lands became areas of economic exploitation (INALCIK, 2022A: 316-318). In particular, the Baltalimanı Agreement

with Britain directly harmed local artisans, led to the establishment of a liberal policy dependent on British trade, and strengthened the position of free trade advocates (ZÜRCHER, 2017: 41).

For three-quarters of a century after the Baltalimanı Trade Agreement, Ottoman imports increased while exports relatively decreased, reflecting the growing dependency on foreign goods (TOPRAK, 2022: 80). In 1825, England exported more than 56 million pounds worth of goods to the Ottomans, while importing approximately 44 million pounds in return. By 1845, the imbalance had deepened, with English exports to the Ottoman Empire approaching 92 million pounds and imports from the Ottomans reaching only 50 million pounds, creating a trade deficit of 42 million (ORTAYLI, 1983: 85-86). This trade deficit exemplifies the changing economic dynamics of the period, as the Ottoman Empire became more reliant on foreign trade and less competitive in producing goods for export. The growing imbalance signalled the deepening integration of the empire into the global capitalist system, but also highlighted the challenges it faced in maintaining economic independence.

During the Tanzimat period, the integration of the Ottoman Empire into the capitalist system accelerated, and foreign trade grew rapidly, doubling every 11-13 years. This expansion of foreign trade, however, also led to an increasing dependence on foreign markets, as British trade dominance grew, contributing to a large trade deficit (ZÜRCHER, 2017: 58). The empire's trade imbalance became a key feature of its economic landscape, highlighting the challenges of maintaining economic sovereignty amidst growing global interconnectedness. As the integration of the Ottoman coasts into global markets intensified, a shift in the social structure occurred, with the non-Muslim bourgeoisie emerging as a dominant economic force right this historical momentum. In particular, in western Anatolia, this new bourgeoisie became significant, benefiting from their connections to global trade networks. While the Muslim segment of society lagged behind in terms of economic power, the non-Muslim bourgeoisie emerged as pioneers of modernization, serving as a social base but in discord with the political superstructure. They became increasingly dependent on global capital for their economic ventures, accelerating their influence (EROL, 2016: 15-20). This shift in the social fabric of the empire played a pivotal role in the modernization efforts of the period, albeit with stark social divisions between religious groups.

In the context of the rising non-Muslim bourgeoisie, the most important issue, concept, and topic of discussion for the Tanzimat reformists was Westernization (ORTAYLI, 1983: 14). Westernization was seen as the key to achieving economic, military, and political power, as in

contemporary states. Westernization reforms reached their peak during the Tanzimat period, particularly with the establishment of Western-style schools and institutions, as recommended by military advisors (GÖÇEK, 1999: 157-158). Within the scope of Westernization and modernization efforts, the equal citizenship approach promised, especially by the Tanzimat Edict, created great expectations among the non-Muslim population and the middle class. However, the non-Muslim segments of society, who sought the elimination of all social inequalities between them and Muslims, were deeply disappointed. Despite some partial improvements, a truly egalitarian approach was not established, leading to dissatisfaction with the reforms (GÖÇEK, 1999: 300).

The rising expectations for reform and equality during the Tanzimat period, especially among non-Muslim communities, were shaped by the promises made in the Tanzimat Edict, but these promises were met with significant challenges in their implementation. The Tanzimat Edict assured that no one could be punished without trial and that their property could not be seized (ORTAYLI, 1983: 81). The edict also promised the abolition of the jizya tax paid by non-Muslims, reflecting Muslim-Christian equality, and for the first time, the concept of Ottomanism was introduced in this context (BERKES, 2012: 216). Although the abolition of the jizya tax, which was inconsistent with the principle of equal citizenship, was envisioned, it was not abolished in practice, and de facto taxation continued at the local level. In contrast, during this period, reactions arose in some Christian villages in Anatolia and the Balkans regarding the payment of the jizya tax. Peasant uprisings, driven by discontent in the Balkan provinces, quickly escalated into national movements (ORTAYLI, 1983: 93-95). In this process, where non-Muslims were ultimately disappointed, the failure of the proposed reforms was largely due to the resistance of local power groups that had lost their influence as a result of tax and military reforms. At the same time, conservative clerics encouraged local resistance against the new order, which aimed for an egalitarian approach toward non-Muslims (BERKES, 2012: 245).

Another significant decree of the Tanzimat period, alongside the firs edict, was the Islahat Edict. Like the Tanzimat Edict, it was issued to address the demands of non-Muslims for equality and to mitigate separatist national movements, which had been influenced by external pressures from European powers during the Crimean War. During the Crimean War (1853-1856), the Ottoman Empire incurred debt through France and England, losing control over trade policies and becoming a peripheral market dominated by European capitalism. This, combined with the increasing imports and trade deficit during the war, exacerbated the

dependence on foreign debt, setting the stage for a financial collapse (ÖZDEMİR, 2009: 8-9). Although the war ended with the Treaty of Paris (1856), which demilitarized the Black Sea, removed Russian influence from Moldavia and Wallachia, and guaranteed the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, the financial devastation caused by the war was severe (ZÜRCHER, 2017: 47-48). However, like the first decree, the Islahat Edict failed to provide full equality for non-Muslims. Despite the state's promises regarding minority rights, it was only able to fulfil some of these commitments. The main reason for this was the reluctance within the bureaucracy to take action in this direction after 1856 (ORTAYLI, 1983: 90-91).

The failure of the Islahat Edict to achieve full equality for non-Muslims, despite its promises, reveals the broader challenges faced by the Tanzimat reforms, particularly the opposition they encountered from Muslim public opinion and traditional power structures. Despite the expectations created by the Tanzimat Edict, Muslim public opinion produced an adverse result. Along with this process, nationalist movements and social unrest intensified (ORTAYLI, 1983: 90-92). Under these conditions, while national movements gained strength among the Christian population, demands based on Islamic sharia rose among Muslims. The Muslim population perceived the Tanzimat and Reform reforms as a negative movement against them. While the Christian bourgeoisie developed, a bourgeois class did not emerge among Muslims and Turks. As a result, Ottomanism could not conceal the state's political and economic weakness and its lack of progress. Despite all its reform efforts, the empire had to confront the fact that it lacked the necessary elements to establish a modern state (BERKES, 2012: 246). Despite the technical reforms made in the army after the abolition of the Janissary Corps, resistance to the state's total modernization was hindered by the ulema class, consisting of clergy, and the opposition of Muslim public opinion to equal citizenship. The clergy concerned that a constitution including non-Muslims would contradict the principles of Islam, along with traditional elements of the bureaucracy and Muslim public opinion, reacted strongly to this new attempt at reform. The main concern of the traditional bureaucracy was their fear of losing their privileged positions and authorities, which had always been in their hands (HANIOĞLU, 2008: 116-117).

3.2.1. Reorganization of Civil and Armed Bureaucracy

In the process of peripheralization, amidst centralization efforts and the challenges of global market integration, a new bureaucratic class emerged to manage an economy that often

conflicted with the interests of the local population (ISLAMOĞLU, 2012: 62). The roots of this bureaucracy can be traced back to the early 19th century. Top-down reforms reorganized the bureaucracy, secured the status of clerks, adjusted salaries, reformed appointment fees, and divided administrative duties (ZÜRCHER, 2017: 35). These reforms, initiated during the reign of Mahmud II, led to the gradual emergence of a modern bureaucracy from the 1830s onward. This transformation involved the slow replacement of the old ruling class, known as the Kalemiye (composed of soldiers, religious officials, and palace officials), which had formed the foundation of the old regime, with the new bureaucratic structure (FINDLEY, 2020: 21-22).

The characteristics of the old bureaucracy, the traditional state structure, were quite different from those of modern administrative systems. In the traditional bureaucracy, civil servants were not state representatives bound by limited contractual responsibilities to serve the state. Instead, in the old Ottoman order, they were personal servants of the ruler (FINDLEY, 2020: 23). In the traditional administrative class, loyalty was directed toward the sultan rather than the state. With the Tanzimat reforms, the old bureaucracy adopted a more anonymous and institutional structure. These reforms modernized registration systems, simplified correspondence language and techniques, and institutionalized archival practices. This process modernized the bureaucracy both technically and administratively, while also strengthening the centralized structure (ORTAYLI, 1983: 113-116). The newly formed bureaucracy was no longer a patrimonial one operating within the framework of cultural tradition, as in the old administrative system. Instead, the reforms oriented toward constructing a modern bureaucracy increasingly marked a transition to an administrative structure defined by rational planning (FINDLEY, 2020: 32).

The modern Ottoman bureaucracy, though predominantly composed of Turkish and Muslim officials, faced significant weaknesses that undermined its effectiveness and stability. These officials introduced dynamics that challenged the sultan's patrimonial rule, creating internal tensions. Meanwhile, the merchant class, largely non-Muslim and prospering under Western protection, remained beyond the influence of both the sultan and the emerging bureaucracy. This lack of integration between the bureaucratic elite and the economically dominant non-Muslim bourgeoisie prevented the formation of a cohesive bourgeois class, further fragmenting the empire's social and economic structure and hastening its decline (GÖÇEK, 1999: 104). From the sultan's perspective, the rise of the modern bureaucracy was paradoxical. While centralization was a necessary response to European challenges, it also marked the dismantling of the traditional Ottoman order. By the 19th century, as the central

government evolved into a civil service resembling modern bureaucracy, power shifted from the personal authority of the sultan to a more impersonal and institutionalized state structure (FINDLEY, 2020: 42). Despite this transformation, the Turkish-Muslim influence and dominance persisted. The continuity between the old and new bureaucracies was evident in the ongoing prominence of Turkish-Muslim officials and the preservation of their values. Although the bureaucracy remained under Muslim control during the empire's integration into the global market, the central state apparatus experienced occasional declines in capacity, reflecting the challenges of modernization and centralization (EROL, 2016: 72-75).

The bureaucratic cadres formed during the Tanzimat reforms sought to unify diverse segments of society under a new structure inspired by the ideology of Ottomanism, aiming to counter nationalist uprisings and local rebellions (DOGAN, 2014: 58). This shift marked the beginning of the end for the old system, which had traditionally organized the Ottoman population into distinct religious communities and their inner autonomy. While the liquidation of the old social system progressed throughout the 19th century, its remnants lingered until the century's end. Under this system, non-Muslims such as Greeks, Armenians, Assyrians, and Jews, though granted limited autonomy, held a subordinate status compared to the ruling Muslim Turks, a framework increasingly at odds with modern state principles (SHIRINIAN, 2021: 174). Resistance to the Tanzimat reforms emerged primarily from social groups, clergy, and the traditional bureaucracy that had benefited from the privileges of the old order/system, inherited from the classical Ottoman order. However, the reforms, being strictly secular in nature, did not provoke opposition from the clergy on religious grounds (BERKES, 2012). Instead, the resistance stemmed from fears of losing long-standing privileges, apprehensions about the egalitarian promises of Ottomanism, and concerns over the reforms' pledge to extend equality to non-Muslim segments of the population.

The Tanzimat reforms introduced a centralized structure, albeit one with limited capacity, which facilitated the development of an elite bureaucratic cadre. These cadres were educated in Western-style and military schools, representing not just technical innovation but also significant sociological change in the context of education (DOGAN, 2014: 59). The schools, established under new regulations influenced by the Education Council (1845), the Ministry of Education (1857), and French secular reforms, played a crucial role in shaping the modern Ottoman bureaucracy (HANIOĞLU, 2008: 102). The roots of these educational reforms can be traced back to earlier institutions such as the War Academy, established during Selim III's reign based on the Austrian model, and schools like the Mekteb-i Maarif-i Adliyye,

the Mekteb-i Tıbbiye (School of Medicine), and the Mekteb-i Harbiye, founded during Mahmud II's reign to train civil servants and military officers (ORTAYLI, 1983: 36). Military reforms, heavily influenced by Western education, further contributed to modernization. During the Tanzimat period, foreign officers joined the Ottoman army as instructors, introducing advanced techniques and doctrines. This era also saw a growing distinction between the civil bureaucracy and the military class, marking an important step in administrative specialization. Concurrently, the composition of the army began to change, with an increasing presence of Turkish officers, leading to its gradual "Turkification" instead of the general identity of Islam (ORTAYLI, 1983: 106-109). These reforms not only modernized the state's administrative and military systems but also helped reshape the Ottoman elite, aligning it more closely with contemporary European models.

The Tanzimat reforms expanded social control by redefining provincial boundaries to strengthen centralized administration, yet these measures inevitably provoked public reactions (ORTAYLI, 1983: 117–119). The primary goal was to enhance the effectiveness of local administrations through a more robust centralized structure. Notably, the construction of railways was regarded as vital for advancing agriculture and trade; however, much of this infrastructure development was dominated by foreign capital. The Tanzimat reforms not only sought to consolidate central authority but also paved the way for structural changes in provincial governance, culminating in the introduction of the 1864 Provincial Regulation. In 1864, the Provincial Regulation introduced a new provincial system designed to incorporate the representation of diverse religious groups within the administrative framework, reflecting the ideology of Ottomanism. However, this initiative was largely ineffective in practice, as the bureaucracy's efficiency in the provinces diminished due to reduced administrative capacity and limited operational authority (ORTAYLI, 1983: 120–122). These reforms in provincial organization failed to achieve their intended results by 1870s. Key obstacles included inadequate transportation and communication infrastructure, a shortage of trained personnel, and local resistance to the changes (AKYILDIZ, 2012: 78). Despite these challenges, the reforms significantly contributed to the transition toward parliamentary governance in the Ottoman Empire. They served as a precursor to the establishment of the first Ottoman Parliament (Meclis-i Mebusan) in the late 19th century, offering a foundational model for later political developments (ORTAYLI, 1983: 126–129).

The challenges faced by the Tanzimat reforms in provincial governance were not only tied to administrative and infrastructural limitations but also deeply connected to longstanding

issues of land, property, and resource distribution within the empire. In this context, the Land Law of 1858 emerged as a significant attempt to address these challenges by formalizing private property and introducing measures to integrate the economy into a cash-based system (Hanioğlu, 2008: 92). While the state protected the livelihoods of the peasants on the one hand due to the legitimacy concerns it inherited from the classical period and the fear of the risks that large landownership could create, on the other hand, it had to face the risk of dispossessing the peasants of land ownership with the new land regulation. Due to these risks, it tried to solve the security problem by imposing various restrictions on land ownership (İSLAMOĞLU, 2012: 60-61).

The core dilemma lay in the tension between the emerging shift toward large land ownership, driven by the inadequacy of small-scale village production within the context of integration into the capitalist world system, and the central state's efforts to preserve its traditional alliance with village communities and maintain its legitimacy. Under the 1858 Land Law, title deeds were issued for abandoned lands to encourage settlement. However, to prevent the formation of large private estates, the validity of these deeds depended on whether the land was cultivated, ensuring that no absolute property rights were granted. As a result, despite the growth of large landholdings, small village ownership remained predominant, reflecting the traditional norms of the period, which the central state sought to sustain (ARICANLI, 2012: 137). The law also accelerated the transfer of state-owned miri lands (state-owned lands), with approximately 70% being allocated to individuals under strict regulations. Additionally, barren lands previously deemed unproductive during the classical period were reclassified as miri lands. Once opened for allocation, these lands were transferred to private individuals, contributing to the consolidation of farms and the strengthening of agricultural estates even if not intended in advance in order to maintain traditional peasantry ties of the state (TABAK, 2008: 18, 213, 291–294).

The Tanzimat reforms faced significant challenges in implementation, largely due to a shortage of trained personnel capable of administering reforms across the empire's vast geography (AKYILDIZ, 2012: 79). Despite efforts at centralization, centrifugal forces retained some influence, creating a balance between the central authority and local powers. Even as the Ottoman central government weakened, mutual legitimacy between the center and decentralized local authorities persisted (EROL, 2016: 69–71). One of the critical obstacles to implementing these reforms was the insufficient training of personnel in regions close to the central bureaucracy, such as the Balkans and Anatolia. This issue, coupled with inadequate

funding for both the development of bureaucratic cadres and the establishment of provincial organizations, significantly impeded the progress of centralization (AKYILDIZ, 2012: 80). Recognizing the financial challenges, the Tanzimat reforms aimed to address them by transforming all citizens into taxpayers in the modern sense. A major step in this direction was the legal abolition of tax exemptions for the privileged military class, which sought to create a more equitable and efficient tax system (CEZAR, 1985: 932–933).

These financial reforms were closely tied to broader efforts to promote equality as a principle of governance. During this period, applying the concept of equality, especially in taxation and citizenship, was viewed as essential for maintaining the empire's stability and cohesion. As a result, the Tanzimat era marked a significant turning point in the emergence of the modern state within the Ottoman Empire (ORTAYLI, 1983: 74–75). This transition to modern governance was also reflected in the diminishing influence of religious law. In line with efforts to adapt to European legal systems, the French Commercial Code (1850) and Civil Code (1867) were adopted. Furthermore, the prevalence of Sharia courts was reduced as the state took steps to establish a modern legal framework (ORTAYLI, 1983: 139–141). These legal reforms underscored the Tanzimat administration's commitment to creating institutions more aligned with contemporary European practices while addressing the challenges of modernization and centralization.

The Tanzimat period focused on the professionalization and modernization of the military. Key reforms targeted the centralization and professionalization of the army. The main challenge was industrializing military equipment, which involved developing state-controlled industries. Between 1840 and 1860, the Tanzimat bureaucracy pursued industrialization efforts under statist policies. The state prioritized establishing military institutions and industries essential for preserving the empire. A key goal was acquiring advanced weapons, machinery, and technology for production (SOYLUER, 2013: 7). Given the lack of private sector-driven industrialization in the Ottoman Empire, the modernization of leather, fabric, weapons, iron, and steel factories, whether established or encouraged by the state, represented a crucial step in meeting the military's needs (ZENGIN, 2020: 166).

Some of the earliest steps towards industrial support for the military during the Tanzimat period included the establishment of factories such as the Beykoz Factory (1835), the Feshane and Cloth Factories in Tophane, the İzmit Paper Factory, and the Beykoz-İnceköy Factory. Despite some facilities operating at a loss, state guarantees and support helped sustain them

(ORTAYLI, 2007: 100). During the reign of Abdülmecid (1839-1861), weapons like cannons and mortars were produced to European standards. Tophane's cannon production efforts were further bolstered by equipment imported from France (SOYLUER, 2013: 49-50). Under Abdülaziz's reign (1861-1876), older rifles were modernized at the Tüfekhane, adopting a more advanced design (Snider) (ZENGIN, 2020: 49).

The 1840s saw the establishment of major industrial plants such as the Hereke Factory, İzmit Cloth Factory, and the Zeytinburnu-Bakırköy industrial zone (KIRLI, 2017: 202). Factories like Feshane were created to supply the military with necessary goods. The state also established the Zeytinburnu Iron Factory and Veliefendi Factory, utilizing Western furnace technology (YILDIRIM, 2015). The Zeytinburnu complex, which included facilities for producing iron, steel, plows, rifle lighters, rifled cannons, mortars, and small arms, was one of the most significant state-owned industrial complexes. The rifled cannons produced here were of comparable quality to those manufactured before(SEYITDANLIOĞLU, 2009: 54).

One of the key turning points highlighting the urgency for military and financial reforms was the Crimean War, which, as previously mentioned, played a crucial role in creating the conditions that led to the declaration of the Reform Edict. The war saw an alliance between Russia on one side and France, England, the Ottoman Empire, and the Kingdom of Sardinia on the other. The conflict stemmed from the long-standing rivalry between Russia and the Ottoman Empire over control of the Black Sea region (KELEŞ, 2009; AKSIN, 1998: 129-130). Additionally, Russia's expansionist policies, presented as efforts to protect Orthodox Christians, were another significant cause of the war (UYAR and ERICKSON, 2009: 157).

Starting from Tsar Peter I (1672-1725), the Russians adopted a policy of claiming ownership over the Black Sea, Istanbul, and the Dardanelles straits. They pursued a strategy of establishing a presence in ports that opened to warm seas suitable for trade. Russia achieved this objective with the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774, which granted them the right to construct war and merchant ships in the Black Sea. As a result of the Egyptian Problem, the Russians adopted a more assertive stance and capitalized on the gains obtained from the Ottomans (ARMAOGLU, 1997: 227-237). The primary factor in preventing Russia from establishing protection and influence over the Ottoman Empire was Britain. England was making efforts to protect the Mediterranean Sea, which is the shortest route to India, against France and Russia (KELEŞ, 2009: 4-5). Although the war took place at a time when international dynamics were changing and with the active support of England, it had a long-

term impact on Ottoman institutions.[38] The Crimean War was an experience that revealed weaknesses within the army despite the military reforms of the Tanzimat period (UYAR and ERICKSON, 2009: 129). The Crimean War led to reforms in the military equipment and training of the armies. The war revealed the backwardness of the Ottoman army in terms of logistics and technology (ÇETIN and KÖK, 2015: 319-320).[39]

The real transition towards establishing a war industry occurred after the Crimean War. "The rapprochement between the Ottoman Empire and England facilitated the import of iron from England. With this advantage, shipyards were added to the cannon foundries and gunpowder factories" (PAMUK, 2005: 245). The West's increased speed and quality in armament production were recognized, prompting the purchase of new types of weapons and materials (ÜNAL, 2006: 124). The practice of purchasing arms was expanded further with the establishment of the Industrial Development Commission in 1860. The commission, which operated until 1873, supported the construction of state factories and the development of private enterprises (SEYITDANLIOĞLU, 2009: 53).

During this period, new rifles were produced in the Rifle Shop. Old rifles were modernized. By 1872, it became possible to convert 300 old rifles into needle guns per day (ÜNAL, 2006: 112). Sniper rifles, which were ordered in the 1860s and started to be produced in the Arms Factories a few years later, began to be used in all gendarmerie units within the next 30 years (ZENGİN, 2020: 135).[40]

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[38] The war ended with the Treaty of Paris of 1856, which recognized the neutrality of the Black Sea and reduced the Russian military presence in the region. The independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire were recognized. Russia had to relinquish control of the Black Sea region and was also subject to financial compensation (ARMAOGLU, 1997: 250-251). During this period, there was growing external pressure and discontent as various groups, including minorities, demanded political and social reforms. Demilitarization of the Black Sea (also on the Turkish side), ending Russian influence in Moldavia and Wallachia, and guaranteeing the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire on behalf of all major European powers were decided (ZURCHER, 2017: 53-54).

[39] In addition to the logistical and technical challenges, the war itself presented a problem, particularly when faced with resistance from soldiers who had received modern education from the new Military Academy (1834) and former officers (UYAR and ERICKSON, 2009: 151).

[40] "In the 1860s, Prussia began to gain an advantage over other European states in wars fought with needle guns (Dreyse-Zündnadelgewehr), which could be fired from cover more easily and more practically than older models. Especially in the 1866 Battle of Sadowa, the newly invented needle guns were shown as the most important reason why Prussia defeated Austria. For this reason, during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz, the Ottoman Empire was one of the first states to accept the new needle guns "(ÜNAL, 2006: 130). Almost all of the cannons produced in Europe were examined and attempts were made to produce similar ones. During this period, in 1863, 48 cannons with a diameter of two and a half were purchased from Prussia, attempts were made to copy them, and the modern rifle was produced (ÜNAL, 2006: 127-128). The production of Armstrong cannons began in 1866 with the plan to establish

In addition, efforts were made to diversify the product range. In 1864, machines were imported for the production of Enfield model rifles and production began in 1865. In 1867, with an agreement made with a Belgian private entrepreneur, 30,000 Enfield rifles were modified. In 1872, equipment was supplied from America for the production of Martini-Henry rifles (ZENGIN, 2020: 53). Existing factories were expanded, and new factories were built. Cannon and lumber factories were also expanded at the same year (ZENGIN, 2020: 57). In 1876, Tophane and its factories successfully started the production of new weapons and new military production regiments were also established and mitralios production began in Tophane Factories (ÜNAL, 2006: 109; ZENGİN, 2020: 86).[41]

3.2.2. Non-Muslim Bourgeois and Fiscal Bankruptcy

During the Tanzimat period, Christian and Jewish merchants and industrialists who were Ottoman subjects benefited from their relatively greater integration into global capitalism compared to Muslim merchants, as well as the resulting economic growth (ZÜRCHER, 2017: 33). While Christians gained advantages from this reform process, Muslims perceived these practices and the state's declarations as an attack on their long-standing superiority and privileges (ZÜRCHER, 2017: 61-62). Muslim merchants and artisans were particularly disturbed by the foreign protection enjoyed by non-Muslim merchants, as they were unable to obtain similar protection or access comparable support (FAROQHI, 2010: 94-95).

Armenians and Greeks, in particular, dominated trade and industry, benefited from European legal protections, and served as intermediaries for European merchants (SHIRINIAN,

a 20-horsepower single-cylinder simple steam engine and 25 production benches at the Tophane-i Amire Factories (ZENGİN, 2020: 75). While the number of guns in stock was 1,200 in 1848, it considerably increased during the 1860s. Furthermore, by 1873, Tophane had reached the capacity to produce 40,000 fireworks per day (ÜNAL, 2006: 110). In the 1860s, rifles from French and Belgian models began to be produced, and the dependency was partially reduced. Between 1860 and 1870, 9,000 pieces were produced in Zeyinburnu. In 1865, large balls weighing 28 tons and weighing 192 kg were manufactured (ZENGİN, 2020: 52). Starting in 1864, machinery, factory supplies, and other tools were brought in to manufacture British rifles. As a result of these efforts, 35,000 rifles were produced. Samples taken from Prussia and England were attempted to be replicated in military factories. The same endeavour continued in the 1870s (ÜNAL, 2006: 129).

[41] Gunpowder, which had cost 750 kuruş for construction before Sultan Abdülaziz, began to be produced using waterpower in 1863-64 through new works conducted at Azadlu Baruthanesi, reducing the cost of gunpowder to 475 kuruş. Consequently, gunpowder started being produced more economically (ÜNAL, 2006: 118).

2017: 21-22). Non-Muslim merchants completely dominated long-distance trade and played a crucial role in the rise of capitalist port cities in Western Anatolia. They were instrumental in integrating Western Anatolian cities into the capitalist world system (EROL, 2016: 31-36). This influence extended to both non-luxury goods and the luxury goods trade, which catered to the palace and bureaucracy. During the reigns of Abdülmecid, Abdülaziz, Murad V, and Abdülhamid II, Jewish merchants were particularly significant in the provision of finance and luxury goods for the palace (IPEK, 2011: 245-246).

The gap between Muslim and non-Muslim elites deepened as the Ottoman economy was transformed by the capitalist world system in this period, and the political sovereignty of the state eroded (AGIR, 2022: 71). During this process, non-Muslims played an active role not only as intermediary in production and long-distanced trade but also in finance. In the mid-19th century onwards, they significantly contributed to the financing of trade and production by assuming a bank-like role, managing money transfers and loans (IPEK, 2011: 4-5). Jews, in particular, held a leading role in the field of finance. Ottoman Jews were prominent in international trade and money transfers (IPEK, 2011: 2-3). By the mid-19th century, non-Muslim Galata bankers, who specialized in currency exchange, lending, and payments, became the primary option for meeting the Ottoman Empire's growing foreign trade and borrowing needs, even though they were unable to fulfil the new demands for modern banking functions (ÖZDEMIR, 2009: 14). Despite this limitation, they managed to turn the situation to their advantage. Galata bankers played an active role in securing the first foreign loan taken by the Ottoman Empire during the Crimean War. They gained importance and profited from the financial services they provided to the state, achieving a more untouchable status than before. Initially, this role was predominantly held by Jews due to their close ties with the palace, but it was later shared by Armenians and Greeks (IPEK, 2011: 5-6). Non-Muslims, who had previously been small-scale money changers, became prominent businessmen as their relations with Europe intensified and they benefited from Western-style education. Their influence grew to the extent that they came to dominate key sectors such as railways, tobacco, and mining (ÖZDEMIR, 2009: 14).

"In the second half of the 19th century, two tendencies were seen during the integration of the Ottoman Empire into the world economy: copying foreign institutions to counter European intervention and increasing foreign financial influence through investments and borrowing" (AGIR, 2022: 61). The non-Muslim communities that controlled merchant and financier networks ultimately became instruments for defending the interests of capitalists

within Ottoman territories and for weakening Ottoman political sovereignty in favor of European states and economies. Ottomanism, the Tanzimat ideology, essentially functioned as a superstructural framework that facilitated the erosion of old version of the Ottoman political sovereignty to new relatively egalitarian one (BERKES, 2012: 247). This process was not merely the product of a top-down dynamic; it was also triggered reciprocally by a bottom-up change. Non-Muslim communities supported national separatist movements by establishing Western-style schools, popularizing them at a mass level, and spreading Western ideas to the Balkans and Anatolia. By the end of the Tanzimat period, minorities had come to dominate finance, trade, and industry. The main reason for this dominance was their strong and advantageous position in capital accumulation, which was further facilitated by the protection provided by European states, making capital accumulation significantly easier compared to the past (GÖÇEK, 1999: 255-256).

However, this conjuncture did not mean that there were still no injustices against non-Muslims. There was a resistance to preserve the privileged position of the Turkish and Muslim communities as the dominant nation. Efforts to rationalize the Ottoman tax system met with strong resistance. The reforms simplified non-Muslim taxes but continued religious discrimination de facto (HANIOGLU, 2008: 91). Although the reforms of the Tanzimat period aimed to establish a modern financial system, this goal could not be achieved. The aim was to abolish the tax farming system, but this goal could not be achieved as well. No innovations were made in tax collection and financial control, and as a result, financial ineffectiveness and decentralization continued (ORTAYLI, 1983: 101-105).

The Tanzimat bureaucracy, which failed to centralize and collect land taxes, banned governors from collecting local taxes and limited their authority. This failure diminished local authority control and increased the influence of small local leaders, who did not hold state office, over the peasants (ÖNAL, 2010: 46). Although the Tanzimat bureaucracy aimed to provide equal treatment and security to all subjects in the area of taxes and to reform state finances and tax collection, this goal was not achieved in practice. On the other hand, a modern tax regulation was introduced in which state officials were at least more effective in collecting taxes (CEZAR, 1986: 281-282).

Although the principle of equality did not work in practice, the most significant development for non-Muslims during the Tanzimat period was the abolition of the jizya tax collected from non-Muslims, which represented a breakthrough change, at least in legal terms.

Another development was the termination of tax exemptions previously granted to various groups (Cezar, 1986: 283). It was typical during this period for reforms introduced at the legal level not to be fully implemented in practice. Despite these developments, the goal of achieving direct tax collection was not realized, and the tax collection capacity remained limited (Zürcher, 2017: 53-55).

Even though equality could not be achieved through reforms, the advantages created for non-Muslims, particularly in the economic field during the Tanzimat period, were effectively realized. Foreign capital and Galata bankers established banks in 1836 and 1840. Bank-ı Dersaadet, founded by non-Muslim Galata bankers in 1847, became the first Ottoman bank to attempt regulating foreign payments (ÖZDEMİR, 2009: 21-22). In 1854, during the Crimean War, the British and French allies convinced the sultan that this prolonged and costly conflict could be financed by borrowing from European markets, leading to a loan of 2.5 million dollars (equivalence of the loan) with 6% interest (GÖÇEK, 1999: 113). Around the same time, the Ottoman Empire's financial crisis, marked by increasing deficits and the debts of the Galata bankers, necessitated external borrowing. To deal with this crisis and manage the debt, another loan was requested from non-Muslim capital (ÖZDEMIR, 2009: 45).

In order to get rid of the current financial crisis, borrowing was resorted to again, and the state's income sources were shown as guarantees for the provision of these debts (ORTAYLI, 1983: 173). The Ottomans tried to achieve fiscal centralization by reorganizing the tax system in 1838, but they could not prevent the foreign debt crisis from 1854 onwards (FINDLEY, 2020: 52-53). After 1854,[42] the financial crisis became chronic and the spiral of foreign debt and interest reached its peak with the financial bankruptcy that had to be declared in 1875 (AKYILDIZ, 2012: 57). In this crisis, the Ottoman Bank, which was established in 1856 with British capital support, with the non-Muslim capitalist's active participation, aimed to fix the exchange rate in order to manage its financial needs, but it ultimately failed (ÖZDEMİR, 2009: 25-26).

During the Tanzimat period, Armenian bankers were the primary beneficiaries of economic exchanges (Zürcher, 2017: 42-43). Banking at the time had a profiteering nature, focused on short-term speculative gains, and was plagued by structural problems (ZÜRCHER,

[42] In 1855, the Ottomans, who could not cover the expenses of the Crimean War with the 1854 loan, received a new loan of 5 million pounds from England and France. This loan initiated foreign financial control (ÖZDEMİR, 2009: 48)

2017: 59-60). The period from the Crimean War to the financial bankruptcy of 1875 was when the rise of non-Muslim capital was most evident. As mentioned earlier, before the Paris Conference in 1856, Sultan Abdülmecid issued the Reform Edict, which included provisions to reorganize the financial system dominated by non-Muslim merchants, aiming to aiming to gain leverage and secure financial resources under European pressure (ÖZDEMIR, 2009: 24).

The decree facilitated foreign investment and borrowing, allowing public works to be primarily conducted by European companies with special privileges (AGIR, 2022: 62). However, it failed to resolve financial problems, as domestic capital accumulation and foreign capital operated in tandem. Consequently, the state bureaucracy was compelled to grant privileges to both minorities and foreigners while permitting external intervention (ÖZDEMIR, 2009: 11). All the banks established during the Tanzimat period had connections to foreign capital and operated on fragile grounds due to their ties with local non-Muslim circles and close relations with foreign capitalists (ÖZDEMIR, 2009: 37-39). In cases of disputes, these financial circles and merchants were subject to consular courts rather than the empire's sharia courts (AGIR, 2022: 54).

Due to the Ottoman Empire’s poor record in paying its foreign debts, the only source it could borrow from after 1858 was the non-Muslim Galata Bankers. Since these financial circles were able to make excessively high profits by lending to the state at high interest rates, the financial burden that the Ottoman Empire fell into had become unsustainable (ÖZDEMIR, 2009: 29). The bankruptcy of 1875 was essentially a reflection of this structural problem about bifurcation between state and non-Muslim capitalist. This bifurcation integrated with the dynamics that will lead to bankruptcy, especially with the increasing debt burden. The advances from the Ottoman Bank and Galata bankers were insufficient during the wars and rebellions (like in Cretan rebellion). The restructuring the debts and the decree to cut interest payments that were attempted to be put into effect through political intervention were not effective. Its actual bankruptcy in 1875 and its official declaration in 1876 were the final result of the long-lasting structural debt crisis (ÖZDEMIR, 2009: 68-70). With this fiscal bankruptcy, state revenues were handed over to the Rüsum-u Sitte Administration, established to manage debts. The Ottoman Public Debt Administration (OPDA) (1881), which prioritized the collection of debts owed to Europeans and non-Muslims until the empire's collapse, was a direct continuation of this system (GÖÇEK, 1999: 245-246).



Annual Interest on Foreign Borrowing of the Ottoman Empire, 1854-1914 (in percent) (PAMUK, 2024: 119).

Since there was no possibility of external borrowing at the end of the process that started with the Crimean War, non-Muslim financial circles, which remained as the only way to borrow, took the field again in the 1877 Russian War. During this process, the sultan borrowed from minority bankers and since he could not repay, the OPDA was established in 1881 as the last stage of bankruptcy for the security of the debts and incomes of the minorities (GÖÇEK, 1999: 114). The OPDA in 1881 was a historical process in which the Ottoman financial autonomy was extremely reduced in terms of transferring important state revenues to European control and was a turning point in terms of relations with Europe (AGIR, 2022: 65). While the geography of the empire was a source of cheap raw materials in the first half of the 19th century, the OPDA which was established as a result of the financial bankruptcy of 1875, both resulted in the loss of control of the treasury and marked a transition from the unequal trade phase to the imperialism phase (ÖNAL, 2010: 44).

3.3. Islamism as a New Elite Conciliation: Shrinking to Anatolia Geographically

Abdulhamid inherited a bankrupt empire, a situation further worsened by the 1877–78 war. The Muharram Decree of 1881 established the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (OPDA) to manage revenue sources and service debt, controlling one-third of state revenue (ZÜRCHER, 2017: 80). The privileges, protections, and concessions granted to non-Muslim minorities by European imperialist powers during the Tanzimat period were among the dynamics that led to financial bankruptcy. These measures also plunged the Ottoman reform

experiment into crisis by fuelling mass resentment against Christians among Muslims and increasing social unrest (AKÇAM, 1993: 59-60).

Islamism, which emerged as a reflection of this economic and social crisis, was not only a reflection of a social reaction against the privileged population segments created by the Tanzimat reforms. It was also a reaction of Muslims against the new equal citizenship practices formalized with the Islahat Edict (reform edict) (1856). The reaction resulting from the loss of their previously held 'sovereign nation' status became the source of the public support that Islamism needed (BULAÇ, 2005: 48). Islamism was adopted by Sultan Abdulhamid and a part of the bureaucracy as an ideology that declared the end of Ottomanism as an expression of all this reaction. The basic motivation of Islamism was that it claimed that preventing the collapse of the empire was to establish a new establishment that emphasized the Muslim population and Islamic values (KARA, 2014: 27). Against this ideological backdrop, Sultan Abdulhamid II, citing the war with Russia (1878) and European pressure as justifications, suspended the parliament in February 1878 to establish the absolute monarchy he desired. This action ended the parliamentary and constitutional government that had emerged from the Tanzimat reforms. He then ruled as an absolute monarch for thirty years (ZÜRCHER, 2017: 72).

There were two separate aspects of Islamism. One was Islamism, which was an expression of the reaction formed at the social level and around organic intellectuals. The second was Islamism, which was an ideology from above, designed by Sultan Abdulhamid and a part of the bureaucracy, and which wanted to use the policy of uniting the Muslims of the world as a trump card against the European imperialists. The first, Islamism, was an understanding that claimed that the whole of life, such as politics, law, education, should be reconstructed and revived by returning to the essence of Islam against the oppression of the West by Muslims. The pioneers were names such as Cemaleddin Efgani, Muhammed Abduh and Namık Kemal. The second was the defense of Islamic unity against the European powers under the leadership of Sultan Abdulhamid. (KARA, 2014: 17).

Islamism gained solid ground in 1875, fuelled by both the financial collapse and the anti-Christian reaction sparked by the Christian uprisings in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro (BELGE, 2012: 552). Under these conditions, a second version of Islamism emerged, with Sultan Abdulhamid II reinforcing the title of Islamic caliphate more strongly than before. He employed this discourse both to justify internal reforms and as a diplomatic tool against external threats (HANIOGLU, 2008: 127-128).

After the Berlin Congress held after the Russo-Turkish War, II. Abdulhamid pursued a pragmatic foreign policy by using the great powers against each other, strengthening the Muslim identity of the empire, and promoting Pan-Islamism (HANIOGLU, 2008: 129-130). To maintain control over Muslims in Europe and the East, Abdulhamid sought to use the revived title of caliph as a "bargaining tool," particularly in the conflicts between England, France, and Russia.[43] This understanding took shape as a conservative reaction that yearned for the great old days in these regions as a result of the failure to gain advantage through the soft path conducted with the understanding of Ottomanism during the Tanzimat period (BELGE, 2012: 562-563).

Islamism was not only an ideological framework in the context of foreign policy. It was also mobilized for the moves the state needed in domestic policy. Feeling the need to react to the increasing European pressures in the post-Berlin process, Abdulhamid took oppressive measures such as restricting the Armenian Patriarchate, imprisoning the clergy, and controlling Armenian schools during this period (ASTOURIAN, 2021: 26-27). In this context, Islamism went beyond the practices within a certain conjuncture in domestic politics and began to form the internal logic of the state's population policies. The policies put into effect during this period by Abdulhamid, such as settling Balkan Muslims in Anatolia, integrating Kurds into the state through Islamism,[44] and assimilating non-Muslims through forced conversion and marriages, were the pioneers of an effort to homogenize Anatolia based on the Muslim population (KORKMAZ, 2021: 102-103).

Sultan Abdulhamid placed the revitalization of Islamic values at the center of his political action to preserve the territorial integrity of Muslims by uniting them under the leadership of the Ottomans. At the same time, the sultan mobilized Muslim Turks and Kurds against Christians (KHOSROEVA, 2017: 111-113). The dynamic that made this mobilization possible was the reactions of Muslim artisans. As the Ottoman economy gradually integrated into the capitalist world economy, Muslim artisans directed the anger they had accumulated due

[43] The British occupation of Egypt and the opening of the Suez Canal reduced the importance of Ottoman territorial integrity for Britain. Thereupon, Abdulhamid II turned to Germany and Russia for support. He made concessions such as the Baghdad Railway to Germany and the Black Sea Treaty to Russia (HANIOGLU, 2008: 131-133).

[44] The majority of the traditional Kurdish elite saw themselves as Muslims and therefore Ottomans, part of the Ottoman union within the framework of a broader brotherhood pact or, in other words, a kind of Islamic pact (BOZARSLAN, 2005: 97). For the general acceptance that dominated the Kurdish public, "being a Kurd" meant being a Muslim towards non-Muslims, especially Armenians, with whom they shared the same geography (BOZARSLAN, 2005: 98-99)

to the loss of their positions and the spread of European-made goods against local Christians, whom they identified with Europe (ASTOURIAN, 2021: 15). Especially during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, the Christian-Muslim conflict experienced its most intense phase until that day, and Islamic unity policies increased simultaneously (ASTOURIAN, 2021: 19-20).

Abdulhamid sought to capitalize on the anti-Christian sentiments that emerged during the Russian war to establish his oppressive regime, as previously explained. He viewed the prevention of the empire's disintegration as dependent on creating a form of government based on the sultan's absolute authority, alongside implementing militarist reforms and pursuing Islamist policies. There was no consensus within the bureaucracy on a form of government based on Islamism and the absolute will of the sultan, but there was an agreement between the sultan and the bureaucracy on militarist reforms. In this context, after the Russian War and the Berlin Congress, the Sultan requested the dispatch of a military delegation from Germany, marking the beginning of German influence that would continue until the end of the empire (AKSAN, 2007: 401).[45]

The reason for this policy change was the rising power of the German military. Sultan Abdulhamid II desired to implement innovations with the assistance of German experts. The German victory in the French-German War (1870-1871) served as the driving force behind the establishment of German admiration within the Ottoman military and civil bureaucracy. Through an agreement reached on July 14, 1880, military experts were brought in from Germany (ORTAYLI, 1981: 46-47). Although the German military reform was followed, teams were established and technical reports were written to monitor the military developments and armament strategies of other European states (YORULMAZ, 2014: 200-202).

From 1875 to 1882, the Ottoman Empire was highly active in the production and supply of weapons and ammunition. Initially, weapons maintenance and repair were conducted in the newly established workshops, but later, new workshops were established by utilizing the expertise of the craftsmen working in these workshops (ZENGİN, 2020: 68-69). In 1887, the Ottoman government signed an agreement with the Mauser Company for the supply of 500,000

[45] After the reunification in 1871, Germany's industrial expansion and military prowess altered the balance of power. Sultan Abdulhamid regarded Germany as a potential ally and tilted the scales in favour of German companies in the Ottoman arms market. The increasing industrial production in Germany, particularly in iron and steel, played a crucial role in this preference (YORULMAZ, 2014: 182).

rifles and 50,000 carbines, making them the first army to equip a large number of Mauser rifles (YORULMAZ, 2014: 221-222).

In the 1870s, the engineering school for the Naval Forces was reorganized (Muhendishane-i Berri Hümayun). The programs of France and Germany were used for this reform. Considering the lessons learned from the Russian War, it was decided to double the number of field artillery (Krupp) and this decision was implemented. Faster-firing field guns began to be used by reforming the gun technology (ZENGİN, 2020: 95). Due to the shortage of qualified personnel, immigrants were employed in the Industrial Regiments during this period. Thus, the modernization of military technology and the lack of human capital required for the application of this technology on the battlefield were tried to be eliminated (KURT, 2015: 91).

In 1880, in anticipation of a possible conflict with Greece, the latest version of Gatling rifles and Krupp cannons were purchased from Germany and domestic production began at the weapons factory. In addition, 55 thousand cartridges were produced (ZENGİN, 2020: 111). In addition, various bronze and steel bullets with diameters ranging from 6 cm to 21 cm could be produced for the first time (ZENGİN, 2020: 96). In 1887, despite some dissenting opinions, Mauser rifles received the approval of the commission, opening the way for the Germanization of the Ottoman arms market and achieving a monopoly on Mauser small arms. The number of the Krupp cannon was also expanded (YORULMAZ, 2014: 213-214). From 1890 onwards, work began to convert Martini Henry bayonets to Mauser. In 1899, an agreement was reached to purchase a press, lathes, equipment for drilling cannon barrels, a steam engine to power these machines, and an 8-ton steel furnace to produce nickel-plated steel from the Ehrhardt Factory (ZENGIN, 2020: 87; 107). From 1889 onwards, Krupp cannons and Mauser rifles became the main inventory of the Ottoman army (ORTAYLI, 1981: 32; 66). However, this German engagement was not seen as an obstacle to technology transfer from other countries. In 1899, the latest system hydraulic presses were brought from England and added to the Zeytinburnu Factory (ZENGIN, 2020: 116)

With the modernization efforts conducted since the end of the 19th century, the Zeytinburnu factory turned into a heavy industry complex focused on the production of weapons and ammunition (SABANCI, 2016: 190). As a result of the reforms conducted in the Yıldız Ordu Factory with the contribution of French engineers in 1904, 250 Ottoman Mauser rifles and 6 Maxim rifles could be produced per month (ZENGIN, 2020: 140-141). Faster-firing

steel cannon production began in Tophane. In 1905, acid and base furnaces were purchased for serial cannons and modernization was conducted (ZENGIN, 2020: 155).

3.3.1. Genesis of Anti-Christian Contract in Islamist Period

Although the establishment of the Ottoman Empire in the classical period was a system in which the Muslim identity was primary and the members of other religions were secondary, under the Islamism that emerged in the second phase of the 19th century, it meant a break from the "pax Ottoman" understanding that was claimed to be within the establishment of the empire earlier. This new anti-Christian pact was like a silent agreement to gradually homogenize Anatolia through Islamization and to reduce its Christian population as much as possible during the formation process of the emerging nation-state. This understanding, which began to form in the Tanzimat period, expressed the aim of establishing a new establishment. The claim of a new order was the ideological articulation of the anger accumulated against non-Muslim middlemen and therefore non-Muslims who became rich in the lands of the empire that became peripheral to the capitalist world system during the insertion process in the 19th century. The fact that companies owned by foreigners and non-Muslims or in which they were influential intermediaries employed and preferred non-Muslims instead of Muslim workers was an important factor in the formation of this anger (AKYILDIZ, 2005: 137). Islamism was the ideological crystallization of this reaction. The expression of this anger first revealed itself as Islamism. This establishment attempt was put into practice by the palace and the bureaucracy. From the 1870s until the collapse of the empire, the founding internal logic of the newly emerging nation-state began to be Islamism with this process.

In the context of the classical Ottoman imperial organization, it was essential to represent recognized religious groups and partially autonomous religious communities led by religious leaders responsible for these religious groups against the central authority (AKGONUL, 2012: 39-40). Until the Tanzimat period, the Ottoman institution had a predominantly Muslim identity in political organization, but the security of non-Muslim peoples was ensured within the scope of the imperial model. Security of life and property was provided in return for extra taxes obtained from non-Muslims. Although the founders of the empire were Turks, the unity element that kept the dominant group together with the organized groups around it was the religion of Islam (AKGONUL, 2012: 37-38). The religion of Islam both fostered a cooperative model that included Muslim peoples and served as an effective tool

in acting as a barrier against the Turkmen warriors which did no obey the Ottomans (especially those who did not adhere to orthodox religious beliefs), who could potentially incite constituent violence against the Ottoman imperial family and the state.

This situation began to change for the first time during the Tanzimat period. The dynamic of change that emerged in response to this inegalitarian situation was realized through external pressure and strengthened the status of Christian minorities (ZÜRCHER, 2017: 50). The reason this external pressure could find a de facto counterpart was both that the Ottoman economy was undergoing peripheralization and that the bourgeoisie, increasingly consisting only of non-Muslims, was a state apparatus with low central action capacity in the 19th century. In the rapprochement oh non-Muslim merchant class and Europeans, the Ottoman state became more open to external pressure in the same process. Most of the merchants driving this dynamic into the societal level were non-Muslim merchants from Greece, Armenia, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Wallachia (ORTAYLI, 2008: 361).

The first reaction to the rise of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie during the Tanzimat period found expression in the axis of Islamism. However, this reaction was not solely directed at the newly formed bourgeoisie. Since the first quarter of the century, national movements and the separatist demands of non-Muslim communities had already triggered public opinion regarding the dysfunctionality of the imperial establishment. While Ottomanism was the dominant ideology at the official level, anti-non-Muslim sentiment began to emerge among the Muslim public opinion. This sentiment traced its roots to the reaction against the national movements of non-Muslim peoples, starting with the Greek War of Independence (1821-32). The establishment of the Greek state, coupled with the continuation of irredentist efforts concerning the Greek population within the Ottoman Empire, further fuelled anti-Christian public opinion among Muslims (SHIRINIAN, 2017: 33-34).

This reaction did not occur solely among ordinary Muslims. Even among the New Ottomans, who defended Ottomanism and equal citizenship, racist and hostile discourses against Christians arose during times of rebellion and mass reaction, which were perceived as states of emergency (AKÇAM, 1993: 63). Behind this situation lay the security concerns of the New Ottomans. In any state of emergency, fostering anti-non-Muslim sentiments was used as a political strategy. Since Muslims lacked external support, they were economically worse off than Christians. This reality was the primary catalyst for the development of racist ideas rooted

in Islamic or Turkish identity. These ideas emerged in movements such as the New Ottomans and, later, the Union and Progress Party (AKÇAM, 1993: 62).

Muslim craftsmen and the segments of the population they were able to mobilize directed the resistance and anger they were unable to show against the powerful West, which they saw as an enemy, towards non-Muslim minorities (AKÇAM, 1993: 70). In this process, Ottoman Muslims began to react because of the fact that the people they considered "inferior" had become richer compared to them after centuries of a social order in which they had seen themselves as dominant. According to a widely held belief, there was resentment towards losing power to Bulgarian milkmen, Serbian shepherds, and Greek tavernkeepers". This feeling found its counterpart in direct reactions against non-Muslims in Lebanon in 1844 and in Serbia between 1856-61 (AKÇAM, 1993: 67-68). This anger and mutual conflicts intensified the conflicts in Macedonia, Eastern Anatolia, Thrace, and Western Anatolia with the rise of ethnic nationalism between Christians and Muslims after 1878 (KARPAT, 2003: 85).

Beyond the national uprisings and movements, there were also structural sources of conflict. One such source was the perception among the Muslim public regarding the absence of non-Muslims in the military. Another issue was the imbalance in the number and distribution of staff between Muslims and non-Muslims in the state’s civil bureaucracy. Non-Muslims were largely unaffected by wars due to their exemption from military service, while Muslims suffered losses. Christians gained economic advantages, while Muslims bore the burdens of war (AKÇAM, 1993: 61). Non-Muslims held limited roles in both the military and civil bureaucracy. Specifically, in the army, non-Muslims often paid a special tax in exchange for being exempted from military service (FINDLEY, 2020: 56-58). Despite their limited presence in society and bureaucracy, their external connections alarmed the Muslim-Turkish bureaucracy, which was concerned about security and the homogeneity needed for the emerging nation-state. This situation fuelled rising reactions in the Muslim public. What was once seen as a source of income during the wars of the classical period began to create resentment as the wars became more burdensome. During the classical period, Christians who were exempt from military service paid a special tax, in line with equality policies in the latter half of the 19th century (ZÜRCHER, 2017: 51).

A similar separation, though less intense than in the army, gradually took place in the civil bureaucracy over time. There was a separation of less intensity compared to the army, and the differences varied from institution to institution due to the pragmatic and practical concerns

of the state. For example, non-Muslims could hold positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where their high language skills were practically useful, but this was, of course, also had certain limitations. Non-Muslims had fewer promotion opportunities than Muslims (FINDLEY, 2020: 165). Christian and Jewish foreign relations personnel, who had slightly more opportunities during the Tanzimat period, decreased in number during the reign of Abdulhamid (1878-1908), when Islamism was on the rise. Moreover, non-Muslims were hired at a very marginal level in new recruitments made in existing cadres. Most of the existing non-Muslims were from older generations in this period when Islamism was on the rise (FINDLEY, 2020: 371-372).

However, this situation did not develop quickly during a period when Islamism was on the rise. The cadres trained during the Tanzimat period, when egalitarian state reforms were prevalent, largely consisted of the Muslim population, marking the fermentation process of Islamism. This is clearly seen in the reorganization of the bureaucracy during this era. "All of the students who graduated from Mülkiye (a school specialized in training civil servants for the state), which was open between 1859-79 to work in new bureaucratic institutions, were Muslims." (GÖÇEK, 1999: 185). Under these conditions, the institution where the relatively non-Muslim population was accepted was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, even in this institution, their presence was limited, despite the non-Muslim population's prominence in foreign language proficiency. Even in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which stood out for its inclusion of non-Muslims, two-thirds of the cadres were Muslims during this period (FINDLEY, 2020: 137).

With the effect of the Tanzimat reforms, the reforms deepened social divisions, state institutions progressed in terms of gaining a more secular character and became more egalitarian. Nevertheless, it also exacerbated the problem of social fragmentation with the rise of national identities and the non-Muslim bourgeoisie (SHIRINIAN, 2017: 26-28). During the reign of Abdulhamid (1876-1908), the answer to this fragmented society problem taken from the Tanzimat period was formulated as Islamism. The Islamism that emerged during this period also meant a break from the classical imperial model with an unnamed anti-Christian consensus. The religion of Islam, which was functionally part of the sultan's power within the old imperial paradigm, entered a phase of drifting towards the status of open internal enemies of non-Muslims, who were social others with a protection status in the imperial model. This internal enemy status is not only the product of a process shaped by the state, but also a civil Islamism has risen that finds the state apparatus passive in this regard and advocates a more radical mobilization of Islamist policies. The wave of sentiment against the fragmented society and

non-Muslims has been so great that an opposition Islamist movement against Abdülhamid's Islamist policies is also strong. The fundamental conflict here is that Abdülhamid's Islamism is more strongly modernist than the opposition Islamists in the field of the army and education (KARA, 2014: 29).

Although Islamist policies were dominant during the reign of Abdulhamid, modernization and taking Western institutions as an example continued. Revolutionary steps, especially the opening of girls' schools and the spread of schools in Anatolia, were taken during the reign of Abdulhamid. For civil Islamist groups, modernization and Westernization were an antithesis that held these opposition groups together and innovations that had to be resisted. The common motif of Islamism in both its state-centered and civil versions was the perception of non-Muslims as agents of the Western world due to the pure socio-political structure they imagined (BORA, 2017: 42-43). In the face of this radical reaction, the representation rate of non-Muslims, which was already exceptionally low as a result of the practices of the palace and bureaucracy, decreased even further during the reign of Abdulhamid (FINDLEY, 2020: 162-163).

The emerging Islamist and anti-Christian contract was most clearly manifested during the reign of Abdulhamid in the radical change in the position of the Armenians, who had been considered a "loyal nation" by the Ottomans for centuries. The Hamidiye Regiments, which were newly mobilized militia units, especially in Eastern Anatolia, marked the beginning of a dangerous process for the Armenians. The Hamidiye Regiments, which were established in 1890 and actively participated in the clashes and massacres with the Armenians in 1894-96, were the product of the accumulation process of anti-Christian sentiments that had been rising throughout the century (ASTOURIAN, 2021: 28). Undoubtedly, the actions of the Hamidiye Regiments were not the first collective action against the Armenians. The collective violence and elements of mutual conflict against Armenians, which were previously the result of collective actions of local communities, became systematic with the establishment of the Hamidiye Regiments (AKÇAM, 1993: 96).

What happened after the 1890s was essentially a process of the anti-Muslim sentiments that had accumulated since the Tanzimat period becoming more systematic and the new anti-Christian consensus that emerged between the state and society becoming systematic. The formation of the Turkish-Islamic nation state was also fermented in the same process. In this process, the merging of the palace and bureaucracy with local social reaction was a new

phenomenon and it was a period when the mutual interaction between the state and society within the scope of anti-Christian sentiments intensified (AKÇAM, 1993: 97-99). In this process, it was not possible to distinguish between sentiments emphasizing Turkish identity and reactions based on Islam. Although there was a fine line between Islamism and Turkism, the dominant discourse during the Abdulhamid period was Islamism. However, with the rise of separatist demands of the Muslim peoples, in which Islamism was the perpetrator, Turkism came to the fore. The exclusionary reaction within the bureaucracy, where the Turkish element was influential, was intertwined with a type of Islamic religious exclusivity that could not accept equality with Christians or their superiority. The source of energy for these two types of reactions was the reactions of elements that had lost their social and economic status to non-Muslims (AKÇAM, 1993: 65).

The attacks of the local Muslim population against Armenians, Assyrians and other Christians had continuity in Ottomanist, Islamist and Turkist cadres. This continuity was so effective that the Committee of Union and Progress, which initially included non-Muslims and was embodied as a constitutional movement against the despotism of Abdulhamid, passively and later actively carried the continuity of the anti-Christian agreement until it came to power (KALIGAN, 2017: 93-94). In the context of periods and events, the prominence of either the Islamist or Turkist elements was essentially the product of practical and pragmatic concerns. The fundamental problem was to seek an answer to the question of how the state would be saved. Although Turkism came to the fore in the last quarter of the 19th century and in the process leading to the end of the empire, this was a new version of Islamism within Turkism as a response sought against the collapse of the state. The basic practice seen in both versions was the systematic or non-systematic bureaucratic or civil practices of decreasing the Christian population of Anatolia as much as possible and homogenizing it first within the framework of Islam and then primarily within the framework of Turkism. Behind these practices of power was the expression of the accumulated anger against the non-Muslim middlemen merchants and national separatist movements that were included as peripherals in the capitalist world system in the 19th century, and therefore against the non-Muslim population.

3.3.2. Muslim Migration to Anatolia and Fragmented Social Structure

Another historical dynamic that was as important as the social anger that accumulated against the rising non-Muslim merchant class in the formation of the anti-Christian agreement

was the intense migration of Muslims to Anatolia as the Empire was shrinking geographically towards Anatolia. During the 19th century, significant waves of migration occurred as Turks and Muslims from the Balkans and Russia relocated to Anatolia. As a consequence of the migrations throughout the 19th century, particularly during its final quarter, the state's emerging population policies increasingly aligned with these demographic shifts. By the late 19th century, under these circumstances, the Ottoman Empire began implementing practices aimed at the homogenization of Anatolia's population. This process eventually extended to include compulsory population exchanges alongside the natural migration of populations (ADANIR, 2015: 26; KARPAT, 2003: 17). Abdulhamid II thought that the ethnic and religious balance in Anatolia should be changed. During this process, Muslim communities such as Bosnians and Pomaks from the Balkans and Circassians from the Caucasus migrated to Anatolia. The decade following the 1877-78 war was a turning point for policies aimed at the Islamization of Anatolia within this historical context (ADANIR, 2015: 21).

The Muslim migrations from the Caucasus and Rumelia to Anatolia in the 19th century occurred for national, political, and religious reasons. The first of these migrations began with the annexation of Crimea to Russia in 1783 and continued throughout the 19th century (KARPAT, 2003: 15-16). Starting from the Serbian rebellion (1804) and the Ottoman-Russian War (1806-1812) until to 1877-1878 Russian War the Empire shifted to a Muslim empire and a state centered and only effective in Anatolia (FINDLEY, 2020: 59–65). It intensified especially after the 1877-78 war, which resulted in the loss of one third of the lands and 20% of the population during the reign of Abdulhamid II. After this war, over a million Muslims had to be settled permanently in Anatolia (ZÜRCHER, 2017: 76)

The majority in Anatolia and Mesopotamia were Muslims. Muslim nations were Turkish, Arab, and Kurdish, mostly in Anatolia. The main minority communities were Christian and Jewish minorities. The leading Christian nations in the Balkans were Greeks, Bulgarians, and Serbs, and they constituted the majority in this geography. Muslims in the Balkans were a minority, and the main minority peoples were Bosnians, Albanians, and Turks in the Balkans (Zurcher, 2017: 4). During the 19th century, there was migration in two directions, forced displacement, and collective actions aimed at homogenization. There were mutual conflicts and massacres with the Greek and Armenian communities seeking independence. During the same process, ethnic massacres were conducted against Muslims, especially in the Balkans. As a result of these mutual massacres, the resulting migration movements led to an increase in the Muslim population and a decrease in the Christian population in Anatolia, from the second half

of the century until the fall of the empire. These migrations, which ensured the homogenization of the Anatolian population in favor of Muslims, also had a profound effect on the Turkish nation-state identity in long term (AKÇAM, 1993: 76-77).

The migration that began with the Russian annexation of Crimea in 1783 reached a mass dimension after the 1850s. It was 1-1.2 million people including Circassians, Chechens and Abkhazians (EFE, 2018: 20). In total, 1.8 million Tatars migrated from Crimea to Ottoman lands between 1783-1922. The migration of Caucasian communities that left the Caucasus was 500 thousand between 1881-1914 and over 1 million in total. As a result of the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian War, 1.2 million people migrated from the Balkans to Anatolia (BARUT, 2018: 165). After the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian War, when the Russians took Kars and Batum, a mass Muslim Georgian migration took place (CHOKHARADZE and KESKIN, 2015: 106)

Having to flee the actual oppression of the Russian imperial forces in the Caucasus since the 1860s, the Circassians were accepted as immigrants within the borders of the Ottoman Empire and settled in Armenian and Greek villages and were forcibly settled in the homes of people living in these regions. From this period onwards, the predominantly Circassian population that came from the Caucasus and took refuge in the empire was approximately 1 million (EFE, 2018: 21). The number of Muslim Georgians who migrated from the region under the same oppression and settled in the Black Sea coast and mountainous regions is estimated to be around 500 thousand (CHOKHARADZE and KESKİN, 2015: 107).

Although the migration of Tatars, Circassians, Abkhazians, Laz and other Muslim peoples began due to the pressures of the Russian imperial forces that caused forced migration after the Crimean War of 1853, the volume of these migrations was not very intense. The main mass migrations, especially in the Caucasus, took on a mass character from the 1860s onwards, when the Caucasian resistance formed around Sheikh Shamil in 1859 was broken (BARUT, 2018: 163). These Muslim communities living in the North Caucasus and the Turkish-speaking Nogays migrated to various regions of Anatolia during this process. These immigrants were settled in different provinces by the state through various settlement policies (KUSHNER, 1998: 19).

With the independence of Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro through the Berlin Treaty of 1878, the proportion of the Muslim population in the total population living in Anatolia increased rapidly (EFE, 2018: 22). The migration from the Balkans began with this process and

continued until it increased again between 1908-1909 and reached its peak during the Balkan War in 1912-1913. Macedonia and Thrace, where approximately 1.5 million Muslims lived, were lost on this date and a part of this population migrated to Anatolia (BARUT, 2018: 164). In total, 5-7 million immigrants from the Balkans, Crimea and the Caucasus settled in Anatolia, most of them starting from the second half of the 19th century and reaching its peak until the collapse of the empire (EFE, 2018: 23).

While Anatolia was being homogenized through Islam, there was also the problem of preventing the separatism of non-Turkish Muslim nations. National movements that could emerge among Muslim but non-Turkish elements continued to be one of the fundamental issues within the state apparatus, both in the Ottoman Empire and later in the republican period. Indeed, as a historical reality, Islamism became dysfunctional, especially with the separatism of Muslim Albanian and Arab populations. After conflicts such as the Crimean War migrations and the 1897 Russian war, Turkish nationalism became the dominant ideology (GÖÇEK, 1999: 296). The bureaucracy and intellectuals adopted Turkism, based on the Turkish-speaking population, the language of the army and bureaucracy, as an ideological formation that could reorganize the state against the separatism of non-Turkish Muslim nations.

The birth of the Turkish nation state was experienced as a state apparatus transforming from an empire to a nation-state, while Anatolia, a geographical area, had to be accepted as a national space. The empire was a region like Anatolia, which was a transition area between three continents and where it was extremely difficult for the state to establish dominance in the geography due to its mountainous structure (TUNCEL, 1991: 108). This geography was like a cradle for communities belonging to many different religions and speaking different languages, and it was a geography where transportation problems were intense due to its mountainous structure. When considered together with the difficulty that geography created in terms of the bureaucratic structure of the state, the problem of fragmented society was a challenging element in terms of the formation of the emerging nation-state. The tensions between the population, which was mostly composed of Greeks, Armenians, Kurds and Alevis, and the state apparatus and local resistances were an important problem in terms of the formation of the nation-state (KIESER, 2005: 21-22).

Eastern Anatolia was home to various ethnic and religious groups. Turks dominated the cities and Armenians directed trade. Jews, Qizilbash, Zazas, Arabs and Assyrians lived in the region (ÜNGÖR, 2016: 46-48). Zazas and Kurds were both handicaps in terms of the formation

of a nation state and resisted the centralization policy of the Ottoman state apparatus in its current form (HANIOGLU, 2008: 88-89). The Armenian community and the Armenian nationalist movement, which were scattered throughout Anatolia but especially in Eastern Anatolia, resisted the centralization of the state apparatus (HANIOGLU, 2008: 107-108). In the 1880s, the Armenian national movement, supported by the Russians and Armenians living in Tsarist Russia, began to take action in an organized manner. This was an important period when the Ottomans intensified their repressive measures (SHIRINIAN, 2017: 25).

The largest ethnic group living in Eastern Anatolia and its periphery, where Armenians were predominantly located, was the Kurds. Starting from the 1830s, due to reform and centralization efforts, the Kurdish emirates that were passed down from father to son were eliminated, and an unstable social structure was created in the region until the republican period (KIESER, 2005: 24). Although the Kurdish local lords resisted centralization and increasing tax demands by making alliances with Armenian leaders until the 1870s, the process ultimately resulted in the Armenians losing land (ASTOURIAN, 2021: 24-25). The Kurds were drawn towards an integration with the central state based on Islam from the 1870s until the end of the empire. As the emirates were liquidated, tribes came to the fore. According to reports in 1885, conflicts between small and small tribes were common (KLEIN, 2014: 115).

The central state, which took advantage of this situation in the late 19th century, increased its influence in Eastern Anatolia by forming militia forces (Hamidiye Regiments) from some tribes. The reason for this result was that the tribes gained great material benefits from this partnership with the state (KLEIN, 2014: 121). As we will try to explain in the next section, the source of this enrichment was not only state resources. In this process, which provided the social consent that the state needed, one of the most important sources of this social consent was the transfer of confiscated Armenian properties to the hands of Muslims. The Hamidiye Regiments, established by Abdulhamid II in 1890, were a planned movement aimed at taking control of the provinces farthest from the center of the empire (KLEIN, 2014: 113).

Since the state pursued policies aimed at settling Kurdish tribes in Eastern Anatolia for agriculture, this led to conflicts in the region apart from the activities of the Hamidiye Regiments. At the end of the reign of Abdulhamid, Armenian farmers faced land losses (SHIRINIAN, 2017: 23-24). While Armenians in Eastern Anatolia began to be dispossessed, the traditional structure of the Armenian society living in more urban and Western Anatolia had

already begun to transform as a result of contact with the West. The national ideas that developed among urban Armenians began to become mass under the leadership of a new bourgeoisie against the Patriarchate and the traditionally powerful Istanbul families (YUMUL and BALI, 2009: 363-364)

Another conflicting issue, like the Armenians, was experienced in Western Anatolia between the Greeks and the state apparatus. In western Anatolia, although the Greek state was established in 1829-1830, the existence of the Greeks in Anatolia continued to be problematic until the collapse of the empire (AKGONUL, 2012: 40). In the dynamics of the second half of the 19th century, the Greeks were divided into aristocrats who supported the church and the empire and secular Greeks (related to merchants) (BENLISOY and BENLISOY, 2009: 372). This situation meant that the ability of the Ottoman state apparatus to represent the religious leadership that was classically accepted was eroded and that the already fragmented society became even more fragmented. It was also difficult to manage and establish the Greek society due to another factor. While the Western Anatolian Greeks, who were integrated with the capitalist world economy, the Anatolian Greek communities remained under more backward economic conditions. Some Greek populations represented a different social structure due to their important trade relations with Southern Russia (BENLISOY and BENLISOY, 2009: 367)

The fragmented social structure of this period, which resulted from the dominance of these two peoples, especially in the economic field, and their disagreements with the political field, particularly concerning both Armenians and Greeks, was most clearly manifested at the social level in the field of education. In the second half of the 19th century, the process of schooling gained momentum in stages and at different rhythms for different peoples under the leadership of national movements. The first to develop a significant school system among national communities were the Greeks. In 1878, there were 105 Greek educational schools in Istanbul (FINDLEY, 2020: 202). At the beginning of 1870, there were a total of 46 Armenian schools in Istanbul. By the end of the century, Armenians had 800 primary schools in Anatolia and many high schools in cities such as Istanbul and Izmir (FINDLEY, 2020: 203). These two historical data were one of the important alarming factors of the state apparatus that we have conveyed so far. At the end of the century, the harsh and reactionary actions of the state apparatus within the framework of the ideology of Turkism were due to the deepening of the fragmented society and the genesis of the alternative public spheres in the historical process in which the separate national and public spaces of these two main peoples were formed.

In this historical context, Jews were not the subject of direct conflicts because they were a small minority compared to the Armenian and Greek communities. However, despite this situation, Jews were a critically important people in the second half of the 19th century because they played an important role in finance and were related to merchants and farmers of all identities in this fragmented society. After the Tanzimat and Islahat Edicts, Jews established good relations not only with the sultan but also with the bureaucracy and established relations with some major families (İPEK, 2011: 247-248). From the 1850s onwards, Jews became the largest group among bankers in Galata. Economic power and the influence of the religious leader on the Jewish community decreased and the power to shape Jewish public opinion shifted to secular merchants and intellectuals (İPEK, 2011: 38).

As we will try to convey in the next section, the homogenization of Anatolia with this Muslim settlement did not provide a solution to the fragmented society problem. Amidst this wave of migration, the Ottoman State developed settlement policies that evolved in response to the shifting political, social, and economic conditions over the course of the centuries. When migration increased in the 19th century, the Migrants' Commission was established in 1860. The state settled Muslim migrants in the border regions to create buffer zones. (IPEK, 1991: 129-130). With a decree, land was given to those who wanted to settle in Ottoman lands. They were also granted exemption from taxes and military service (KARPAT, 2003: 104-105). This Muslim population policy was mobilized to homogenize Anatolia, but these people were prevented from defending their national rights due to the spirit of the period. Contrary to the Arab and Albanian national movements that showed that the Islamist strategy was coming to an end, the national demands of the Crimean, Balkan and Caucasian Muslims did not become mass and did not become an urgent agenda.

3.4. Turkism as a New Constitutive Power: The Limits of Islamism

The process in which the Islamist ideological approach began to cease to be a state policy ended with the development of Muslim Arab and Albanian nationalisms. The emergence of national movements among these Muslim peoples began to show that Islamism was not the reality of the idea of unity of the world Muslims, which was planned to be used neither in ensuring the unity of the empire nor as a trump card against imperialist powers (GEORGEON, 2006: 14). On the other hand, as a result of the collapse of the Islamic model, the necessity to rely on the Turkish element imposed itself on the bureaucracy and the intellectuals. In the

historical conditions where Islamism was abundant for the bureaucracy and the intellectuals and the necessity to rely on Turkism emerged, the main problem was the lack of a national bourgeoisie of the Turkish element, which was a great handicap. By the end of the 19th century, the Ottoman bourgeoisie had disintegrated due to intra-class tensions and ethnic-religious fragmentation. Different segments were experiencing a kind of harmony problem under the shadow of different national movements on behalf of the Ottoman political establishment (GÖÇEK, 1999: 297).

In the absence of a national bourgeoisie element on which the Turkish element could rely, the necessity of benefiting from the power within the state apparatus became the basis on which the formation of the nation-state was based. Since the Ottoman State's inclusion in the capitalist world economy was a result of free trade and different economic policies made possible through capitulations, the Turkish element showed a weak character in the economic field (ÇIZAKÇA, 1985: 371). Capitulations were trade agreements made between European states and the Ottoman State. In the 18th century, capitulations were the main factors that led to tax exemptions for non-Muslims and discontent among Muslim merchants. This situation led to both a decrease in tax revenues and internal turmoil (FAROQHI. 2010: 94-95). The new bourgeois classes that emerged with the development of trade and industry played important roles in nationalist movements and uprisings to the extent of the power they gained through these capitulations. In addition, due to their close relations with the West, this new class contributed greatly to the massification of these national values by engaging in educational and publishing activities among different peoples (STAVRIANOS, 1958: 145-146).

The Ottoman example was different from European examples in that the degree of homogeneity that could overlap the political and economic power of the bourgeoisie made it difficult to establish a new order due to ethnic, racial, and religious differences (GÖÇEK, 1999: 242). Ottomanism and Islamism policies were essentially the answers sought against this problem of fragmented society and homogeneity. However, by the end of the century, due to the national movements of Christian and other Muslim peoples and the independence of some of them, Turkism became the primary paradigm. At this historical turning point, Turkism, which played a central role in the formation of the nation-state, emerged as a result of a crisis in Islamism, incorporating Islamism at a practical and pragmatic level (ÜNLÜ, 2019).

Although these various attempts at establishment yielded different results, a common feature in all of them was the continuity of the modernization efforts within the military. The

presence of this common feature can be attributed to the fact that the Turkish element constituted the core bureaucracy, which played a fundamental role in the transition from empire to nation-state. The military-nation concept shaped by the bureaucratic elites has taken its place at the center of the new nation-state organization, and militaristic modernization has become the internal logic of the new nation-state with a certain continuity and through bureaucracy (ALTINAY and BORA, 2008: 140-142). The military modernization and the activities of the military cadres in the modernization process, together with the fact that these elements are under Turkish dominance, have given the color of militaristic modernization to the form of the nation-state in a way that will reveal itself in the process of Turkism. Since the state was controlled by an elite-bureaucratic class whose need to establish ideological ties with the masses was not limited to the influence of Islamic legitimacy among Muslims, the process in which the Turkish element came to the fore was also an effort regarding this legitimacy problem, especially in terms of suppressing this problem with militarist power (AKÇAM, 1993: 134).

Despite the bureaucratic cadres and the dominance of the army, the fact that the Ottomans were still a peasant society was the main handicap for the Turkist cadres. Since the peasant masses saw their identity as Muslim, the bureaucratic elites and the Young Turk cadres had to act pragmatically. Although these cadres were mostly modernist and positivist, they had to include Islamism and Muslim values pragmatically in their political agenda (AKÇAM, 1993: 135). Although initially constitutional and democratic, the Union and Progress Party administration, as the political articulation of the Young Turks, became increasingly nationalist and centrist under these conditions. After Islamism ended, they turned to Turkification policies that promoted Turkish identity and moved away from the egalitarian discourses of their first establishment. Behind this return to nationalism, the reactionism produced in the face of the fear of collapse and the end of expectations of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie being integrated into the state were important factors (KARLSON, 2012: 23-26).

The new bureaucratic class was also acting with the confidence of holding the state apparatus in its hands during the Turkism period, but the class composition limited this mobility (ORTAYLI, 1983: 83). The new modern bureaucracy was limited by the commercial bourgeoisie formed by non-Muslims, and their mobility was reduced by the external protection behind these communities. In the Turkism period, it was certain that there could be no compromise between the Turkish-Muslim bureaucracy and the commercial bourgeoisie formed by Christian minorities. These two separate components of society were completely separated

as two completely separate groups in the Turkism period, making it impossible for social integration to occur (GÖÇEK, 1999: 305-306).

The first signs of the formation of a new national community emerged in the context of the decline of the old imperial understanding and institutions in the Islamist period (DERINGİL, 2002). Since the Ottomanism, which was put into effect during the process of erosion of imperial institutions, did not produce satisfactory results for non-Muslims, the insecurity in the status of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie continued despite its increasing wealth. It continued to be in a fragile state, especially due to the lack of security of inheritance rights and the inability to ensure the continuity of its wealth, until the Turkism period (GÖÇEK, 1999: 207-208). However, during the Turkism period, this situation became overt and, as we will try to show in the following sections, it directly evolved into the practice of seizing non-Muslim properties.

The bourgeoisie was not only a source of difficulty for the Muslim-Turkish bureaucracy because it was non-Muslim, but it was also very fragmented and heterogeneous in terms of religion and ethnicity. Since the non-Muslim bourgeoisie belonged to many different peoples, such as Greeks, Armenians, and Jews, it was more difficult to manage. This heterogeneous class, which held the economic power, was not suitable for any negotiation or foundation project aimed at establishing a "nation-state". The coercive population policy, which the Union and Progress Party, which was the representative of the bureaucratic elite mentality at the end of the empire, was dragged into, became the initial stage of the Turkish nation-state under these conditions with the mobilization of homogenization practices (BELGE, 2012: 572-573). The reason for this perception of necessity and the acceptance of the political agenda related to it was that towards the end of the 19th century, the empire lost its financial control, and the tax administration came under the control of foreign powers that were the patrons of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie (GEORGEON, 2006: 8). Considering the dynamics that prepared these conditions, military reforms came to the forefront as the locomotive of modernization reforms in the minds of the bureaucratic elite (BELGE, 2012: 541).

Despite the reforms we have mentioned above, there was a significant need for financial power to transition to an army that was more technologically advanced and at the level of modern states (GÖÇEK, 1999: 115). In the Ottoman modernization process, there was no similar bourgeoisie in Western European examples, nor was there a landowner class like the Junkers of Prussia (BELGE, 2012: 14). Under these historical conditions, the traditional

Muslim ruling class, the civil servants, were barely able to maintain political sovereignty against imperialist powers (FINDLEY, 2020: 28-29).

In the second half of the 19th century, positions continued to be passed down from father to son in the military wing of the new bureaucracy, which was almost entirely composed of Muslims. This situation also reflected the security concerns of the state apparatus (GÖÇEK, 1999: 168-169). Since the emerging civilian Turkish national movement was a movement that prioritized state interests and was dominated by geostrategic concerns, it was implicitly and explicitly integrated with these new bureaucratic elites (GEORGEON, 2006: 18). In this context, the bifurcation between the state and civilian versions in the Islamism process was not experienced in the Turkism process. Both within the bureaucratic framework that emerged in the second half of the 19th century and under the influence of Turkism, the Union and Progress administration strengthened the role of the military in politics. This shift towards creating a militarized population became more prominent after the 1908 Revolution, which ended Sultan Abdulhamid II's reign and marked the rise of the Union and Progress Party (HANIOGLU, 2008: 162-164). The 1908 Revolution was a reaction to the Abdulhamid period, but it was also a combination of the reform tradition that developed since the Tanzimat period and the effectiveness of the military bureaucracy that pioneered military modernization (QUATAERT, 2010: 41-42).

Turkish nationalism, as seen in some late nationalisms, had a reactionary and aggressive character (AKÇAM, 1993: 37-39). The Union and Progress cadres, initially influenced by Ottomanism and later shifting towards Turkism, were influenced by Social Darwinism as they turned towards Turkism. Although they were influenced by positivism, their view of Islam as a practical tool to keep society together was seen as a necessity for survival in this context (HANİOĞLU, 1985: 620). The reason for this contradictory ideological formation seen in the Union and Progress cadres is that they lacked theoretical clarity for a long time. The only common point of these cadres was the motivation to overthrow the despotic rule of Sultan Abdulhamid, generally in the establishment and growth stages (KANSU, 1995: 32).

The main demand of this movement, which was the first organized opposition, was to reopen the parliament that Sultan Abdulhamid had closed, using the Russian War of 1878 as an excuse (BELGE, 2012: 554). During Abdülhamid’s reign, the Unionist cadres, who were initially committed to an egalitarian defense of the constitution, shifted their stance after coming to power, adopting a more authoritarian and Turkish nationalist approach. This transformation

was partly due to the political realities they faced. The egalitarian defense of the Ottoman constitution had, in part, been a pragmatic strategy for survival, given the pressures of the time. Although the 1902 Congress decisions had emphasized the protection of people's rights, freedoms, reforms, and the constitution, the Union and Progress Society, upon taking power, eliminated the non-centralist wing and adopted a strongly centralist and authoritarian character (ÇAVDAR, 1991: 19-20).

Although the Unionists initially seemed to take the idea of Ottoman citizenship as their basis, after 1908 they openly pursued a policy of modernizing the Turkish element and emphasizing the Turkish language in order to establish centralism (GEORGEON, 2006: 32). Especially after the Balkans were completely cut off, this attitude reached a point of no return (MARDIN, 2008: 25). The Unionists, who appeared to defend the rights of all peoples with their constitutionalism against the tyranny of Abdulhamid, changed their discourse and actions in order to consolidate their power in the extraordinary period following the Balkan Wars (1912-13). The hostile policies towards non-Muslims, which had previously been exposed under certain exceptional circumstances, gradually evolved into a continuity that reproduced and consolidated political sovereignty after the Balkan Wars (EROL, 2016: 122-123; KARLSON, 2012: 14-15). When all lands in the Balkans were lost in 1913, the "national economy" approach was established in the economy. Taking advantage of the war, capitulations were abolished, and laws were enacted that limited economic power to Muslim Turks. The aim of creating a national bourgeoisie through state intervention within the bureaucracy was established (GEORGEON, 2006: 19-20).

The communities that were influenced by Turkism formed in the 1880s later joined the Unionist cadres (MARDİN, 2008: 65). The initial aim of the organization was to provide for the interests of the society without making any distinctions of wealth, nationality, or sect. It was to re-establish the Constitutional Monarchy, protect human rights, spread education, and defend civilization (ÇAVDAR, 1991: 17-18). However, it also had a Muslim solidarity vein in its roots. The Union and Progress Society, founded in 1889 by students at the Military Medical School, later took the name of the Union and Progress Society. Its initial aim was to mobilize the Muslim youth around the empire (BOZARSLAN, 2005: 193-194). Later, with the support of the bureaucracy, the statist tendency increased among the Unionists, and they saw the opposition to the despotic rule of Abdulhamid and the transition to constitutional government as the most important step to ensure the salvation of the state (ÇAVDAR, 1991: 15-16).

The greatest bureaucratic support for the Unionists came from the army. This was because the Unionist cadres had a large military presence, and the Unionist cadres came to the forefront in modernizing the army and their importance within the state. Due to these circumstances, the Unionists made many reforms in this context. Despite the technology transfer and production efforts made in previous periods when the frequency of war was relatively low, the Ottoman Empire, which came under the control of the Young Turks when they came to power, fell behind European weapons technology despite all their efforts (ERICKSON, 2007: 154).

In 1908, the Unionists adopted an economic model that aimed to increase industrial production for the development of the country. Imports should be limited as much as possible and goods should be produced domestically (TOPRAK, 2014: 70). Despite this goal, the existing conditions were not suitable for its implementation. This decision was adopted under conditions where only 4% of merchants were Turkish (UĞUR and ERTAN, 2022: 35). It was envisaged that with the new national economic plan, the handicaps created by the liberal economic approach could be overcome and steps could be taken that would contribute to the country's economy. Following 1908, a consciousness emerged that the establishment of a customs barrier, coupled with a special tax, would safeguard the nation's economy from foreign competition (TOPRAK, 2014: 121).

During this period, the idea of developing the domestic arms industry and equipping the army with domestic equipment became dominant, but it did not yield successful results at the targeted level. Despite this, there was a development in not being dependent on a single country for ammunition supply (SABANCI, 2016: 150). In 1913, a special law was passed for the development of industry, and in 1914 it was decided to abolish the privileges given to foreigners (they were not actually abolished until 1923) (KARPAT, 2010: 172). [46]

[46] In the process that started after the Balkan Wars, the Ottomans advanced in producing cast iron and steel for the army. According to the reports of some high-ranking officers, the Ottomans were superior to the Balkan states in terms of weapons (SABANCI, 2016: 135). During this period, the Ottomans gave great importance to ammunition made of steel. A steel factory was established in the shipyard with German help (SABANCI, 2016: 213-214). In addition, German expertise was used for the Beykoz Tanneries and Shoe Factories that produced army uniforms and leather products (AYDIN and ZORLU, 2015: 742-743). During this period, out of necessity, cooperation with the Germans went beyond programs, training, arms sales, and technology transfer. German officers were scattered throughout the Ottoman Empire (ERICKSON, 2007: 11). Germany's control over military organization gradually increased. During this period, while England and Russia determined the fate of the Ottoman Empire, Germany's exclusion from this sharing process intensified sympathy towards the Germans (ORTAYLI, 1881: 118). On the other hand, economic power was particularly important for German foreign policy

Following the Balkan Wars, there was an increase in nationalist sentiments among the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) and the approach of holding non-Muslims, especially Greeks, responsible for military failures was established (EROL, 2016: 116-118). While the emerging anti-Western sentiments turned into a reaction against non-Muslims on the one hand, on the other hand, the idea of creating a Turkish bourgeoisie within the bureaucracy, corporatism, and the necessity of state intervention in the economy were established (HANİOGLU, 2008: 190-191). With this process, the Committee of Union and Progress began to establish banks that helped Muslim merchants accumulate capital (TOPRAK, 2022: 87).

This transformation of the Union and Progress movement, as will be attempted to be demonstrated in the following section, was a reflection of the Turkish national movement that was developing despite the fragmented population structure in Anatolia. Simultaneously, it was an expression of the state bureaucracy's transition from an establishment strategy based on Islamism to a new establishment strategy based on Turkism and a version of Turkism dissolved in it, based on a religious policy. The historical process in which Turkism was the dominant paradigm under the conditions of a fragmented society took shape under palliative solutions and reactionary collective actions shaped under the influence of efforts to establish a national economy. Under these conditions, social engineering and population homogenization emerged as both state policy and social action in the pursuit of nation-state formation. The defining characteristics of this process and its resulting impacts are analysed in the following section.

3.4.1. Initial of Demographic Engineering in Anatolia

As a phenomenon of the modern nation-state era, the homogenization of ethnic groups within the geography of political sovereignty was a widespread ethnic engineering practice of modern states. "The process of ethnic cleansing was shaped from top to bottom by the radical elites who ruled the states in the context of hierarchy, friendship and career relations, by the combination of paramilitary gangs and grassroots" (MANN, 2005: 6-21). A similar phenomenon to this widespread phenomenon was also experienced in the Ottoman example.

and created political interests. German war trade was at the center of the nexus between economic growth and expansionist foreign policy in the Ottoman market (YORULMAZ, 2014: 53-54). The supply of technical/military materials was of vital importance during the war. Enver Pasha, the leader of the ruling party, established new committees to accelerate exchanges with Germany. Certain roles and responsibilities were assigned, with an emphasis on effective communication and meticulous processing of orders. The importance of safe and fast supply was recognized by both sides (AYDIN and ZORLU, 2015: 747-748).

Following a systematic exile, a large part of the non-Muslim population was deported from their places in the Anatolian geography, and the ethnic homogenization process of the state apparatus was applied in a way that was oriented towards the given fragmented social structure (MANN, 2005: 140-145).

In the Ottoman case, the Greek and Armenian populations were the main obstacle to the state apparatus reacting against the Christian bourgeoisie. The state bureaucracy, thinking that this obstacle should be removed, wanted to forcibly remove the Armenian population and the Greek state through a diplomatic agreement (BORA, 2017: 217). Although a process was shaped for the Greeks that would eventually lead to an exchange through legal means, the Armenians were excluded from the geographical space of the new nation-state through force. The reason for wanting to remove both large populations from Anatolia was that the bourgeoisie and intellectuals from these populations were perceived as local supporters of imperialism (KEYDER, 2014: 86). The process leading to the forced displacement of the Armenian population and the exchange of the Greek population with Greece (with Muslims sent to Anatolia by Greece) were important steps toward achieving the ethnic homogeneity necessary for the Turkification of the economy (Bora, 2017: 174-175).

Behind this problem was the system of the traditional imperial order built on inequality. In the Ottoman nation system, Armenians, Assyrians, Greeks, and Jews could not serve in the army and also did not have the right to bear arms (SHIRINIAN, 2017: 19-20). Although they did not have the right to bear arms, in the process of establishing a modern state, this state of religious-ethnic fragmentation was perceived as a security problem and these communities were faced with harsh measures by the state (GÖÇEK, 1999: 84-85; SHIRINIAN, 2021: 175-176). One of the factors behind this fear was that the bourgeoisie class consisted of non-Muslims and that the non-Muslim population was especially dense in the capital, where the state bureaucracy was dense. While the population of the capital Istanbul reached 1.1 million, Greeks (152 thousand), Armenians (149 thousand) and Jews (44 thousand) had a population and foreign relations that would create the perception that they posed a danger with their existence (İPEK, 2011: 33).

Racist discourses, actions, and practices were present in the classical Ottoman Empire's establishment, as well as within the ideologies of Ottomanism and Islamism. These tendencies persisted, either implicitly or explicitly, under the Union and Progress administration, where Turkism gained prominence. However, there was no systematic program for the complete

destruction of the Armenians during this period (AKÇAM, 1993: 100). The Armenian massacres were a process characterized by the absence of a clear central plan. In the face of local collective violence, there was a bureaucratic apparatus that directed this violence. This direction was characterized by silence and non-intervention. There was no clear central strategy of destruction and no coordination based on the active participation of local administrators. While local massacres took place, the bureaucracy passively turned a blind eye (AKÇAM, 1993: 105-106). Collective violence turned into a cohesion factor when there was a need to create a temporary sense of unity among Muslims, Turks, and the bureaucracy (ASTOURIAN, 2021: 36-37).

Collective violence became continuous from the 1890s onwards and massacres took place between 1894-1896. The Armenian national movement was brutally suppressed by the Hamidiye units, which consisted of mostly Kurds (ZÜRCHER, 2017: 78). The incident that paved the way for the 1894-96 Hamidiye massacres occurred as a result of the resistance against the heavy taxes imposed by Sultan Abdulhamid II and the collective violence organized by the Kurdish tribes against this resistance. Armenian revolutionaries who resisted these conditions demanded equal rights and joined the armed resistance (KORKMAZ, 2021: 98-99). The massacres of 1895 were a precursor to a broader policy of ethnic homogenization (KIESER, 2020: 68-70). The demographic homogenization that was embodied in the later mass casualty was like a phase of the goal. The largest of these was seen in the mass killings committed by the locally allied forces backed by the bureaucracy that took place in Adana and Cilicia in 1909 (ASTOURIAN, 2021: 34-35).

After the major military defeat in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, the CUP directed the anger of Muslims towards non-Muslims. In 1914, there was a mass migration of Greeks and Bulgarians under these conditions, but the resulting unrest continued (ADANIR, 2015: 22). The Balkan Wars, along with the territorial losses in Bulgaria, Bosnia, and Albania, put the initial desire for reform (which was extremely limited) on hold and led to a military dictatorship. Along with this process, an aggressive Turkish nationalism emerged (KARLSON, 2012: 11-12). The Unionists forced the mass displacements and massacres in the Balkan Wars, and they ignited the process of the formation of a will to establish a Turkish-Muslim nation-state (KIESER, 2020: 65-66). Before the Balkan Wars, Muslim residents, who were less conscious of Turkish national identity, used the terms "Muslim" and "Turk" interchangeably (EROL, 2016: 105-106). However, in the process that began with the Balkan Wars and afterwards, Turkishness began to come to the fore. After the Balkan Wars, anti-Christian sentiment became

part of broader nationalist efforts to strengthen Ottoman Muslims (EROL, 2016: 119-121). During this process, the Unionists saw non-Muslim groups in the border regions as a threat during the Balkan Wars (1912-13) and evacuated non-Muslim villages (KAISER, 2005: 126-127). In addition to the transfer of Muslim populations to the border regions, attempts were made to ensure the escape of the Greek and Bulgarian populations piecemeal. In July 1913, the previously lost city of Edirne was returned to the Ottomans and violent actions began against the Greek and Bulgarian populations, and 150,000 Greeks were forced to flee due to these events (ÖZEL, 2020: 81-82; KIESER, 2020: 71-73).

At the end of this process, the complete loss of the Balkans and the complete migration of the Muslim population to Anatolia had a great impact on the transition to the establishment of Turkism. The oppression experienced by Muslims in the Balkans was effective in this consolidation effect. As a result of the Balkan Wars, approximately half a million Muslim population was displaced, but half of them were able to reach Anatolian lands (EROL, 2016: 134-136). Turkism, which was the product of the already alarmed Unionist cadres, acquired a more reactionary character under these conditions. Moreover, this alarm increased even more with the participation of some Armenians in the Russian forces on the eve of the World War. The Union and Progress administration, which turned into a de facto dictatorship under extraordinary conditions, began to directly target non-Muslim minorities (SHIRINIAN, 2017: 47-49). After affecting the Armenians and Greeks, this process led to the Assyrian massacres and the looting of Assyrian villages in April 1915 (KHOSROEVA, 2017: 120-121).

In 1913 and 1914, agreements were made between Bulgaria, Greece, and the Ottoman Empire for the population exchange. While World War I delayed the Greek exchange, Armenians faced mass deportations and massacres starting in 1915 (ADANIR, 2015: 23). Despite the exchange not being officially conducted, after 1914, the intelligence and action organization Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa used the method of intimidation to encourage the Greek population to flee. This practice led to a total of 150,000 Greeks leaving their places in Western Anatolia and settling on the islands in the Aegean Sea (KALIGAN, 2017: 98-99).

In the mutual conflicts during the reign of Abdulhamid or the massacres carried out by the Hamidiye Regiments, state policies and conflicts between ethnic and religious groups were deeply intertwined, and there was neither purely bureaucratic control from above nor could these be considered as spontaneous massacres of local people. These were processes that progressed through mutual interaction, connivance and encouragement (KORKMAZ, 2021:

113-114). During the Union and Progress period, the relationship between the central state structure and the peripheral social base intensified and consolidated. After most Ottoman soldiers died in hot conflicts with Russia in late 1914, the fear of Russian occupation within the Ottoman Empire turned towards the Armenian population and led to their being seen as internal enemies in the northeastern border regions that had to be destroyed for the security of the state (KAISER, 2005: 128-129). However, this situation was definitely not a deviation specific to the period and was a kind of result of historical conditions in which many factors overlapped, such as the hatred felt towards the non-Muslim bourgeoisie in the second half of the century, the reaction against the loss of position of the Muslim element that considered itself dominant in the Ottoman classical order, and the Muslim migration from the Ottoman periphery to Anatolia.

In early 1915, local authorities, fearing a rebellion from Armenian organizations in Cilicia, began small-scale Armenian deportations from Dörtyol-Zeytun to Konya. By mid-1916, the deportations had become even more massive (ÖZEL, 2020: 85-86). Kurds actively participated locally in the Armenian deportation. Muslim groups such as Kurds and, to a lesser extent, Albanians and Arabs settled in the areas left by the Armenians (KIESER, 2020: 78). In the state bureaucracy part of the deportation, the intelligence organization was active, and the state's acceptance of Armenians as an internal enemy was an effective factor in its actions at that time (ÖZEL, 2020: 89-92). Kurdish regiments, Circassian militias and local Union and Progress-led paramilitary groups generally acted together with this intelligence organization (ÖZEL, 2020: 100-101)

3.4.2. Efforts to Turkify the Economic Field at the End of Empire

Non-Muslims had limited social integration in the classical of the empire. Despite their increasing wealth through trade, their status was insecure, and they could not transfer their wealth to future generations (GÖÇEK, 1999: 207-208). Their security became even more precarious when their already fragile situation in the classical order was further compounded by the Muslim reaction that accumulated in the 19th century against the economic advantages they enjoyed, the influx of the Muslim population into Anatolia, which intensified in the second half of the century and reached its peak in the last quarter of the empire, and the exclusionary character of the emerging nation-state paradigm. This new paradigm imposed the necessity of homogenizing the fragmented Anatolian population within the political logic of the era. The fact that the fragmented society gained a more homogeneous character with the disappearance

of the Christian population from Anatolia was a transition period for the Turkification of the economy that would last from the end of the empire to the early republic and a leverage for the Ottoman bureaucracy in terms of the formation of the nation-state. In the process from Abdulhamid II to the Young Turks and later the Kemalist republic, power was centralized, the economy was Turkified (Islamized) and demographic homogenization took place. The position that the central bureaucracy gained at the end of the 19th century was due to its active role in this process. This transformation was a result of the central authority that was lost in the 18th century, the reactions towards the re-centralization in the 19th century and the dependence on competition in the interstate system of the capitalist world economy (KEYDER, 2014: 41).

When the need for the formation of a new founding will for the formation of the nation-state and the Turkification of the economy arose, the army became the main carrier and agent of the process. Although the soldier-nation myth/narrative of Islamic-Turkish historiography and the approach of continuity of an eternal state unity have been constructed as a historical narrative presented within the history of the army, which is assumed to have a history of thousands of years, it is essentially a historical narrative that was fermented in the conditions of the 19th century and later constructed retrospectively (KAFADAR, 2019). The need for the narrative of the army's eternal existence for thousands of years to become public opinion gradually became an essential need in the process of integrating into the capitalist world system in the 19th century, with the loss of territorial and political sovereignty. This new constitutive power, new establishment, made Turkism the founding principle of the new order as a belief that developed in the fear of the state's extinction. This process took place in a society where the concept of Ottoman citizenship was fragmented with the Tanzimat Edict (1839) and Islahat Edict (1856) in the 19th century (ÜSTEL, 2008: 27). In this context, militarist modernization in the 19th century was not only a technical issue in terms of the formation of the nation-state, but also a collection of attempts to solve the identity problem in general in terms of the fragmented Ottoman social order (BELGE, 2012: 540-541).

The Ottoman Empire's declaration of bankruptcy as a result of war losses and its becoming a peripheral state, the financial difficulties that emerged with military modernization in the 19th century, combined with the increasing hatred towards non-Muslims, led to the formation of a nation-state that can be defined as militarist modernization and a response to the self-identity crisis of the era (BELGE, 2012). It was of vital importance for the Ottoman bureaucracy to overcome the problem of financial dependency and to build the national economy, and reforms were made in this direction, as described above. When attempts to end

the capitulations failed, the inequality that was previously conducted indirectly against non-Muslims, who were seen as agents of the capitalist West, took the form of direct violence and intervention. The main motivation for this transformation was to obtain the capital accumulation accumulated in the hands of non-Muslims. The practice of targeting non-Muslims to support Muslim economic elites became increasingly widespread and gained momentum after the Young Turk Revolution in 1908. At the same time, influenced by Friedrich List's theoretical approach, the bureaucracy shifted towards an understanding that a state's local bourgeoisie should be protected through its economic policies (AGIR, 2022: 68-69).

"The constitutional government and free trade advocacy of New Ottomans like Namık Kemal (1840-88) and Şinası (1824-71) influenced state cadres throughout the 19th century, opposing a state-led economy. Sakızlı Ohannes Pasha criticized protectionism and statism, defending property rights and free enterprise. Mehmet Cavit Bey (1875-1926) later argued that the Ottoman state's development could only be achieved by integrating into the world economy and encouraging foreign capital" (ERDOĞAN, 2005: 32). Inspired by David Ricardo, Cavit Bey argued that the balance of payments would ultimately be balanced in light of the principle of relative superiority of countries (TOPRAK, 1985: 635). The Ottoman intellectuals of the Tanzimat period between 1838-1876 were generally in favor of classical economics. The classical economic understanding was defended with their articles defending the liberal economic understanding in the Ceride-i Havâdis magazine published in 1840. They defended the principle of mutual benefit and specialization in agriculture (DOĞAN, 2016). There was no radical break during the reign of Abdulhamid II (1876-1908). The first theoretical criticisms of the principles of free foreign trade in Ottoman economic thought were made by Musa Mehmetcanoğlu Akyiğitzade in the late 19th century. Inspired by Friedrich's List, he argued that the Ottoman Empire was an agricultural country but that it should not neglect industrialization (TOPRAK, 1985: 636-639). After the 1908 Revolution, members of the Chamber of Industry and the Turkish Homeland magazine defended the necessity of industrialization and the need to move away from being an agricultural country. They argued that the state could only be saved from the financial pressure from Europe through industrialization (TOPRAK, 1985: 1348-1349).

The aim of the new policy, which clearly revealed the necessity of creating a national economy in this process, was to get rid of the alliance of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie and the great imperialist powers (GEORGEON, 2006: 33). In this context, the Union and Progress cadres supported Muslim entrepreneurs after the Balkan Wars and encouraged the national

economic policy. In this process, it began to be accepted that supporting domestic capital was necessary for economic independence (TOPRAK, 1997). In this context, the practice of illegally seizing and selling the stocks of Armenian merchants would be seen as a solution at the end of the empire. Enrichment in this way became a quite common practice. Armenian goods were looted during the deportation, fermenting in the process after the Balkan Wars (1913) and gaining momentum after 1917 (KÉVORKIAN, 2021: 137-138). In this way, national economic initiatives that failed due to the difficulties brought by the war, inflation and economic collapse, military demands and excessive money printing were tried to be compensated. The seizure of non-Muslims' properties became a kind of capital accumulation strategy in this process (HANIOGLU, 2008: 192). This capital accumulation strategy was a wealth transfer strategy that emerged at the intersection of Turkish nationalism and population policies (SHIRINIAN, 2017: 38-39).

By 1913, the capital of foreign companies had reached ten times that of local companies. This was one of the main reasons for the reactionary character that the national movement gained from its development (GÖÇEK, 1999: 248-250). Under these conditions, the seizure of Armenian properties was like a kind of counter-capital accumulation strategy. This accumulation strategy was one of the final results of the anger against the non-Muslim bourgeoisie that emerged in the 19th century (KÉVORKIAN, 2021: 135-136). However, during this process, the Unionists in power cooperated with local forces instead of directly using the bureaucracy in the process of seizing these properties. The reason behind this choice was to facilitate the seizure of Armenian properties and at the same time to have the mass support that the new organization needed (KÉVORKIAN, 2021: 131-132).

The Armenian case was different, unlike the Jewish massacre, because the Ottoman State did not have strong ideological ties with the people and was conducted within a bureaucratically organized plan. The state, which was not sure of mass support, could not do this due to the lack of ideological ties (AKÇAM, 1993: 136). In this way, the transfer of capital accumulation to the Muslim population was ensured for the state, which lacked mass support, and cooperation was made with a significant part of the population for the mass support required for the new establishment. However, this did not mean that the bureaucracy was content with receiving mass support only as an observer and guide. A section of the bureaucracy, including the Union and Progress delegates, operated at the local level (KÉVORKIAN, 2021: 133-134).

According to Ziya Gökalp, who put forward the idea of Turkification of the economy, the national economy could only be possible by ensuring ethnic homogeneity (KORALTÜRK, 2011: 31). The process of homogenization of the national economy and population, the internal logic of which Ziya Gökalp pointed out, was experienced with intense demographic engineering in the period of 1912-1923. The process that started with the Armenian deportation (1915) and ended with the Turkish-Greek population exchange was the process in which the basic steps of homogenization of the population were taken. This process was the other side of the efforts to build the national economy that started after the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, which was population engineering (KORALTÜRK, 2011: 26-28). Although the desired results could not be achieved in the 1908-1913 period, after 1914, Muslim-Turkish elements began to own companies. Turks began to enter the business lines that the Greeks and Armenians who were under threat had vacated. In a way that would precede the same process, all privileges of foreign companies were terminated in 1914. This decision was an important step taken for the construction of the national economy (KORALTÜRK, 2011: 33-35). In addition, attempts were made to settle Turks in the villages vacated by Armenians whose property and animals were systematically confiscated (ÜNGÖR, 2016: 212-213).

The reactions that initially started with the boycott of non-Muslim goods in 1913-1914 became the clarification of the internal enemy status of non-Muslims that was later brought to the forefront in the context of mass threats. This process was not only a process of Muslims seizing non-Muslim properties, but also an expression of the clarification of the internal enemy status that assigned the political sovereignty of the new state (EROL, 2016: 139-142). The internal enemy status not only expressed an impetus that established political sovereignty, but also, for the first time, the new establishment had mass support, as it was realized in the form of wealth transfers through goods and properties seized through collective violence (KEVORKIAN, 2021: 122-123). Local conflicts or practices such as forced seizures, which mostly took place on a smaller scale before the Balkan Wars, were institutionalized during this period. The practice of legitimizing the collective violence of the old Ottoman regime was normalized and institutionalized during the Unionists period (KEVORKIAN, 2021: 127-128).

Conclusion

In order to understand the formation of the Turkish nation-state in the Ottoman Empire and the reasons for the delay of the national economy, we need to examine three overlapping

dynamics. The first is the long-standing tension between traditional center-periphery relations within the empire, centralization and decentralization, and its impact on the conditions of the 19th century. The second dynamic is the impact of the loss of territory and influence as a result of the failure to adapt to the military revolution in Europe and the decline in the state's capacity for action. The last dynamic was the conflict within the framework of the formation of advantaged and disadvantaged groups created by the Ottoman Empire's peripheral inclusion in the Capitalist World System. The conflict between the accumulation of economic power in the hands of non-Muslim groups that were advantaged in the process of insertion into the capitalist world economy and the Muslim-Turkish element that held the accumulation of military-political power was decisive as a reflection of this third dynamic.

In the classical period, the central state apparatus operated primarily in Anatolia and the Balkans. In other regions, territorial order, military organization, and state control of the economy did not occur. In this context, the centralization reforms implemented in response to the decentralization experienced in Anatolia and the Balkans in the 19th century and the militarist modernization at the center of these reforms were the determining factors in the formation of the nation-state form. The geographical space that would form the essence of the Turkish nation-state fundamentally developed within the framework of population movements and center-periphery dynamics in Anatolia and the Balkans.

After the loss of the Balkans, the remaining geographical space experienced homogenization based on the Muslim population, which became aligned with Turkish identity. This homogenization was driven by Muslim migration to Anatolia and the removal of the Christian population through force, threats, and mutual exchange agreements. This result was the final stage of the formation of the nation-state in terms of being an effort to cover up the accumulation of economic power and the accumulation of political power. The military modernization process and the state's reactionary character stemming from its belatedness which influenced the formation of the Turkish nation-state and its delayed national economy, were rooted in accumulated military reforms aimed at addressing tensions caused by missing the military revolution that peaked in Europe during the 16th-17th centuries. Bureaucratic transformations, militarist modernization, and top-down reforms undertaken to meet military needs and prevent the state's collapse contributed to the creation of the nation-state form in 19th century. This dynamic coincided with the process of peripheral integration into the capitalist world system in the 19th century. During this period, the non-Muslim bourgeoisie that seized economic power became the internal enemies of the nation-state at the final point of militarist

modernization. Non-Muslims became unwanted elements in the geography defined by the nation-state, with the perception of their economic power and foreign relations as a security problem.

The Ottoman Empire's transition from a regional power to a peripheral economy and dependent position within the global capitalist economy reflects both the continuity of pre-modern structures within the empire and the transformative impact of capitalism. Characterized by uneven exchange and increasing financial dependence on Europe, this change highlights the complexity of peripheralization, where local, regional, and global dynamics intersect. The empire's decline was influenced by the historical legacies of core-periphery relations within its geographical context and by the broader forces of global capitalist expansion. In the 19th century, as manufactured goods from Europe flooded the Ottoman market and its political sovereignty weakened under external pressure, the Ottoman Empire became a peripheral country on the verge of collapse. The bureaucracy and traditional craftsmen, who lost their power stemming from production in this process, reacted and resisted this process. Despite this resistance, financial bankruptcy, financial dependency, the collapse of political sovereignty and the delay in centralization were experienced at the end of the century.

The main factor in the formation of this result and the failure of the resistance and top-down reforms was the lack of overlap between the non-Muslim bourgeoisie and the Turkish-Muslim bureaucracy. This conflict between the accumulation of military-political power and economic power was the most fundamental obstacle to the military, political, economic, and social reforms of the empire. The fragmented population structure, which enabled the formation of the incompatibility between these two accumulations of power, was the main obstacle to the emergence of the nation-state. The main geographical area in the process of peripheralization of the empire was the Balkans and Anatolia because in the classical period and in the decentralization era of the 18th century, the social, economic, and political sovereignty of the Ottoman state in other geographical regions was extremely limited or symbolic. In the 18th century, when decentralization reached its peak, Ottoman sovereignty became problematic even in the Balkans and Anatolia. The center-periphery dynamics within the Ottoman Empire were different in each geography due to local conditions, geographical conditions, and the action capacity of the central power. Since different coercion-capital relations were experienced in each geography, there were different core-periphery relations. The economic and social character of the state varied from geography to geography. Each differentiated geography had a different state-economy relationship in terms of socio-economic, physical or proximity and

distance to the bureaucratic state apparatus. Anatolia and the Balkans were geographies where the state made its presence felt more strongly in economic and social areas. In the Balkans, there was an economic and social transformation shaped by feudal tendencies, de facto autonomy, and flexible relations of the central state apparatus.

Anatolia, on the other hand, was the geography where the security concerns of the Ottoman state apparatus were at the highest level and therefore the most brutal. The impact of the Ottoman state apparatus on economic and social areas was limited in the Middle East and less effective in North Africa. In this respect, the core regions of the empire were Anatolia and the Balkans. However, while the action capacity of the state decreased throughout the 18th century, the power of local landowners and elites increased. In the 19th century, when the Ottoman Empire became peripheral, the state apparatus was faced with the necessity of making centralization moves after the decentralization crisis.

If the differences in the geographical structure of the state apparatus and the differences in the power-capital relations within these differences are ignored, the process of integration of the Ottoman Empire into the world economic system cannot be fully understood. For the Ottoman Empire, the transformation forms and rhythms in the Anatolian and Balkan geographies were different due to the geographical differentiation of political control. One of the fundamental determinants of the integration process into the capitalist world system was the geographical heterogeneity in the state's intervention in the economic sphere, which it had had since the classical period. The Balkans, one of the two core geographies of the state, differed from Anatolia due to the earlier integration rhythm of powerful local families, large landowners, and plantation-like farms into the world economic system. In the 19th century, when the influence of the state apparatus was increasingly limited to Anatolia, the geographical extension of the transition process from empire to nation-state was framed by Anatolia.

In this context, despite the failure experienced in the industrialization reforms initiated by state intervention in the 19th century, the fundamental problem was the necessity of ensuring centralization even in Anatolia and the Balkans, which were the core geographies of the empire. As a result of the state's limited mobility within the geography, territorial losses and the security crisis caused by separatist national movements, the main agenda of the state bureaucracy became the effort to prevent the collapse of the state. During this period, the bureaucracy tried to prevent the collapse of the state with new ideological frameworks such as Ottomanism based on equal citizenship, Islamism based on Muslim solidarity and finally Turkism based on the

active Turkish element in the army and bureaucracy against both the process of peripheralization and separatist national movements. These attempts to protect the empire were also an expression of the formation stages and birth pangs of the Turkish nation-state that emerged within the empire. Ottomanism could not stop the separation of Christian nations. After this failure, Islamism was established as a new ideology aiming to unite the Muslim populations of the empire. However, this attempt was also ineffective because national separatist movements emerged among non-Turkish Muslims. Shaped by the Turkish and Muslim elites who dominated the military and civil bureaucracy of the state, Turkism both used Islamism practically and pragmatically and came to the fore with a claim of a founding power that highlighted a new Turkish identity. As an ideological-political framework in which civil bureaucratic cadres and militarist cadres actively participated, Turkism became the active agents of the process of the embodiment of the modern nation-state within a historical process in which Christian communities largely disappeared from Anatolia.

As Anatolia became predominantly Muslim, the Christian presence was reduced to a minimum. This ended the long-standing conflict between the non-Muslim bourgeoisie and the Turkish-Muslim bureaucracy under Turkism. Non-Muslim properties and businesses were seized by other population layers, marking not just a wealth transfer, but a state-society cooperation that built consent and formed the social base of the new nation-state. Population homogenization, wealth transfer, and national economy building emerged together through this dialectic. This process was driven by a bureaucratic-militarist modernization rooted in 19th-century army and bureaucracy reforms, extending into politics, economy, and society. In the empire-to-nation-state transition, wealth transfer accelerated under bureaucratic leadership, forming a national bourgeoisie. Military-civilian bureaucracy and societal segments jointly led local violence during de-Christianization, showing their role in wealth transfer.

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