

IEE 886 Organização Industrial – Prof. Marcelo Resende – PPGE-IE-UFRJ –

Objetivos

Fornecer fundamentos formais associados a diferentes aspectos de teoria de oligopólio e competição imperfeita mediante a combinação de discussões mais gerais contidas em livros-texto e detalhamento de certos artigos-chave (indicados com *)

Ementa

1. Introdução, 2. Modelos Tradicionais de Oligopólio, 3. Complementos à Teoria do Oligopólio, 4. Teoria Dinâmica de Oligopólio, 5. Modelos de Dinâmica Industrial, 6. Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento

Programa

1. Introdução: Contextualização Básica do Campo de Organização Industrial

Tirole (1988) – introdução, Martin (2002) – cap. 1

2. Modelos Tradicionais de Oligopólio

2.1 – Caracterização inicial de modelos estáticos de Cournot e Bertrand e alguns aspectos básicos de estabilidade

Martin (2002) – cap. 2

2.2 – Modelos estáticos de oligopólio sob a ótica de Teoria dos Jogos

Gibbons (1992), Klemperer e Meyer (1986), Tirole (1988) – cap. 5, Martin (2002) – cap. 3

3. Complementos à Teoria do Oligopólio

3.1 – Modelos de diferenciação de produto

Hotelling, H. (1929), D'Aspremont et al. (1979), Salop (1979), Tirole (1988) - cap.

7, Martin (2002) – caps. 3 e 4

3.2 – Propaganda

Butters (1977), Milgrom e Roberts (1986), Gibbons (1992) – cap.4, Martin (2002) – cap. 9

3.3 – Busca, dispersão de preços e custos de mudança

Varian (1980), Klemperer (1987)

4. Teoria Dinâmica de Oligopólio

4.1 – Colusão tácita

Green e Porter (1984), Rotemberg e Saloner (1986), Tirole (1988) - cap.6, Gibbons (1992) - cap.2, Bagwell e Staiger (1997), Martin (2002) – cap. 10

4.2 – Mecanismos facilitadores

Cooper (1986), Sklivas (1987)

5. Modelos de Dinâmica Industrial

Jovanovic (1982), Hopenhayn (1992)

6. Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento

Loury (1979), Tirole (1988), cap. 10, Martin (2002) – cap. 14

Bibliografia

Bagwell, K., Staiger, R.W. (1997), Collusion over the Business Cycle, *RAND Journal of Economics*, 28, 82-106 (*)

Bagwell, K., Wolinsky, A. (2002), Game theory and industrial organization, In R. J. Aumann & S. Hart (eds.), *Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications*, and vol. 3, chapter 49, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1851-1895

Butters, G. (1977), Equilibrium distribution of sales and advertising prices, *Review of Economic Studies*, 465-491 (*)

Cooper, T.E. (1986), Most-favored-customer pricing and tacit collusion, *RAND Journal of Economics*, 17, 377-388 (*)

Dal Bó, P. (2007), Tacit collusion under interest rate fluctuations, *RAND Journal of Economics*, 38, 533-540 (*)

D'Aspremont, C., Gabszewicz, J.J., Thisse, J.F. (1979), On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition", *Econometrica*, 47, 1145-1150 (*)

Gibbons, R. (1992), *Game Theory for Applied Economists*, Princeton: Princeton University Press (**)

Green, E.J., Porter, R.H. (1984), Noncooperative collusion under imperfect price information, *Econometrica*, 52, 84-100 (*)

Jovanovic, B. (1982), Selection and the evolution of industry, *Econometrica*, 50, 649-670

Hopenhayn, H. (1992), Entry, exit and firm dynamics in long-run equilibrium, *Econometrica*, 60, 1127-1150 (*)

Hotelling, H. (1929), Stability in competition, *Economic Journal*, 39, 41-57 (*)

Klemperer, P. (1987), Markets with consumer switching costs, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 102, 375-394 (*)

Klemperer, P., Meyer, M. (1986), Price competition vs. quantity competition: the role of uncertainty, *RAND Journal of Economics*, 17, 618-638 (*)

Loury, G.C. (1979), Market structure and innovation, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 93, 395-410 (*)

Martin, S. (2002), *Advanced Industrial Economics*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2^a ed. (**)

Milgrom, P., Roberts, J. (1986), Price and advertising signals in product quality, *Journal of Political Economy*, 94, 796-821

Rotemberg, J.J., Saloner, G. (1986), A supergame-theoretic model of price wars during booms, *American Economic Review*, 76, 390-407

Salop, S. (1979), Monopolistic competition with outside goods, *Bell Journal of Economics*, 19, 141-156 (*)

Shaked, A., Sutton, J. (1982), Relaxing price competition through product differentiation, *Review of Economic Studies*, 49, 3-13 (*)

Sklivas, S.D. (1987), The strategic choice of managerial incentives, *RAND Journal of Economics*, 18, 452-458 (*)

Sutton, J. (1991), *Sunk Costs and Market Structure: Price Competition, Advertising, and the Evolution of Concentration*, Cambridge-MA: MIT Press

Sutton, J. (1998), *Technology and Market Structure: Theory and History*, Cambridge-MA: MIT Press

Sutton, J. (2007), Market structure: theory and evidence, In M. Armstrong & R. Porter (eds.), *Handbook of Industrial Organization*, vol. 3, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 2301-2368

Tirole, J. (1988), *Theory of Industrial Organization*, Cambridge-MA: MIT Press (**)

Varian, H. (1980), A model of sales, *American Economic Review*, 70, 651-659 (*)

Avaliação

Serão realizadas 2 provas para fazer em casa constituídas de exercícios referentes aos modelos discutidos no curso